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ABSTRACT
Chapter one is divided in two parts. Part 1 
examines the component elements of the model 
company. Part 2 examines the way in which the 
model company hypothesized in Part 1 has been 
eroded. The chapter concludes that a combination 
of judicial interpretation and statutory 
intervention regarding the elements of the model 
has made it unworkable. Chapter two focuses on 
the model legal control element of the company, 
the board of directors. It examines firstly the 
model function of the board. It then examines 
how the exercise of the directors' managerial 
discretion can be interfered with by the
members. It concludes that the board has been
degraded to a secondary organ. Chapter three 
examines the effect of the institutional 
investor on the degraded model legal structure. 
It concludes that the presence of a large 
shareholder within the company with interests 
other than those of the company to pursue, has 
a further degrading effect on the model legal 
structure of incorporated companies. Chapter 
four focuses on the directors duty to act "bona 
fide in the interests of the company" and finds 
that the judicial definition of that duty has 
considered the shareholders interest as
paramount. Here the directors' discretion within 
this duty to make decisions based on the long 
term or future interests of the shareholders has 
been eroded by remuneration schemes designed to 
create a concurrence of interests between the 
shareholders and the directors. Thus the
directors have a duty to act in the interest of 
the shareholders, the majority of whom, within 
public limited companies, are institutional. 
Chapter five considers the conclusions from each 
of the above chapters and examines one 
particular example where the eroded model can be 
clearly seen. This chapter recommends regulating 
private and public companies separately and 
suggests some potential answers to the eroded 
model legal structure.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE EROSION OF THE MODEL LEGAL COMPANY.
Part 1.
1.0 The Model Legal Company.
This chapter describes a model of the limited 
company. To do so the chapter is divided into two parts. 
In Part 1 the thesis describes the component elements of 
the model company. In Part 2 the thesis examines the way 
the component elements of the model have been eroded to 
the point that the basic model hypothesized in Part 1 no 
longer exists. Part 2 concludes that the model company is 
now unworkable.
The thesis turns to examine three aspects of the 
model company. It begins with the decision of the House 
of Lords in SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) 
where the company was held to be a legal entity, separate 
and distinct from its members. Thus once the requirements 
of the Companies Acts with regard to incorporation are 
complied with, a separate legal entity comes into 
existence.
The second element of the model company consists of 
the constitution of the company, the memorandum and 
articles of association. The memorandum provides the 
legal entity with its purpose through the objects clause. 
The articles of association provide the ownership and 
control structure of the company (the board of directors
1
and general meeting), they regulate the interaction of 
those organs of the company, as well as providing a
statement of the rights and obligations of the members
and the company to each other.
The third element of the model arises from the
decision in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461. There it 
was held that the only the company could maintain
proceedings in respect of wrongs done to it. Thus FOSS V 
HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461, sustains and compliments
both the decision in SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [1897] A.C.
22 (H.L.), and the ownership and control mechanisms in
the articles of association by placing the cause of 
action in the company. Thus if the organs of the company 
do not instigate an action for a wrong to the company as 
a legal entity, no action can be brought.
1.1 The Decision in SALOMON V SALOMON.
The facts of the case were as follows. Salomon
carried on a business as a leather merchant. In 1892 he 
formed the company Salomon & Co. Ltd. Salomon, his wife 
and five of his children were the members. The members of 
the family apparently holding the shares as nominees for 
Salomon. Salomon was also the managing director. The 
newly incorporated company purchased the leather business 
and the company immediately ran into difficulties. One 
year later the company was in liquidation and its assets
2
were insufficient to discharge its liabilities to its
unsecured creditors. The liquidator, on behalf of the
unsecured creditors, brought an action alleging that the 
company was but a sham and a mere "alias" for Salomon. 
The Court of Appeal upheld this claim in doing so they 
looked at the motives of the promoters and members of the 
company, and as such Salomon was liable to indemnify the 
company against its trading debts.
The House of Lords unanimously reversed that
decision. It held that the company was validly formed
according to the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, which 
only required that there be seven members, holding one 
share each. The business thus belonged to the company and 
not to Salomon. Salomon was an agent of the company, not 
the company his agent. Lord Halsbury L.C. stated at 
p . 31: -
[e]ither the limited company was a legal entity 
or it was not. If it was, the business belonged 
to it and not to Mr. Salomon. If it was not, 
there was no person and no thing to be an agent 
at all; and it is impossible to say at the same 
time that there is a company and there is not.
The decision established that the company was a legal 
entity which was at law a different person altogether 
from the members. It has therefore a definable interest 
which is separate from its members.1
1 On the issue of the separate legal personality of the 
company, see Ussher (1986: pp.16-57) and Pennington (1985: pp.46- 
52) .
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In giving his reasons for overturning the decision 
of the Court of Appeal, Lord Macnaghten stated:-
[t]he company is at law a different person 
altogether from the subscribers ...; and, 
though it may be that after incorporation the 
business is precisely the same as it was 
before, and the same persons are managers, and 
the same hands receive the profits, the company 
is not in law the agent of the subscribers or 
trustee for them. Nor are the subscribers, as 
members liable, in any shape or form, except to 
the extent and in the manner provided by the 
Act.
The importance of the case lies in the consequence 
which flow from the decision.
They can be articulated as follows: the fact that
some of the subscribers to the memorandum and articles 
are mere nominees is irrelevant; the machinery of the 
Companies Acts may be used by an individual to carry on 
what is in economic reality his business; the company 
formed in compliance with the regulations of the 
Companies Acts is a separate person and not per se the 
agent or trustee of its' controller.
The application of the judgment can be seen in the 
following cases.
In MACAURA V NORTHERN ASSURANCE CO. [1925] A.C. 619 
the appellant sold all the timber on his estate to a 
company in return for the issue to him of the whole share 
capital of the company. The appellant then later insured 
the timber with a policy taken out in his own name. The 
timber was destroyed by fire some time later. The
4
insurance company contended that he had no insurable 
interest in the timber. Lord Wrenbury agreeing with the 
insurance company's contention, stated that a member
2
[1940]
even if he holds all the shares is not the
corporation and neither he nor any creditor
of the company has any property legal or 
equitable in the assets of the corporation.
In BATTLE V IRISH ART PROMOTION CENTRE LTD. [196 8]
I .R . 252 the defendant company was being sued but had no 
assets with which to defend the action. The managing 
director, who was also the major shareholder, wished to 
conduct the defence of the company. He maintained that a 
judgment in default against the company would reflect on 
his standing and reputation in the business community. 
The court considered this. O'Dalaigh C.J. dismissed the 
request stating
[t] his is an infirmity of the company which 
derives from its own very nature. The creation 
of the company is the act of its subscribers; 
the subscribers, in discarding their own 
personae for the persona of the company, 
doubtless did so for the advantages which 
incorporation offers to traders. In seeking 
incorporation they thereby lose the right of 
audience which they would have as individuals; 
but the choice has been their own... [He] cannot 
as major shareholder and managing director now 
substitute his persona for that of the 
company.2
Thus, as in PEARLBERG AND O'BRIEN [1982] Crim. L.R. 829,
it is possible for a member to steal from his own
See also GENERAL ACCIDENT CORPORATION V MIDLAND BANK LTD.
3 ALL E.R. 252.
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company.3
The principle that the company is a separate legal 
entity lies at the heart of the model company. It impacts 
on the other elements of the model and must be kept in 
mind as the thesis now turns to consider the second 
constituent of the model company.
1.2 The Mémorandum, Articles of Association and Section 
25 .
The Memorandum.
The model company constitution is contained in the 
Companies Act 1963 in the form of the memorandum 
(sections 5-10) and also the articles of association 
(sections 11-15) which creates a management and ownership 
structure and regulates the behaviour of the organs.
It is from the memorandum of association, after the 
registration procedure is complied with, that the company 
defines its existence as a separate legal entity.4
More specifically section 5 (1) of the 1963 Act,
states that : -
any seven or more persons or, where the company 
to be formed will be a private company, any two 
or more persons associated for any lawful
3 See ATT-GEN. REFERENCE (NO.2 OF 1982) [1984] 2 W.L.R. 447; 
and RE SULLIVAN [1984] Crim. L.R. 405. For an analysis of the 
difficulties surrounding this type of corporate theft, see 
Jefferson (1993: pp.180-181) and Virgo (1991: pp.464-489).
4 SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.).
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purpose may, by subscribing their names to a 
memorandum of association and otherwise 
complying with the requirements of this Act 
relating to registration, form an incorporated 
company, with or without liability.
The act of association is formalised and acknowledged 
legally through the subscription to the memorandum and 
compliance with the registration procedure.
The requirements as to the content of the memorandum 
are set out in section 6:-
[t]he memorandum of every company must state-- 
(a) in the case of a public limited company, 
the name of the company, with 'public limited 
company' or 'cuideachta phoibli theoranta' as
the last words of the name;....
(c) the objects of the company.
Section 6 (2) states, that if the company is limited by
shares the memorandum must also state that the liability 
of its members is limited.
Where a company has a share capital section 6 (4)
states:-
the memorandum must also, unless the company is 
an unlimited company, state the amount of share 
capital with which the company proposes to be 
registered, and the division thereof into 
shares of a fixed amount;
The subscribers to the memorandum must take at least one 
share each, (section 6 (4) (b)) and must write opposite
to his name the number of shares he takes, (section 6 (4)
(c) ) .
The Companies Act 1963 places the control over the
alteration of the company's constitutional document (the 
memorandum) in the hands of the members. Section 10 (1)
states:-
[s]ubject to subsection (2) [an application to court 
to cancel an alteration of the memorandum], a 
company may, by special resolution, alter the 
provisions of its memorandum abandoning, restricting 
or amending any existing object or adopting a new 
object and any alteration so made shall be valid as 
if originally contained therein, and be subject to 
alteration in like manner.
The legal entity has thus a purpose to pursue, 
defined in the objects clause. If the company trades 
outside of the objects clause, the transaction will be 
ultra vires and void.5 Thus in RE JON BEAUFORTE (LONDON) 
LTD. [1953] Ch. 131 the company was established to 
manufacture costumes and gowns. It traded as a 
manufacturer of veneer panels. No change had been made to 
the objects clause. The note-paper of the company 
described the company as a veneer panel manufacturer. The 
company went into liquidation and the trade creditors of 
the company sought to be paid for goods and services 
supplied to the company. They were met with the argument 
that the transactions were outside the objects and 
therefore void. It was held that the trade creditors were 
not entitled to be paid. They had actual notice of the 
business being carried on (the note-paper) and 
constructive notice that the business was not within the
5 Or if as in RE GERMAN DATE COFFEE CO. (1882) 20 Ch. D.
169, (C.A.) the objects of the company can no longer be obtained,
the company must be wound up.
8
company's objects.6 Thus once the company goes beyond its 
defined objects the transaction will be ultra vires and 
void.7
The Articles of Association.
Another part of the second element of the model 
company is the articles of association which regulates 
the internal administration of the company. Here the 
thesis examines three aspects of the articles. The 
separation of ownership and control, the regulation of 
the interaction of the organs and the residual function 
of the general meeting.
Section 11 of the Companies Act 1963 (as amended by 
section 2 of the Companies (Amendment) Act 1982) provides 
for the registration of articles of association with the 
memorandum, "signed by the subscribers to the memorandum 
and prescribing regulations for the company."
The Companies Act 1963 contains a model set of 
regulations and provides in section 13 (1) that
" [a] rticles of association may adopt all or any of the 
regulations contained in Table A. " Further to this 
section 13 (2) provides that:-
ti] n the case of a company limited by shares 
and registered after the operative date, if 
articles are not registered or, if articles are
6 See also RE INTRODUCTIONS LTD. [1970] Ch. 199 (C.A).
7 For an examination of the history and nature of the ultra 
vires rule, see Mac Cann (1992: pp.79-86) .
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registered, in so far as the articles do not 
exclude or modify the regulations contained in 
Table A, those regulations shall, so far as 
applicable, be the regulations of the company 
in the same manner and to the same extent as if 
they were contained in duly registered 
articles.
The articles must comply with section 14 of the 1963 
Act and "be signed by each subscriber to the memorandum 
in the presence of at least one witness who must attest 
the signature." Section 15 (1) places the control of the 
internal regulations in the hands of the general meeting 
in that it states "a company may by special resolution 
alter or add to its articles".
Incorporation has a critical effect on the 
contractual nexus of the members and the company. This is 
set out in section 18 (2)
[f]rom the date of incorporation mentioned in the 
certificate of incorporation, the subscribers of the 
memorandum, together with such other persons as may 
from time to time become members of the company, 
shall be a body corporate with the name contained in 
the memorandum, capable forthwith of exercising all 
the functions of an incorporated company, and having 
perpetual succession and a common seal, but with 
such liability on the part of the members to 
contribute to the assets of the company in the event 
of its being wound up as is mentioned in this Act.
Thus the 1963 Act details the model company's legal 
personality as defined by SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [1897] 
A . C . 22 (H.L.) . Once the incorporation procedure is
complied with the company is a separate legal entity.
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The Separation of Ownership and Control.
One aspect of the model that is significant, is 
contained within the articles of association.8 This is 
the separation of the ownership and control powers.9
The model company has two organs, the members in 
general meeting and the board of directors. The
management powers are delegated to the board by the 
members, but with some functions reserved by the members 
in general meeting.10 Thus management can operate the day 
to day function of the company subject to the continuing 
approval of the members.
The Irish Table A articles were substantially
adopted from the Table A articles contained in the U.K
Companies Act 1948. The Table A articles in the U.K Act 
constructed a model along the lines of the neo-classical 
theory of the firm, where the company is a "black box" 
owned by the shareholders and managed on their behalf by 
directors who take various factors of production, combine 
them and create new products (Tomlinson (1986: p.220)) .
The primary feature of the Irish Table A is that it 
maintains this neo-classical model by creating through 
Article 80, a company which consists of two organs, the 
general meeting and the board of directors.11 The
8 See the Companies Act 1963, Table A.
9 Article 80.
10 See below at p.18, The Residual Function of the General 
Meeting.
11 Article 80.
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managerial power which is inherent in the ownership 
rights of the members, is delegated upwards from the 
general meeting to the board of directors, residual power 
residing in the organ of the general meeting.
It should be noted that a company limited by shares 
is not required to register articles on formation.12 It 
is, though, almost invariably the case that a company 
will register articles upon formation. If the company 
does not register a set of articles on formation then it 
is deemed to have adopted Table A.13 Even where a company 
does register articles on formation, it is deemed, as 
provided in section 13, to adopt Table A anyhow, except 
where modified or excluded. It is normal in practice for 
most companies to adopt Table A with some amendments. In 
all cases the articles contain a separation of ownership 
and control.14
The importance of Table A in shaping the law with 
regard to companies is best put by Ussher when he 
states:-
[m] ost of the regulations in Table A have a 
long history, going back to the 1908 [Companies 
(consolidation)] Act and beyond, and therefore,
12 Companies Act 1963, section 11 (as amended by section 2 
of the Companies (Amendment) Act 1982).
13 Companies Act 1963, section 13.
14 The Council of The Stock Exchange currently requires the 
articles of each quoted company to comply with the provisions set 
out in The Yellow Book (1994). Those provisions concern 
amendments to Table A. They relate specifically to the separation 
of the ownership-control elements of the company.
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though they may not be law, a body of law has 
grown up around them as a result of their 
interpretation in the many jurisdictions 
possessing the British company law heritaqe 
(1986: p.62).
Flynn (1991: pp.101-102) while exploring the apparent
divergence between the wording of article 80 and its 
interpretation in the case law, notes the traditional 
assumptions regarding ownership and control. He states:-
[a]ny consideration of the power relationships 
within the corporation should initially focus 
on the way in which the directors and other 
members of the managerial group actually 
interact with the general shareholding body. 
The importance of this relationship is rooted 
in our corporate law system's standard reaction 
to these groups, treating them as the sole 
constituent elements of the corporate entity, 
simultaneously denying other corporate 
constituencies any relevance, let alone power.
The "corporate law system's standard reaction" as 
Flynn identified above has evolved from the model legal 
structure set out in the Table A articles contained in 
the Companies Act 1963.15
Thus Gower (1979: p.10) refers to a model company
where ownership is separated from control, when he makes 
the following general comment:-
[t]oday the great bulk of industrial enterprise 
is in the hands not of individual entrepreneurs 
but of large public companies in which many 
individuals have property rights as
shareholders and to the wealth of which they 
have directly or indirectly contributed. 
Investments in companies probably constitute
15 Companies Act 1963, First Schedule.
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the most important single item of property, but 
whether this property brings profit to its 
owners no longer depends on their energy and 
initiative but on that of the management from 
which they are divorced. The modern shareholder 
has ceased to be a quasi-partner and has become 
instead simply a supplier of capital.
The vesting of the control power upwards to the directors 
occurs in Table A article 80. It states
[t]he business of the company shall be managed 
by the directors, who may pay all expenses 
incurred in promoting and registering the 
company and may exercise all such powers of the 
company as are not, by the Companies Act 19 63 
to 1983 or by these regulations, required to be 
exercised by the company in general meeting, 
subject, nevertheless, to any of these 
regulations, to the provisions of the Act and 
to such directions, being not inconsistent with 
the aforesaid regulations or provisions, as may 
be given by the company in general meeting; but 
no direction given by the company in general 
meeting shall invalidate any prior act of the 
directors which would have been valid if that 
direction had not been given.
It should be noted that the powers of management are 
vested in the directors as a board, not in the directors 
as individuals.
In SALMON V QUIN & AXTENS LTD. [1909] 1 Ch. 311.
(C.A.); [1909] A.C. 442, (H.L.) it was accepted that the
general meeting cannot interfere with the powers of the 
board unless they act in conflict with the Companies Acts 
or the articles.16 The general meeting can of course 
amend the powers of the directors through a special 
resolution or remove the directors through an ordinary
16 The directors cannot do anything illegal or ultra vires.
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resolution.17
Regulation of the Interaction Between the Board of 
Directors and the General Meeting.
Table A articles 92-100 provide for the retirement 
of directors by rotation and their re-election by the 
general meeting. Any casual vacancies may be filled until 
the next general meeting, and both the board and the 
general meeting may appoint additional directors. Power 
to remove a director lies with the general meeting, who 
may do so by ordinary resolution. A member or members 
holding 51 per cent of the voting shares in the company 
can be sure of electing the whole of the board or at 
least having a veto over the membership of that board.
The ownership organ of the company is created by 
Table A regulations 47-50. The company is required to 
"each year hold a general meeting as its annual general 
meeting in addition to any other meeting in that year."18 
Thus the members of the company must meet at least once 
a year to exercise their control function. Regulation 49 
states that "all general meetings other than annual 
general meetings shall be called extraordinary general 
meetings" and regulation 50 places the power to call a 
general meeting in the hands of the directors who "may, 
whenever they think fit, convene an extraordinary general
17 Even a director for life can be removed if the articles 
are amended by special resolution.
18 Regulation 48.
15
meeting" .19
Regulation 5 0 also provides for the members to 
requisition an extraordinary general meeting in 
accordance with the Companies Act 1963, section 132, 
which provides that:-
[t] he directors of a company, not withstanding 
anything in its articles, shall, on the requisition 
of members of the company holding at the date of the 
deposit of the requisition not less than one-tenth 
of such of the paid up capital of the company as at 
the date of the deposit carries the right of voting 
at general meetings of the company..., forthwith 
proceed to convene an extraordinary general meeting.
Thus the intention is that the shareholder, through 
his participation in the general meeting, may exercise 
control or have an input into the exercise of control. 
The exercise of this control is limited by the fact that 
there is only one compulsory general meeting each year, 
and the right to call a general meeting is limited to the 
directors and those members who fulfil the share 
qualification in section 132 of the Companies Act 1963.
The articles define the general meeting as the unit 
of ownership. They go on to regulate its conduct and 
interaction with the board of directors. The following 
paragraphs detail the procedural aspects of the general 
meeting's powers.
Table A regulation 51 provides minimum notice
19 Failure by the directors to call a meeting may lead to 
shareholder action, see Milman (1988: pp.186-187), and Fox (1988:
pp.1261-1262) .
provisions for the annual general meeting of 21 days and 
14 days for all other general meetings. These notice 
provisions are clearly intended to curb abuses of the 
directors' power to call general meetings and to give the 
members adequate time to arrange to attend a meeting.
The proceedings at general meetings are governed by 
regulations 53 to 62. These regulations provide that no 
business shall be transacted at the general meeting 
unless the quorum is present, and unless otherwise 
provided the quorum shall be three. The chairman of the 
board of directors shall be the chairman of the general 
meeting and where there is an equality of votes the 
chairman shall have a casting vote. Voting at the general 
meeting shall be by a show of hands, unless a poll is 
demanded by the chairman, or at least three members 
present in person or by proxy, or by any member or 
members present in person having shares which are equal 
to one tenth of the total sum paid up on all the shares 
conferring the right to vote.
Regulations 63 to 73 deal in detail with the 
exercise of the members' vote. The regulations provide 
for voting on a show of hands, and on a poll where each 
share carries one vote. They deal specifically with the 
qualifications of the member; for example, if a member is 
insane, his vote may only be exercised through his 
committee, receiver, guardian or other person appointed 
by the court. In order to exercise the membership rights 
attached to the ownership of the company's shares, all
17
sums due to the company in respect of shares held must be 
paid before a member is entitled to vote at any general 
meeting. The members' votes can also be exercised by 
proxy, and any instrument appointing a proxy shall be in 
writing under the hand of the appointer or his attorney.
A valid instrument confers the right to demand a poll. 
Regulation 74 allows any body corporate which is a member 
of the company to appoint any person to represent it at 
any meetings of the company. That person shall have all 
the powers the body corporate could exercise as a member 
of the company.
The Residual Function of the General Meeting.
The general meeting after the upward delegation of 
the management powers to the board retains a number of 
powers.20 The powers that remain to the general meeting 
come from a number of sources. The Companies Acts 1963- 
1990 give control over various important management 
decisions to the general meeting, by requiring special 
resolutions to be passed before the board can proceed. 
Thus the Companies Act 1963 requires a special resolution 
to change the company name, to alter the objects or 
articles of association, to authorise an application to 
Court seeking a reduction of capital, for the company to 
purchase its own shares, to wind up the company 
voluntarily (except on the grounds of insolvency or under
20 Companies Act 1963, Table A, article 80. For a discussion 
of the effect of this article see the judgment of O'Connor M.R. 
in RE GALWAY AND SALT HILL TRAMWAYS CO. [1918] 1 I.R. 62.
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the provisions of the articles), or to present a petition 
for an order for a compulsory winding up.21 The articles 
also reserve specific functions to the general meeting 
such as the power contained in article 76 of Table A to 
fix the remuneration of the directors.
As well as specific reserved functions the general 
meeting retains power through its general role as a 
legislator. This function allows it to amend the 
company's constitutional documents through special 
resolutions and also to exercise its ordinary resolution 
power.22
The general meeting has a truly residual power in a 
number of situations, such as when there is no board of 
directors. Then the general meeting may exercise all the 
functions of the company.23 The general meeting may also 
ratify acts which were ultra vires the directors but 
intra vires the company.24
One of the most controversial residual powers of the 
company is the power of the general meeting to ratify 
wrongs done by the directors to the company. The leading 
English authority on this issue, BAMFORD V BAMFORD [196 8]
21 Companies Act 1963, sections 23, 10, 15, 72, 60, 251,
213, respectively.
22 The Companies Act 1963, section 182 states that removal 
of a director is by ordinary resolution. Appointment is as per 
the articles of association, usually by ordinary resolution.
23 FIRTH V STAINES [18 97] 2 Q.B. 70 and MAHONY V EAST 
HOLYFORD MINING CO. (1875) L.R. 7 (H.L.).
24 RE BURKE CLANCY & CO. LTD. H.C., UNREPORTED, 2 3 MAY 1974, 
IRVINE V UNION BANK OF AUSTRALIA (18 77) 2 App. Cas. 3 66.
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3 W.L.R. 317 concerned directors who in order to ward off 
a take-over bid from another company, allotted 500,000 
shares in their company to a third company. The company's 
articles of association placed the disposal of all 
unissued shares in the hands of the directors. Two 
shareholders challenged the allotment of the shares by 
the directors, on the grounds that they had not acted 
"bona fide in the interests of the company."
The directors then convened an extraordinary general 
meeting and a resolution approving the allotment to the 
third company was passed. The question arose whether, 
assuming that the directors had not acted bona fide for 
the benefit of the company, the action of the general 
meeting cured the irregularity. Harman L.J. stated:-
[t]he only question is whether the allotment, 
having been made, as one must assume, in bad 
faith, is voidable and can be avoided at the 
instance of the company .... at their instance 
only and of no one else, because the wrong, if 
wrong it be, is a wrong done to the company. If 
that be right, the company, which had the right 
to recall the allotment, has also the right to 
approve of it and forgive it; and I see no 
difficulty at all in supposing that the 
ratification by the decision of December 15 in 
the general meeting of the company was a 
perfectly good "whitewash" of that which up to 
that time was a voidable transaction. And that 
is the end of the matter.
It must be noted that the position in Ireland is 
somewhat different. Budd J.25 sets out clearly in NASH V 
LANCEGAYE SAFETY GLASS (IRELAND) LTD. (1958) 92 I.L.T.R.
25 The judge in the case was Budd J. but the report refers 
to Dixon J.
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11 that elements of bad faith in the exercise of 
directors' powers will render the act or acts involved, 
unratifiable by the general meeting.
Not all wrongs can be easily ratified by the general 
meeting. The general meeting cannot by a simple majority 
ratify a breach of an individual membership right.26 The 
general meeting could, though, alter the constitutional 
document conferring the membership right by passing a 
special resolution.27
Certain wrongs remain un-ratifiable, and the company 
can always maintain a right of action against the 
wrongdoer. Examples of un-ratifiable wrongs are 
transactions which are ultra vires the company,28 a 
criminal act of any sort,29 or a fraud on the minority.30
The final residual power of the general meeting is 
the ability of the members to pass a resolution releasing 
the directors from the duties owed by them to the company 
in advance of any breach.31 This can be done only if the
26 The section 25 contract gives the shareholder a right of 
action to rectify the wrong.
27 This itself would be subject to the provisions of the 
articles of association regarding alteration of class rights and 
the provisions of the Companies Acts 1963-1990.
28 See HENNESSY V NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION [1947] I.R. 159.
29 See COCKBURN V NEWBRIDGE SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY CO. LTD. 
[1915] 1 I.R. 237 at 255 where O'Brien L.C. considered that a 
company cannot ratify its own criminality.
30 See MENIER V HOOPER'S TELEGRAPH WORKS (1874) L.R. 9 Ch. 
App. 3 5 0.
31 SHERRARD V BARRON [1923] 1 I.R. 21.
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anticipated breach is one which is ratifiable. This 
problematical element of the model company will be dealt 
with later in chapter two.32
The Rights and Obligations of the Members and the Company 
Defined in the Articles of Association.
The final part of the second element in the model 
company concerns the relationship between the members and 
the constitutional documents. Central to this 
relationship is the Companies Act 1963, section 25 (1). 
Section 25 (1) states:-
[s]ubject to the provisions of this Act, the 
memorandum and articles shall, when registered, 
bind the company and the members thereof to the 
same extent as if they respectively had been 
signed and sealed by each member, to observe 
all the provisions of the memorandum and of the 
articles.
This section has a long history in both the statute 
and case law dealing with the articles of association. 
The origin of the wording may be traced to the U.K. Joint 
Stock Companies Act 1844. The 1844 Act took the existing 
method of forming an unincorporated joint stock company33 
and added the benefits of incorporation once the company 
followed the proper registration procedure. The deed of 
settlement was the constitutional document and formed a
32 See Chapter two, pp. 120-121.
33 By deed of settlement.
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contract between the members who sealed it.
The Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 removed the deed 
of settlement as the constitutional document of a joint 
stock company, and introduced instead the memorandum and 
articles of association. Along with this new format, the 
1856 Act introduced a provision similar to section 25 (1) 
above in order to maintain the contractual relationship 
between the members.
Ross J. in CLARK V WORKMAN [1920] 1 I.R. 107
stated:-
[w]e must first consider what is the position 
of a shareholder in this and similar companies.
He does not hold his property simply at the 
mercy of the majority. His rights are carefully 
guarded, and his chief protection consists in 
the articles of association. Now, what do the 
articles of association amount to in point of 
law? They constitute a contract between every 
shareholder and all the others and between the 
company itself and all the shareholders. It is 
a contract of the most sacred character and it 
is on the faith of it that each shareholder 
advances his money.34
Thus the articles of association constitute a statement 
of the rights and obligations of the members and the 
company towards each other, which are enforceable 
contractually.
34 Ross J. is here referring to the Companies Act 1908, 
section 14. See also the judgment of Farwell L.J. in SALMON V 
QUINN & AXTENS LTD. [1909] 1 Ch. 311. (C.A.); [1909] A.C. 442,
(H.L.).
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1.3 FOSS V HARBOTTLE: Majority Control.
From the above it can be seen that the general 
meeting makes decisions on a majority basis. Resolutions 
can be by simple majority or in the case of an amendment 
to the articles, by special resolution requiring a 75% 
majority. The democratic principles applied here come 
from ATT. GEN. V DAVEY (1741) 2 Atk. 212 where at common 
law it was recognised that corporations vote by 
maj ority.35
In FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461 the company in 
general meeting refused to take an action against the 
directors who were alleged by the minority shareholders 
to have wronged the company. The court dismissed an 
action by the minority shareholders who sought to force 
the directors to put right the wrong to the company. It 
held that only the company had a right to bring such an 
action. Thus it lies with the organs of the company to 
instigate an action. Such an action should be brought by 
the board of directors as the control organ,36 if the 
directors can not, or will not, bring an action, the 
power reverts to the general meeting.37
The principles in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461
35 There Hardwicke L.C. stated " [i]t cannot be disputed that 
wherever a certain number are incorporated a major part of them 
may do any corporate act.."
36 SHAW & SONS (SALFORD) LTD. V SHAW [1935] 2 K.B. 113,
( C . A . ) .
37 PENDER V LUSHINGTON (18 77) 6 Ch. D. 70.
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have been reiterated in cases since 1843. In MAC DOUGALL 
V GARDINER (1875) 1 Ch. D. 13 an individual shareholder
suing on behalf of himself and the other shareholders 
complained of a breach of the articles by the chairman of 
the general meeting. The suit was rejected as the 
litigation should have been in the companies name.
In O'NEILL V RYAN AND OTHERS [1990] I.L.R.M 140 the 
plaintiff here alleged that the principle shareholder in 
Ryanair Ltd. had entered into a price fixing arrangement 
with Aer Lingus. He claimed that Ryanair's interests had 
been damaged and that the value of his minority 
shareholding had been reduced. Lynch J. described it as 
"a classic case to which the rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE 
applies." Only the company could bring such an action.
Thus the legal entity of the company which arises 
due to the mechanism of the Companies Acts and SALOMON V 
SALOMON & CO. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) is controlled by the
organs created in the articles of association and 
enforced through the rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2
Hare 461.
Part 2.
1.4 The Erosion of SALOMON V SALOMON.
The starting point in examining the erosion of the 
principle expounded in SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [18 97]
A.C. 22 (H.L.) begins not with the judgment of the House
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of Lords but with the judgment in the Court of Appeal. 
The views of the judges in the Court of Appeal38 differ 
so widely from the opinion of the House of Lords that the 
gulf warrants examination. Taking the statute as the sole 
guide Lord Halsbury L.C. found that, since the company 
was incorporated in accordance with the Act, it was ex 
hypothesi a valid entity. The motives of the six nominal 
shareholders were unimportant as long as there was no 
fraud.
On the issue of fraud Lord Halsbury L.C. decided 
that when all the shareholders are aware of the 
conditions under which the company was formed and the 
conditions of purchase it was impossible to maintain that 
the company was defrauded. This was entirely consistent 
with ERLANGER V NEW SOMBRERO PHOSPHATE CO. (1878) 3 App. 
Cas. 1218. The rest of the judges followed a similar
line. The important difference between the higher court 
and the Court of Appeal is that the House of Lords firmly 
restricted the interpretation of the statutory intention 
to the words contained in the Act.39
In his judgment Lord Halsbury states clearly that he 
is using only the words of the statute in his attempt to 
determine the main question. He states "I have no right 
to add to the requirements of the statute, nor to take 
from the requirements thus enacted. The sole guide must 
be the statute itself." He continues to criticise the
38 SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [1895] 2 Ch. 337 (C.A.).
39 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844.
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decisions of the judges in the Court of Appeal for 
"inserting into the Act of Parliament limitations which 
are not to be found there".
The judges in the Court of Appeal were, in their 
consideration of elements outside the Act, attempting to 
get to the intention of the legislators. Lord Halsbury 
took a narrower view of the considerations which could be 
brought to bear on the Salomon case. He considered only 
the wording of the Act.
The judgment of Kay L.J. in the Court of Appeal 
would appear to merit more discussion than the dismissal 
of Lord Halsbury would suggest. There Kay L.J states:-
[t]he statutes were intended to allow seven or 
more persons, bona fide associated for the 
purpose of trade, to limit their liability 
under certain conditions and to become a 
corporation. But they were not intended to 
legalise a pretended association for the 
purpose of enabling an individual to carry on 
his own business with limited liability in the 
name of a joint stock company.
Kay L.J. is there attempting to ascertain the true 
meaning of the Act. In doing so he considered elements 
outside the wording of the Act, the motives of the 
promoters and members. The subsequent development of the 
law, which has provided wide exceptions to the judgment 
of Lord Halsbury, also considered elements outside the 
wording of the Act.
It is clear that the company as a separate legal 
entity is not a sacred doctrine. Ussher (1986: pp.24-25)
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considers the Salomon judgment a statement of normality 
from which the courts may depart.40 He further catalogues 
those departures into five categories.41 The judiciary 
may thus depart from the rule in these circumstances. 
When the company is being used to circumvent an existing 
legal duty.42 When the court has a discretion to grant a 
remedy it is likely that it will investigate elements 
behind the corporate "veil."43 Where the law requires 
that the courts determine the corporation's status as a 
person.44 Where the corporation is being used as an 
artificial scheme for the avoidance of tax.45 Where the
40 For a consideration of the situations where the rule in 
SALOMON V SALOMON & Co. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) is reversed 
pursuant to various statutory provisions, and personal liability 
is imposed on the shareholders or the directors or both, for all 
or part of the debts and liabilities of the company, see Mac Cann 
(1991d: pp.206-210) and Mac Cann (1991e: pp.232-236). There he 
concludes:-
it can be seen that although the Rule in SALOMON V
SALOMON has not been abolished the principle of
limited liability has been gradually eroded by the
Companies Acts...
41 See also Keane (1991: p. 123), Wardman (1994: pp.179-181) 
and Pennington (1985: pp.53-63) where they all provide that there 
are five exceptions to the Salomon rule.
42 See the judgment of Meredith M.R. in CUMMINGS V STEWART 
[1911] 1 I . R . 236 at 240 for a statement of when this exception
applies. See further GILFORD MOTOR CO. LTD. V HORNE [1933] Ch. 
935 and JONES V LIPMAN [1962] 1 ALL. E.R. 442.
43 See the judgment of Devlin L.J. in MERCHANDISE TRANSPORT 
LTD. V BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION [1962] 2 Q.B. 173 at 202 and 
also RE BUGLE PRESS LTD. [1961] Ch. 270.
44 Lord Parker in DAIMLER COMPANY LTD. V CONTINENTAL TYRE 
(GREAT BRITAIN) COMPANY LTD. [1916] 2 A.C. 307 looked at the
individual members of the company to determine its character. See 
also UNIT CONSTRUCTION LTD. V BULLOCK [1960] A.C. 351 (H.L.).
45 FIRESTONE TYRE & PUBLIC COMPANY V LLEWELLIN [1957] 1 ALL 
E.R. 561.
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interests of justice require it.46
The judgment of Lord Halsbury L.C. has effectively 
been set aside.47 Lord Denning in LITTLEWOODS STORES V 
I.R.C. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1241 was vocal on the point where 
he stated
[t]he doctrine laid down in Salomon's case has 
to be watched very carefully. It has often been 
supposed to cast a veil over the personality of 
a limited company through which the courts 
cannot see. But that is not true. The courts 
can, and often do, pull off the mask. They look 
to see what really lies behind. The legislature 
has shown the way with group accounts and the 
rest. And the courts should follow suit.
Gower (1979: p.131) felt:-
there is evidence of a general tendency to 
ignore the separate legal entities of various 
companies within a group, and to look instead 
at the economic entity of the whole group.48
The judiciary now seem to be doing that which Lindley,
46 See the judgment of Costello J. in POWER SUPERMARKETS 
LTD. V CRUMLIN INVESTMENTS LTD. H.C., UNREPORTED, JUNE 22 1981 
where he stated "a Court may, if the justice of the case so 
requires treat two or more related companies as a single 
entity. . . 1 See also the judgment of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest 
in LEE V LEE'S AIR FARMING [1961] A.C. 12 where he suggested that 
the existence of "a sham or a simulacrum" might lead to a finding 
that the company and the controller were not separated.
47 Lowry (1993b: pp.41-42) examines the judicial practice of 
"lifting the corporate veil". He concludes:-
[t]he problem that can naturally arise from this 
approach is the uncertainty which it casts over the 
safety of incorporation. The use of the policy to 
erode established legal principle is not necessarily 
to be welcomed.
48 Lord Denning repeated this statement from Gower in D.H.N. 
LTD. V TOWER HAMLETS [1976] 1 W.L.R. 852.
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Lopes and Kay L.JJ. did in SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [18 95]
2 Ch. 337 where they looked at the membership of the 
company to determine whether it was a sham. 49 50 51
1.5 Restricting the Scope of the Memorandum and section 
25 .
The Memorandum.
If a company trades outside the ambit of its objects 
clause that transaction will be ultra vires and void at 
common law. The rule led to a number of hardships52 In 
order to redress the balance, the legislature enacted 
section 8 of the Companies Act 1963. Section 8 modified 
the ultra vires rule where the third party is not 
actually aware that the transaction was ultra vires.
The legislature were obliged by a European Community 
Directive53 to enact Statutory Instrument 163/1973.
49 For an in-depth examination of when the veil of
incorporation will be "lifted", "peeped behind", "penetrated", 
"extended" or "ignored", see Ottolenghi (1990: pp.338-396).
50 Further erosion occurs in a winding up of a company on 
the "just and equitable" grounds in the Companies Act 1963, 
section 213. There the company has been treated as analogous to 
a partnership.
51 See Gallagher and Ziegler (1990: pp.292-313) for an
examination of when the courts will at common law lift the veil 
of incorporation. They conclude that the lifting of the veil 
impacts on other aspects of the law such as the directors' duty
to the company as a whole, individual taxation principles, and
the rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 HARE 461.
52 See RE JON BEAUFORTE (LONDON) LTD. [1953] Ch. 131 above.
53 The First Council Directive on Companies No. 
68/151/E.E.C.
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Section 6 essentially modifies the ultra vires rule in 
the same way section 8 does. If the person dealing with 
the company deals in good faith and the directors decide 
on the transaction then section 6 provides that the 
transaction is valid.54
The statutory erosion of the ultra vires rule has 
meant that the objects clause is to all intents and 
purposes obsolete. The company as a legal entity has no 
longer any direction provided by the objects clause.
The Erosion of the Statutory Contract.
The section 25 contract set out above in Part 1 is, 
at face value, a statement of the rights and obligations 
of the members and the company. It is here argued that 
the contract itself has inherent difficulties and that 
the judiciary, while recognising these difficulties, have 
been over-restrictive in defining its nature as a 
contract. The result of this over restrictive approach 
has been a degradation of the contractual nature of the 
articles, to the extent that the rights and obligations 
of the parties are no longer certain.
The problems created by a statutory contract for the 
judiciary arose in defining the boundaries of such an 
unusual contract.
Some of the problems were obvious, a contractual 
relationship is certain, whereas the relationship arising
54 For a consideration of the English position, see Ferran 
(1992 : pp.124-128) .
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from the articles is alterable.55 In a contractual 
relationship, generally only the contracting parties can 
be bound but the articles of association bind even third 
parties56 who are not parties to the initial document.
Keane, discussing the nature of the relationship 
created by section 25, states : -
[i]t should also be remembered that any 
contract which can be spelled out from the 
articles between the company and its members 
differs significantly from other contracts, 
since it is always open to the company 
unilaterally to alter the terms of the contract 
by amending the articles in the manner 
permitted by law. (1991: p.63)
One thing appears certain from the case law: it is 
not a contract like other contracts. Steyn L.J. stated in 
BRATTON SEYMOUR SERVICES CO. LTD. V OXBOROUGH [1992]
B.C.L.C. 693:-
[i] t derives its binding force not from a 
bargain struck between parties but from the 
terms of the statute. It is binding only 
insofar as it affects the rights and 
obligations between the company and the members 
acting in their capacity as members. If it 
contains provisions conferring rights and 
obligations on outsiders, then those provisions 
do not bite as part of the contract between the 
company and the members, even if the outsider 
is coincidentally a member. Similarly, if the 
provisions are not truly referable to the 
rights and obligations of members as such it 
does not operate as a contract. Moreover, the 
contract can be altered by a special resolution
55 Within statutory confines.
56 Future shareholders in the company.
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without the consent of all the contracting 
parties. It is also, unlike an ordinary 
contract, not defeasible on the grounds of 
misrepresentation, common law mistake, mistake 
in equity, undue influence or duress. Moreover, 
as Dillon L.J. has pointed out, it cannot be 
rectified on the grounds of mistake.
The company in this case argued that in order to give 
business efficacy to the articles a term should be 
implied into the articles. Dillon L.J. referred to this
concept and dismissed it. Thus normal rules regarding
contracts do not apply.57
Section 25 (1) creates a contract where in fact
there is none.58 The reason such an unusual contract was 
created was as an attempt to bridge the changeover
between the deed of settlement company and the new 
company formed under The Joint Stock Companies Act 1856.
The practical problem for the legislature was that 
while the old deed of settlement created a contractual 
relationship between the members who sealed it, the new 
constitutional documents59 would not. The answer was to 
create an artificial contract.60
57 See SCOTT V FRANK F SCOTT (LONDON) LTD. [1940] 3 ALL E.R. 
508 where it was held that the court had no jurisdiction to 
rectify the articles of association of a company. Sir Christopher 
Slade referred to the judgment of Jenkins L.J. in HOLMES V LORD 
KEYES [1958] 2 ALL E.R. 129 in dismissing the business efficacy 
argument.
58 At least not one fulfilling the normal conditions for the 
creation of a contract.
59 Memorandum and articles of association.
50 The original wording in the Act of 1844 evolved almost 
unchanged through the 1856 Act, the Companies Act 1862 section 
16, the Companies Act 1948 section 20 (1), into the Irish
Companies Act 1963 section 25 (1) and finally to reside unchanged
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Capacity.
The judicial restriction of the section 25 contract 
began when the contract was interpreted in terms of the 
capacity of the person who wishes to rely upon the rights 
contained in the articles, as in ELEY V POSITIVE 
GOVERNMENT SECURITY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. (1876) 1 EX. D. 88 
(C . A . ) . In that case the plaintiff argued that the 
articles formed a contract under which he could sue the 
company.51 It was held that the articles of association 
were a matter between the shareholders inter se, or the 
shareholders and the directors, and did not create any 
contract between the plaintiff and the company.
In IN RE TAVERONE MINING CO.:PRITCHARD'S CASE (1873) 
L.R. 8 Ch. 956 at 960, Mellish L.J. stated:-
I am of the opinion that the articles of 
association cannot be considered as a contract 
in writing between De Thierry and the company 
for the sale of the mine to them. It may no 
doubt, be the case, if no other contract was 
entered into, and if De Thierry signed these 
articles and they were acted upon, that a Court 
of Equity would hold that as between him and 
the company-- from their acting upon it--there 
was a binding contract; but in themselves the 
articles of association are simply a contract 
as between the shareholders inter se in respect 
of their rights as shareholders. They are the 
deed of partnership by which the shareholders 
agree inter se.
In MELHADO V PORTO ALEGRE RY. CO. (1874) LAW REP. 9 C.P. 
503 Lord Coleridge stated:-
in the U.K. Companies Act 1985 section 14 (1).
61 He relied on ORTON V CLEVELAND FIRE BRICK CO. 3 H.& C. 
868, MAIR V HIMALAYA TEA CO. LAW REP. 1 Eq. 411 and MELHADO V 
PORTO ALEGRE R Y . CO. (1874) LAW REP. 9 C.P. 503.
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[t]he action is brought on a clause in the 
articles of association, by which the directors 
are authorised to pay certain expenses if they 
should consider them to be properly deemed 
preliminary expenses. The declaration avers 
that all conditions were performed necessary to 
entitle the plaintiffs to be paid their 
expenses; and therefore I think we must take it 
that they were expenses which, if the directors 
had thought proper to pay them, the articles 
would have justified them in paying. The 
question, therefore, is whether an action will 
lie for the payment of these expenses, in 
pursuance of the articles of association, to 
which the plaintiffs were not parties.62 I have 
come to the conclusion that no such action will 
lie.53
In BROWNE V LA TRINIDAD (1887) 37 Ch. D. 1, (C.A.) at 13,
Cotton L.J. stated:-
[t]he memorandum of agreement of the 24th of 
November, 1844, is in no way a contract between 
the plaintiff and the company. It is said that 
it was adopted and incorporated into the 
articles, but I cannot accede to that. The 
company by its directors acted upon the 
agreement, but that does not make it binding 
upon the company. Then it is incorporated into 
the articles in such a way as to entitle the 
plaintiff to say I have such a contract between 
me and the company as can be enforced by a 
Court of law, and as I might enforce in equity 
by way of specific performance? That point is 
settled I think, by Eley v Positive Government 
Security Life Assurance Co. (1876) 1 EX. D. 88 
(C.A.).
Lindley L.J. continued:-
[h]aving regard to the terms of s.16, there 
would be some force, or in all events some
62 Mellor J. said " [t] he plaintiffs were not in any way 
parties to the articles of association, and there was not, 
therefore, any express contract to pay them."
63 Brett J. referred to KELNER V BAXTER (1866) L.R. 2 C.P. 
174 in dismissing the argument for ratification of a contract 
made before the existence of the company.
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plausibility, in the argument that, being a 
member, the contract which is referred to in 
the articles has become binding between the 
company and him. Of course the argument is open 
to the difficulty that there could be no 
contract between him and the company until the 
shares were allotted to him, and it would be 
remarkable that, upon the shares being allotted 
to him, a contract between him and the company, 
as to a matter not connected with the holding 
of shares, should arise.
It should be emphasised once again that section 25 
(1) only creates a contract with regard to the rights and 
duties of members in their capacity as members. Astbury 
J. stated in HICKMAN V KENT OR ROMNEY MARSH SHEEP- 
BREEDERS' ASSOCIATION [1915] 1 Ch. D. 881 Ch.:-
I think this much is clear, first, that no 
article can constitute a contract between the 
company and a third person; secondly, that no 
right merely purporting to be given by an 
article to a person, whether a member or not, 
in a capacity other than that of a member, as 
for instance, as solicitor, promoter, director, 
can be enforced against the company; and, 
thirdly, that articles regulating the rights 
and obligations of the members generally as 
such do create rights and obligations between 
them and the company respectively.64
Thus if the articles confer rights on a member other than 
in his capacity as a member there is no contractual 
relationship established unless it is contained in a 
collateral contract established separately from the 
articles.
64 He referred to BISGOOD V HENDERSON'S TRANSVAAL ESTATES 
[1908] 1 Ch. 759 where Buckley J. stated " [t]he purpose of the
memorandum and articles is to define the position of the 
shareholder as a shareholder, not to bind him in his capacity as 
an individual."
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The cases above indicate that the judiciary had 
reached a consensus on this particular restriction on the 
contractual aspect of the articles of association.65 The 
capacity of those seeking to rely upon the statutory 
contract is of great importance. Those outside the 
judicial interpretation of the statutory contract and 
those suing in a capacity other than members are excluded 
from enforcing the contract.56 The certainty of the 
contract is now no longer clear.
Who May Rely on the Contract?
The judiciary also considered the extent to which 
the parties to the contract could enforce it against each 
other. The authorities clearly show that the company was 
entitled as against its members to enforce and restrain
65 Another problem was that the wording of the 1856 Act was 
such that it failed to take account of the separate legal 
identity of the company. As Gower states:-
[u]nhappily, full account was not taken of the vital 
new factor, namely, the fact that the incorporated 
company was a separate legal entity, and the words "as 
if ...signed and sealed by each member" did not have 
added to them "and by the company." (1979: p.315).
The present wording of the Companies act 1963, section 25 (1) has 
evolved almost unchanged from the 1856 Act and so retains this 
anachronistic omission. The reason that the section was adopted 
straight from the U.K. Companies Act 1948 is perhaps because the 
case law had already dealt with the problems arising from the 
omission, and so there was no need to add extra wording to 
include the company.
66 See RAM KISSENDAS DHANUKA V SATYA CHARAN LAW (194 9) L.R. 
77 I.A. 128 where the enforcement of a right contained in the 
articles by a shareholder had the indirect effect of protecting 
an outsider's position under those articles. For a consideration 
of this case and the position of outsider rights generally see 
Smart (1989: pp.143-147).
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breaches of the articles of association.67 The degree to 
which the articles could be enforced against the company 
by the shareholders was also clarified.68
In IMPERIAL HYDROPATHIC HOTELS CO. BLACKPOOL V 
HAMPSON (1882) 23 Ch. D. 1, 13 it was held that the
members, in turn, have a corresponding right to take 
legal proceedings against the company to enforce the 
articles.69 Thus as in JOHNSON V LYTTLE'S IRON AGENCY 
(1877) 5 Ch. D. 68770 a member may sue the company in
order to restrain it from excluding him from 
membership,71 or a member may as in GRIFFITH V PAGET 
(1877) 5 Ch. D. 894 sue the company for a return of his
capital on winding up.
The question as to the enforceability of the 
contract between members is one which has caused some
67 See MAC DOUGALL V GARDINER (1875) 1 Ch. D. 13, PENDER V
LUSHINGTON (1877) 6 Ch. D. 70 and IMPERIAL HYDROPATHIC HOTEL CO. 
BLACKPOOL V HAMPSON (1882) 23 Ch. D. 1, 13.
68 In BRADFORD BANKING CO. V BRIGGS (1886) 12 App. CAS. 29, 
33. Lord Blackburn stated " [t]his property in the shares was, by 
virtue of the 16th section of the Act already quoted, I think, 
bound to the company as much as if he had (at the time he became 
the holder of these shares) executed a covenant to the company 
in the same terms as article 103, but I do not think it was bound 
any further."
69 Cotton L.J. states: "we have really to consider whether 
in the present case the contract between these shareholders has 
been followed."
70 In JOHNSON V LYTTLE'S IRON AGENCY (1877) 5 Ch. D. 687 
James L.J. stated " [t]he notice... . did not comply strictly with 
the provisions of the contract between the company and the 
shareholders which is contained in the regulations of [T]able A."
71 See also GREAT NORTH OF ENGLAND RAILWAY COMPANY V 
BIDDULPH 7 M. & W. 243 and NEWRY AND ENNISKILLEN RAILWAY COMPANY 
V EDMUNDS 2 Ex. 122.
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difficulty.72 It is clear that the articles constitute a 
contract between the members themselves but there has 
been much judicial debate as to whether a member can 
enforce a right contained in the articles directly 
against another member or whether the company is the 
proper plaintiff in such an action.
In WOOD V ODESSA WATERWORKS CO. (1889) 42 Ch. D. 6 3 6  
Stirling J. stated that "[t]he articles of association 
constitute a contract not merely between the shareholders 
and the company, but between each individual shareholders 
and every other."
In SALMON V QUIN & AXTENS LTD. [1909] 1 Ch. 311.
(C.A.); [1909] A . C . 442, (H.L.) Farwell L.J. considered
Stirling J.'s words and stated "I think that is accurate 
subject to this observation, that it may well be that the 
Court would not enforce this covenant as between the 
individual shareholders in most cases."
Lord Herschell, dissenting in WELTON V SAFFERY 
[1897] A .C . 299, stated:-
[t]he articles thus become in effect a contract 
under seal by each member of the company, and 
regulate his rights. They cannot, of course, 
diminish or affect any liability created by the 
express terms of the statute; but, as I have 
said, the statute does not purport to settle 
the rights of the members inter se, it leaves 
these to be determined by the articles (or the 
articles and the memorandum together), which 
are the social contract regulating these 
rights. I think it was intended to permit
72 See the comments of Stirling J. and Farwell L.J. below 
and the confusion which the statement of Lord Hershell also 
below, has caused.
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perfect freedom in this respect.
He continued:-
[i] t is quite true that the articles constitute a 
contract between each member and the company, and 
that there is no contract between the individual 
members of the company, but the articles do not any 
less, in my opinion, regulate their rights inter se. 
Such rights can only be enforced by or against a 
member through the company, or through the 
liquidators representing the company, but I think 
that no member has, as between himself and another 
member, any rights beyond that which the contract 
with the company gives.
Following this accepted authority, the articles do not 
constitute a contract between the members themselves and 
the only proper plaintiff in an action to enforce rights 
contained in the articles between members is the company 
itself.73
On the other hand, there is much authority for the 
opposite view that the articles are enforceable by one 
member directly against another. Vaisey J. in RAYFIELD V 
HANDS [1960] Ch. 1 considered all the conflicting 
authorities74 on the issue and stated:-
73 This would be entirely consistent with the company as a 
separate legal entity as in SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [1897] A.C. 
22 (H.L.) and with the company as proper plaintiff as in 
PRUDENTIAL ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD. V NEWMAN INDUSTRIES LTD. AND 
OTHERS [1982] Ch. 209.
74 In particular he focuses on Lord Herschell's judgment in 
WELTON V SAFFERY [1897] A.C. 299 where he states " [i] t is quite 
true that the articles constitute a contract between each member 
and the company, and that there is no contract in terms between 
the individual members of the company; but the articles do not 
any the less, in my opinion, regulate their rights inter se."
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[n]ow the question arises at the outset whether 
the terms of article 11 relate to the rights of 
members inter se (that being the expression 
found in so many of the cases), or whether the 
relationship is between a member as such and 
directors as such. I may dispose of this point 
very briefly by saying that, in my judgment, 
the relationship here is between the plaintiff 
as a member and the defendants not as directors 
but as members. . . .75
While Vaisey J. advocated the above approach, he was 
aware that it may be limited to specific circumstances. 
Vaisy J. discussed the judgment of Wynn-Parry J. in RE 
HARTLEY BAIRD LTD. [1954] 3 ALL E.R. 695 where he
stated:- "[i]n my view, interpreting such a commercial 
document as the articles of association, the maxim ut res 
magis valeat quam pereat should certainly be applied, and 
I intend to interpret these articles in the light of that 
maxim." He referred also to HOLMES V LORD KEYES [1958] 2 
ALL E.R. 129 where Jenkins L.J. stated "articles of 
association of the company should be regarded as a 
business document so as to give them reasonable business 
efficacy. . 1,76
In his conclusion he stated:-
[t]he conclusion to which I have come may not be of 
so general an application as to extend to the
Vaisey J. regarding the above, comments that Lord Herschell's 
statement is somewhat cryptic.
75 See also RE LEICESTER CLUB & COUNTY RACECOURSE CO. EX P .
CANNON (1885) 30 Ch. D. 629. In particular Pearson J. at p.633
on the directors character as members.
75 Both of these cases diminish further the contractual
certainty of the articles of association.
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articles of association of every company, for it is, 
I think material to remember that this private 
company is one of a class of companies which bears 
a close analogy to a partnership.
This thesis would suggest that Vaisey J. was perhaps 
swayed too much by the statements of Wynn-Parry J. and 
Jenkins L.J.. He himself may have realised this as in the 
final line of his conclusion he states somewhat 
cryptically : -
I do not intend to decide more in the present 
case than is necessary to support my 
conclusion, though it may be that the 
principles on which my conclusion is founded 
are of more general application than might be 
supposed from some of the authorities on the 
point.
There is still confusion with regard to which is the 
correct position. Bare and Bowen (1988a: p.126) agree
that Lord Herschell's dicta, with the quasi-partnership 
exception provided by Vaisey J. , represents the true 
position. Thus a member therefore cannot enforce the 
articles of association of a company directly against 
another member. The proper plaintiff in such a situation 
is the company itself.
Pennington does not agree and holds the opposite 
opinion. He states:-
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[h] owever it has now been settled that the 
members are contractually bound to one another 
to obey the provisions of the memorandum and 
articles so far as they relate to their rights 
and duties as members (Rayfield v Hands [1960] 
Ch. 1) . In the case which so decided it was 
held that a member could enforce an obligation 
imposed by the articles on his fellow members 
who were directors to purchase his shares from 
him when he wished to dispose of them.
(1985: p.67)
As can be seen from the above, the same authority, 
RAYFIELD V HANDS [1960] Ch. 1 is used to support 
differing views.
Gower states:-
[t]he principal occasions on which this 
question is likely to be important arise when 
articles confer on members a right of pre­
emption or first refusal when another member 
wishes to sell his shares (Borland's Trustees 
v Steel [1901] 1 Ch. 279), or, more rarely, a
duty on remaining members to buy the shares of 
a retiring member (Rayfield v Hands [1960] Ch. 
1) . A direct action between the shareholders 
concerned is here possible; and for the law to 
insist on action through the company would 
merely be to promote multiplicity of actions 
and involve the company in unnecessary 
litigation (1979: pp.316-317).
Again RAYFIELD V HANDS [1960] Ch. 1 is used as authority 
for Gower's statement. It must be noted that Vaisey J. in 
RAYFIELD V HANDS [196 0] Ch. 1 stated that his opinion was 
that his decision was one not one of general principle77 
and that it was particular to a quasi-partnership 
situation. The position in the U.K. is unclear; it seems 
illogical to place great emphasis on one part of Vaisey
77 Although his final statement suggests otherwise.
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J.'s judgment and to ignore another significant part.
The situation in Ireland appears much simpler as the 
case law follows only one strand of thinking on the 
subject of direct enforceability of the articles between 
the members. Ross J. in CLARK V WORKMAN [1920] 1 I.R. 107 
laid down the rule which has been followed since.78 Thus 
a right contained in the articles can be enforced 
directly member to member. Indeed this principle was not 
a new one to Irish law, it had it origins in ATT. GEN. 
FOR IRELAND V JAMESON [1904] 2 I.R. 644 (K.B. DIVISION);
[1905] 2 I.R. 218 (C .A .) a case dealing with pre-emption
rights where the majority judgments accepted direct 
enforcement of the articles between members.
The Proper Plaintiff.
The deficiencies in the contractual nature of the 
articles of association are widespread. They stem not 
only from the unusual contractual nature of the articles 
but from a confused judicial interpretation.
The uncertainty of the articles is compounded 
finally and terminally, when many of the duties imposed 
by the articles of association are construed as being 
owed not to the members but to the company as an entity.
Thus following the rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 
2 Hare 461 the company is the proper plaintiff. Even 
though the members fulfil the capacity criteria they may 
not be able to sue as the cause of action belongs to the
78 See above statement of Ross J.
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company or will have to undergo the mechanism of the 
derivative action.
In MOZLEY V ALSTON (1847) 1 Ph. 790 the directors
failed to retire by rotation as provided by the articles. 
They were treated as having committed a wrong to the 
company rather than breaching individual members rights 
regarding re-election. In MAC DOUGALL V GARDINER (1875) 
1 Ch. D. 13 the court refused to recognise an individual 
shareholder's right to a poll.
These cases are clearly confused. To an extent the 
judiciary have categorised certain rights within the 
articles as personal thus not requiring the application 
of FOSS V HARBOTTLE (184 3) 2 Hare 4 61. In PENDER V
LUSHINGTON (1877) 6 Ch. D. 70 a nominee's votes were
refused at a general meeting. The member obtained an 
injunction against the directors acting on the resolution 
passed at the meeting. Jessel M.R. stated:-
he is entitled to have his vote recorded an
individual right in respect of which he has the 
right to sue. That has nothing to do with the 
question raised in Foss v Harbottle and that 
line of cases.
Similarly in CLARK V WORKMAN [1920] 1 I.R. 107
shareholders obtained an injunction against the board of 
directors stopping them acting on a board resolution. The 
basis of their action was that the chairman had not been 
appointed in accordance with the articles of association. 
Ross J. stated "it is essential that the chairman should
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be elected by the machinery provided by that contract, 
and in no other way. "79
In EDWARDS V HALL I WELL [1950] 2 ALL E.R. 1064 the
rules concerning voting at a union meeting were broken. 
Two individual members obtained a declaration 
invalidating a resolution. Jenkins L.J. stated
the personal and individual rights of the 
membership of each of them have been invaded by 
a purported, but invalid, alteration.... In
those circumstances, it seems to me that the 
rule in Foss v Harbottle has not application at
all, for the individual members who are suing
sue, not in the right of the union, but in
their own right to protect from invasion their 
own individual rights as members.
Within the Irish jurisdiction the right of action which 
arises from the infringement of a personal right 
contained in the articles is reinforced by the protection 
of private property contained in Article 43.1 of the 
Constitution.80
The articles of association purport to contain the 
rights and obligations of the members and the company 
towards each other. The Companies Act 1963, section 25 
makes that relationship contractual. The nature of that 
contract is uncertain. A shareholder seeking to rely on 
a term in that contract must first look to see does the
79 See also HENNESSY V NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [1947] I.R. 159 where a quorum requirement 
was treated as an individual membership right.
80 See section below, Equitable Considerations Concerning 
Members Voting Rights.
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term give him a right in his capacity as a shareholder. 
Then he must see if this term confers a right which is a 
personal one rather one owed to the company. If he can 
fulfil these conditions then he can sue under the section 
25 contract.
The restriction of the articles to rights impacting 
on a membership is illogical and unsustainable.
Ussher (1986: pp.165-166) finds that:-
[t] he doctrine is easy enough to state, but 
difficult to apply. The difficulty lies in the 
fact that the rights of members within a 
company are not uniform. We have seen affirmed 
in Bushel1 v Faith the liberty which a company 
has to create shares with widely differing 
rights. Therefore the possibility of making the 
only firm and logically sustainable 
distinction, namely that between rights 
possessed by all members of a company and those 
purported to be granted to only some, 
disappears.
Thus ELEY V POSITIVE GOVERNMENT SECURITY LIFE ASSURANCE 
CO. (1876) 1 EX. D. 88 (C.A.) and BUSHELL V FAITH [1970] 
A.C. 1099 contradict each other.
The position has reached the point that the member 
has no general right to rely on Ross J.'s "sacred" 
contract.81
This thesis maintains that the problem lies not with 
the Companies Act 1963. The Companies Act 1963, section 
25 (1) is quite clear in creating a contractual
81 CLARK V WORKMAN [1920] 1 I.R. 107.
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relationship between the members and the company. It is 
the judicial restrictions which have clouded the issue.
ELEY V POSITIVE GOVERNMENT SECURITY LIFE ASSURANCE 
CO. (1876) 1 EX. D. 88 (C.A.) illustrates this point. If 
section 25 (1) is applied on its literal construction,
"signed and sealed by each member, to observe all the 
provisions of the memorandum and the articles," the 
member who tried to enforce a right contained in the 
articles to be employed for life as the company solicitor 
should at least have been able to establish a contractual 
relationship. The use of the word "all" in section 25 
implies no restriction. Astbury J.s' statement in HICKMAN 
V KENT OR ROMNEY MARSH SHEEP-BREEDERS' ASSOCIATION [1915] 
1 Ch. D. 881 Ch.82 distorts the literal construction of 
the section by restricting the contractual relationship 
to the aspects of the articles relating to rights 
regarding capacity as a member.
The question arises as to what the basis of this 
judicial interpretation is? Logically, section 25 (1)
creates a contractual relationship between the members 
and the company.83
There is in fact no legal basis to that restriction 
save policy considerations. As an answer to the problem 
of the change from the contractual deed of settlement 
company to the articles of association modern company a
82 See above p. 36.
83 As indicated above the case law would support this.
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statutory contract was a clumsy, though pragmatic 
choice.84 The implications of a contract that could 
constantly change and bind third parties, yet still 
retain contractual status were clearly not realised by 
the legislators. The judiciary, who were left to deal 
with the practical implications of the statutory contract 
immediately restricted its impact, by restricting its 
scope.
The problem of defining the nature of the section 25 
contract lies at the heart of the judicially evolved 
restrictions.85 There need not necessarily be a problem 
about defining the nature of the section 25 contract. 
There is clearly a contractual relationship present 
although it may be an unusual one.86 While the origin of 
the contract may be unusual, it need not necessarily 
cloud the nature of the function of the contract.87
A contract has a clear function; it defines the 
rights and obligations of the parties to it. Statute
84 It avoided the complications which would have arisen if 
a new member had to sign the deed of settlement upon joining.
05 Lindley M.R. addresses this point in ALLEN V GOLD REEFS 
GO. OF WEST AFRICA [1900] 1 Ch. 656 where he states " [t] hey have 
the effect of a contract (see s.16) ; but the exact nature of this 
c|ontract is even now very difficult to define".
86 All the judges in BRATTON SEYMOUR SERVICE CO. LTD. V 
OXBOROUGH [1992] B.C.L.C. 693 refer to the novelty of the 
dontract.I
87 Which would be to create legal relations. In the words of 
iiord Stowell in DALRYMPLE V DALRYMPLE (1811) 2 Hag. Con. 54 
contracts "must not be the sport of an idle hour, mere matters 
of pleasantry and badinage, never intended by the parties to have 
any serious effect whatever."
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purports to do this too. The statutory contract created 
by section 25 seeks to define the rights and obligations 
of the members and the company towards each other. As 
such its function is clear. The flaw in the statutory 
contract was the ease with which the rights and 
obligations could be varied,88 by passing a special 
resolution.
This seems to have been the difficulty which led the 
judiciary to attempt a re-definition of the contract. 
The literal interpretation of the wording of section 25, 
creates a contract between the members and the company 
which can be constantly varied89 and which is not 
restricted to the members' rights as members.90 The 
courts have re-defined the section 25 contract to 
restrict the rights under the contract to those rights 
inherent in membership. While the intention of the 
judiciary was clearly to provide certainty as to the 
extent of the contract, the re-definition has moved too 
far from the wording of the Act to have any validity or
88 See the judgment of Lindley M.R. in ANDREWS V GAS METER 
CO. [1897] 1 Ch. 361 on alteration of the constitution.
89 A potential solution was ruled out in WALKER V LONDON 
TRAMWAYS CO. (1879) 12 Ch. D. 705 where it was held that any 
regulation or article purporting to deprive the company of this 
power is invalid on the grounds that it is contrary to the 
statute.
90 Thus the solicitor in ELEY V POSITIVE GOVERNMENT SECURITY 
LIFE ASSURANCE CO. (1876) 1 EX. D. 88 (C.A.) would have been able 
to enforce the article appointing him solicitor.
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certainty.91
Equitable Considerations Concerning Members' Voting 
Rights.
The thesis now turns to examine a specific point 
regarding alteration of the section 25 contract. Ross 
J.92 makes the point that although the power to alter the 
"contract" exists
the statutory powers of altering articles of 
association by special resolution must be 
exercised subject to the general principles of 
law and equity which are applicable to all 
powers enabling majorities to bind 
minorities.93
The point being made by both Ross J. and Lord 
Lindley is that while the contract is an unusual one it 
does contain a safeguard against abuse.
One of the most common phrases associated with the 
exercise of members' votes is the statement of Lindley 
M.R. in ALLEN V GOLD REEFS CO. OF WEST AFRICA [19 0 0] 1
Ch. 656 at 671. There he states
91 This thesis does take note though of the point made by 
Ross J. in CLARK V WORKMAN [1920] 1 I.R. 107 and Lord Lindley in 
ALLEN V GOLD REEFS CO. OF WEST AFRICA [1900] ICh. 656 that there 
are safeguards. But see the section below on equitable 
considerations, where this point is dealt with in detail.
92 See CLARK V WORKMAN [1920] 1 I.R. 107 above in section 
1.2. The Memorandum, Articles of Association and Section 25.
93 Ross J. relies here on the words of Lord Lindley in ALLEN 
V GOLD REEFS CO. OF WEST AFRICA [1900] 1 Ch. 656. Where he refers 
to the alteration of articles of association having implied 
conditions. It is important to note his usage of contractual 
terms when referring to the articles.
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[w]ide however as the language of s.5 0 is, the 
power conferred by it must, like all other 
powers, be exercised subject to those general 
principles of law and equity which are 
applicable to all powers conferred on 
majorities enabling them to bind minorities. It 
must be exercised, not only in the manner 
required by law, but also bona fide for the 
benefit of the company as a whole, and it must 
not be exceeded. These conditions are always 
implied, and are seldom, if ever, expressed.94
In CLEMENTS V CLEMENTS BROS. LTD [1976] 2 ALL E.R.
268 Foster J. in the court of first instance declined to 
recognise the ability of a majority shareholder to 
authorise an allotment of shares, the motive behind the 
share allotment being to dilute the voting power of the 
minority shareholder plaintiff.95 Foster J. based his 
decision on what he termed "equitable considerations." 
Thus the mala fides element of the allotment precluded it 
from ratification.
Evershed M.R. considered the bona fide issue in 
GREENHALGH V ARDERNE CINEMAS LTD. [1951] Ch. 286 (C.A.)
where he stated:-
it is now plain that "bona fide" for the 
benefit of the company as a whole" means not 
two things but one thing. It means that the
94 This statement of principle follows on from Romer L. J. in 
MENIER V HOOPER'S TELEGRAPH WORKS (1874) L.R. 9 Ch. App. 350 
holding that, where the majority of a company propose to benefit 
themselves at the expense of the minority, the court may 
interfere to protect the minority.
95 He considered MENIER V HOOPER'S TELEGRAPH WORKS (1874) 
L.R. 9 Ch. App. 350 as a clear case where there was a restraint 
on the shareholders exercise of powers at the general meeting. 
There the majority purported to expropriate the property of the 
company to the exclusion of the minority.
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shareholder must proceed on what, in his honest 
opinion, is for the benefit of the company as 
a whole. Secondly, the phrase, "the company as 
a whole", does not (at any rate in such a case 
as the present) mean the company as a 
commercial entity as distinct from the 
corporators. It means the corporators as a 
general body. That is to say, you may take the 
case of an individual hypothetical member and 
ask whether what is proposed is, in the honest 
opinion of those who voted in its favour, for 
that person's benefit.
Foster J. in CLEMENTS V CLEMENTS BROS. LTD. [1976] 
2 ALL E.R. 268 agreed with Evershed M.R., and was of the 
opinion that "Miss Clements is not entitled to exercise 
her vote in any way she pleases".95
It is difficult to see how the judgment of Evershed 
M.R. can be reconciled with the concept of the 
corporation as a separate entity and with the members 
rights of property inherent in his shareholding. 97 98
The law here is confused as the votes of members are 
rights of property. The case law makes this clear.99
96 See also Lord Wilberforce's judgment in EBRAHIMI V 
WESTBOURNE GALLERIES LTD. [1972] 2 ALL E.R. 492.
97 More particularly in the Irish jurisdiction where Article 
43.1 of the Constitution protects their right of private 
property.
98 For a definition of a "share" see Pennington (1989: 
pp.140-144). There he concludes:-
the most that may be said of shares in a registered 
company by way of definition is that they are a 
species of intangible movable property which comprise 
a collection of rights and obligations relating to an 
interest in the company of an economic and proprietary 
character, but not constituting a debt.
99 They may even enter into agreements as to the exercise of 
that vote in future. Regarding shareholders' agreements 
generally, see Lower (1994b: pp.241-243).
In NORTH-WEST TRANSPORTATION V BEATTY (1887) 12 APP. CAS. 
589, P.C. it was held that members are free to vote in 
their own self interest even if it is contrary to the 
interest of the company.100 There Sir Richard Baggallay 
stated:-
[i]t would be very undesirable even to appear 
to relax the rules relating to dealings between 
trustees and their beneficiaries; on the other 
hand, great confusion would be introduced into 
the affairs of joint stock companies if the 
circumstances of shareholders, voting in that 
character at general meetings, were to be 
examined, and their votes practically 
nullified, if they also stood in some fiduciary 
relation to the company.
The freedom that the members have when exercising 
their votes could not be a more striking contrast to the 
restrictions on the directors' freedom to vote in the 
management organ.101 Shareholders are essentially free 
from the duties of good faith to which the directors are 
subj ect.102
100 See also GOODFELLOW V NELSON LINE [1912] 2 Ch. 324. More 
recently RUSSELL V NORTHERN BANK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION [1992] 
3 All E.R. 161 regarded the shareholders' right to deal with 
their own interests by contract and confirmed their freedom to 
do so. There that freedom almost had the effect of circumscribing 
the exercise of statutory powers by the company. For a 
consideration of the above case and the shareholders' rights of 
property generally see, Ferran (1994: pp.343-366), Savirimuthu 
(1993: pp.137-140), Shapira (1993: pp.210-215) and Sealy (1992a: 
pp.437-439) .
101 See Gower (1979: pp.571-613) .
102 Gower (1979: p. 615) states "it has been repeatedly laid
down that votes are proprietary rights..... which the holder may
exercise in his own selfish interests even if these are opposed 
to those of then company."
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The right of property inherent in share ownership is 
a very significant one.103 Even directors who are also 
members can exercise their votes as members in disregard 
of their fiduciary duties. In NORTHERN COUNTIES 
SECURITIES LTD. V JACKSON & STEEPLE LTD. [1974] 1 W.L.R.
113 3 the directors were bound to recommend the 
shareholders vote for a resolution. They, themselves as 
shareholders, could vote against it if so minded. 
Directors with de facto control of the company can 
disregard their fiduciary duties and force through a 
confirming resolution by the exercise of their own votes.
Walton J. in that case stated:-
I think in a nutshell the distinction is this. 
When a director votes as a director for or 
against any particular resolution in a 
directors' meeting he is voting as a person 
under a fiduciary duty to the company for the 
proposition that the company should take a 
certain course of action. When a shareholder is 
voting for or against a particular resolution 
he is voting as a person owing no fiduciary 
duty to the company who is exercising his own 
right of property to vote as he thinks fit. The 
fact that the result of the voting at the 
meeting (or a subsequent poll) will bind the 
company cannot affect the position that in 
voting he is voting simply as an exercise of 
his own property rights.
He continues in the judgment to discuss the restrictions 
on a director exercising his votes in his capacity as a 
member : -
103 See also STANDARD CHARTERED BANK V WALKER [1992] 1 W.L.R. 
561 for a consideration of the shareholder's right to do as he 
pleases with his property.
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I think that a director who has fulfilled his 
duty as a director of a company by causing it 
to comply with an undertaking binding on it is 
nevertheless free, as an individual 
shareholder, to enjoy the same unfettered and 
unrestricted right of voting at general 
meetings of the members of the company as he 
would have if he were not also a director.
Clearly it can be seen that there is potential for 
abuse of the majority power position.104 Simple majority 
power confers control105 and that majority can easily be 
guilty of behaviour which is damaging to the company and 
the minority, but yet the majority would still be within 
its legal powers. The law has tried to remedy this 
behaviour but, in trying to balance the principle of 
majority control with an equitable solution, the law on 
this area is somewhat labyrinthine and most certainly 
unclear.105 107
The balance between the members' property right and 
any equitable considerations would seem unclear in the 
English jurisdiction. The right of property contained in 
Article 43.1 of the Irish Constitution would be likely to 
override any equitable considerations. Thus any balance 
created by any equitable controls of the articles of
104 See COOK V DEEKS [1916] 1 A.C. 554 and also
CANADA SAFEWAY LTD. V THOMPSON [1951] 3 D.L.R. 295.
105 See Companies Act 1963, Table A.
105 In particular the exceptions which flow from the 
admission by Wigram V.-C. in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461
that "claims of justice" might apply.
107 See Tuffnell (1993: pp. 90-93) for an examination of the 
law regarding restrictions on the rights of shareholders to vote 
in the English jurisdiction.
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association, as per Ross J. and Lord Lindley above, has 
been removed.
1.6 The Erosion of the Rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE.
A problem arises when as a result of the rule in 
FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461 majority shareholders 
are conferred with untrammelled rights. The majority 
could easily abuse their voting powers either controlling 
directors or voting in general meeting.
The rule protects the company from frivolous
behaviour by unhappy shareholders who are in the 
minority. Also any action by such a shareholder would be 
futile where the majority control the general meeting. 
The potential harshness of the rule was recognised in the 
case law and a number of exceptions evolved.
The exceptions arose out of the judgment of Wigram
J. in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 4 61 where he
stated : -
[i] f a case should arise of injury to a 
corporation by some of its members, for which 
no adequate remedy remained, except that of a 
suit by individual corporators in their private 
characters, and asking in such character the 
protection of those rights to which in their 
corporate character they were entitled, I 
cannot but think that the principle so forcibly 
laid down by Lord Cottenham in Wallworth v Holt 
48 R.R. 187 (4 My. & Cr. 635), and other cases, 
would apply, and the claims of justice would be 
found superior to any difficulties arising out 
of technical rules respecting the mode in which 
corporations are required to sue.
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Thus, no majority vote can be effective to sanction an 
act of the company which is ultra vires or illegal.108 If 
procedures either required by law or by the company's 
articles are not observed, then the majority must follow 
that procedure or else the decision is invalid.109 If a 
member is deprived of his individual membership rights 
then he may sue to enforce that right.110 111 If those 
who control the company act oppressively or defraud the 
company the minority may bring an action against the 
majority.112 If this were not allowed then the wrong 
would go unchecked as the majority would be unlikely to 
authorise action against themselves.
In particular the exceptions to the rule in FOSS V 
HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461 prove much more elusive in
practice.113 This is especially so when a shareholder
108 ASHBURY RAILWAY CARRIAGE AND IRON CO. V RICHE (1875) L.R. 
7 H.L.C. 653.
109 JACKSON V MUNSTER BANK 13 L.R. (Ir.) 118.
110 PENDER V LUSHINGTON (1877) 6 Ch. D. 70 there Jessel M.R. 
stated " [t]his is an action by Mr. Pender for himself. He is a 
member of the company, and whether he votes with the majority or
the minority he is entitled to have his vote recorded an
individual right in respect of which he has the right to sue."
111 See also CLARK V WORKMAN [1920] 1 I.R. 107 and HENNESSY 
V NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL & INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
[1947] I.R. 159.
112 Under the Companies Act 1963, section 205 a member can 
petition for an order ending the oppressive conduct or under 
section 215 petition to wind up the company on the grounds that 
it is "just and equitable" to do so or that there has been 
oppressive conduct. An action may also lie in an exception to the 
rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461.
113 See Keane (1991: pp.280-283) for a discussion of the 
procedural problems.
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wishes to bring an action relying on the exception to the 
rule which permits an action to be brought where a 
majority in control of the company are committing a fraud 
on the minority.114 The basis of the exception is that a 
wrong is being done to the company itself and so the 
company is the proper plaintiff.115 The majority are 
unlikely to agree to this and so the law allows an 
exception to the rule that proceedings can not be brought 
on the basis of a wrong done to someone else.
The minority shareholders are permitted to bring a 
derivative action in the name of the company.116 The 
action derives from the wrong done to the company, rather 
than a wrong to the individual shareholders. Difficulties 
have arisen with the procedural aspects of this area.117 
Firstly, it can occur that there is not actually a 
majority in favour of the fraudulent conduct. Thus, 
although there has been an act which may amount to 
fraudulent conduct, the majority can still decline to 
ratify the action, and take steps to remedy it. Thus, any 
derivative action would be premature where the wrongdoers
114 COOK V DEEKS [1916] 1 A.C. 554.
115 See the judgment of Jenkins L.J. in EDWARDS V HALLIWELL 
[1950] 2 ALL E.R. 1064 at 1066.
116 WALLERSTEINER V MOIR (NO. 2) [1975] Q.B. 373 per Lord
Denning at 390-391.
117 For a further examination of the problems surrounding 
derivative actions and the likely future development of the law 
in this area, see Boyle (1990: pp.3-5) and Doyle (1992: pp.1172- 
1173).
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are not actually in control.110 Any shareholder 
contemplating a derivative action must first take all 
steps necessary to establish that the wrongdoers are in 
control, that is to say convene an extraordinary general 
meeting or if the shareholder has not enough votes, 
petition the court to convene one.119
Another difficulty for a shareholder is the fact 
that it may not be possible until a full hearing has been 
held to determine whether fraud has occurred or not. If 
the court decides that there has been no fraud then there 
was never an exception to the rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE 
(1843) 2 Hare 461 and so the action should not have been 
allowed in the first place.
This issue was discussed in PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE CO. 
LTD. V NEWMAN INDUSTRIES LTD. AND OTHERS [1982] Ch. 209. 
The Court of Appeal said that the way to deal with this
118 The court must be satisfied that the wrongdoers are in 
control: ATWOOL V MERRYWEATHER (1867) L.R. 5 Eq. 464n.
119 There would appear to be a difference in approach to 
establishing control between the Irish and English courts. Keane 
(1991: p.281) provides the not altogether convincing opinion that 
"the court may, as we have seen convene a meeting itself and 
would probably do so before embarking on a lengthy trial." In 
this Keane is presumably referring to the suggestion of Wigram 
V.-C. in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461, at 494 that a 
shareholder could institute proceedings only if all means had 
been used to put the general meeting in motion and had failed.
The English courts have adopted a pragmatic approach to 
establishing control. The court must be satisfied that the 
wrongdoers are in effective control. In particular see PAVLIDES 
V JENSEN [1956] Ch. 565 where it was held that it was not 
necessary to prove control but merely to allege facts which, if 
proved, would establish control; if the plaintiffs can not 
establish the allegations at trial then they will lose. Further 
to this in MASON V HARRIS (1879) 11 Ch. D. 97, (C.A.) control
could be established if the defendants were in a majority on the 
board and the register of members indicated that the directors 
hold a clear majority of the shares.
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problem was to determine it as a preliminary issue and 
require the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case as 
to the fraud.120
This approach is unlikely to be adopted in Ireland 
as the Supreme Court in CAMPUS OIL LTD. AND OTHERS. V 
MINISTER FOR INDUSTRY AND ENERGY AND OTHERS. (No.2) 
[1983] I .R . 88 expressed their disapproval of such issues 
being decided at an interlocutory stage.121 Keane (1991: 
p.2 82) comments on this as follows:-
[t]he plaintiff, after all, is the person who 
is likely to suffer in costs if the plea is 
unsustainable. The impracticability of adopting 
any other course was graphically demonstrated 
in SMITH V CROFT (No.2) [1988] Ch. 144, where
the court of first instance in endeavouring 
loyally to apply the Prudential Insurance Co. 
Ltd. technique found itself in the midst of 
what counsel for the plaintiff described as a 
'procedural shambles'. In the event, the 
'preliminary' issue took 17 days to resolve.
In SMITH V CROFT (NO. 2) [1988] Ch. 144 Knox J. in
his conclusion made the following recommendations for 
change : -
120 The Court of Appeal stated " [i]n our view, whatever may 
be the properly defined boundaries of the exception to the rule, 
the plaintiff ought to at least be required before proceeding 
with his action to establish a prima facie case (i) that the
company is entitled to the relief claimed and (ii) that the
action falls within the proper boundaries of the exception to the 
rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461".
121 There Keane J. stated "on an application for an
interlocutory injunction the Court should not normally express 
any concluded opinion upon the issues raised between the parties. 
In this case, as in all others of a similar nature, a final 
determination of the issues between the parties must await the 
full hearing of the action".
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[f ] irst I consider that there may well be a 
much stronger case for requiring a prospective 
plaintiff to have the onus of establishing that 
this case falls within the exceptions to the 
rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 
E.R. 189, or outside it altogether than there 
is for putting the same onus on him to show 
that the company would be likely to succeed if 
it brought the action. On the latter it might 
well be appropriate to apply the usual test 
under RSC Ord 18, rl9 and the inherent 
jurisdiction which puts the onus on the 
defendants to show the case is effectively 
unarguable.
He continues
[t]hird I believe that it would be helpful for 
there to be specific procedure laid down, 
whether by way of rules of court or practice 
direction I do not know, for the initiation and 
prosecution of actions by minority shareholders 
to recover on behalf of a company.122
As well as an action taken to remedy a wrong to the 
company, a shareholder can take a representative action. 
Lord Denning in WALLERSTEINER V MOIR (NO.2) [1975] Q.B.
373 describes it as where:-
[s]tripped of mere procedure, the principle is 
that, where the wrongdoers themselves control 
the company, an action can be brought on behalf 
of the company of the minority shareholders, on 
the footing that they are its representatives 
to obtain redress on its behalf.123
When taking such an action it has often been 
accompanied in England by a preliminary issue regarding
122 See further, Prentice (1988: pp.341-346) and Stallworthy 
(1988 : p p .217-222) .
123 See also Gower (1979: p. 647) .
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costs. The court may order the company to indemnify the 
plaintiff against the costs of the action.124 In 
WALLERSTEINER V MOIR (NO. 2) [1975] Q.B. 373 the court
held that an order for costs should be made, where it was 
reasonable and prudent in the company's interest for the 
plaintiff to bring the action, and he does so in good 
faith. 125 126 The order should also be made irrespective 
of the outcome of the case.
The rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461
enshrines the principle of majority rule. The minority in 
a limited number of circumstance may challenge the 
decisions of the majority.127
The convoluted mechanisms necessary to bring an 
action alleging an exception to the rule in FOSS V 
HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461 are really an attempt to 
maintain some structure to the model company.128 The 
action is in fact being brought by the individual 
shareholder. It is not instigated by the organs of the
124 Similar to the way a trustee is entitled to indemnity 
from his cestui que trust who is sui juris: see HARDON V BELILIOS 
[1901] A .C . 118 and RE RICHARDSON [1911] 2 K.B. 705.
125 There Lord Denning stated " [a] ssuming that the 
shareholder had reasonable grounds for bringing the action -- 
that it was reasonable and prudent course to take in the 
interests of the company -- he should not himself be liable to 
pay the costs..."
12s See Graham (1986: pp. 153-155) regarding the determination 
of the best commercial interests of the company.
127 Only those exceptions which impinge on the company as a 
separate legal entity appear here.
128 Reform of this area in Australia and New Zealand has led 
to the proposal that the rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 HARE 
461 be abolished; Sealy (1991: pp.175-179).
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company. Thus it is truly an exception to the rule that 
only the company can maintain an action for a wrong 
against itself. The mechanism of the action maintains the 
pretence that the action is being instigated by the 
company and that this in some way maintains the integrity 
of the rule.
As well as the above established exceptions there 
may be potential to create others. The minority may be 
entitled to added protection, notwithstanding the rule in 
FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 4 61. Hamilton J. in MOYLAN 
V IRISH WHITING MANUFACTURERS LTD. H.C. UNREPORTED, 14 
APRIL 1980 suggested that the rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE 
(1843) 2 Hare 461 must be applied in the light of the
Constitution. In doing so he examined many authorities 
which suggested that there may be further exceptions to 
the rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 46, arising in 
the interests of justice.
In that judgment Hamilton J. did not explain the 
constitutional basis for his decision. Instead he set out 
the rule in BURLAND V EARLE [1902] A.C. 83 where Lord 
Davey held that:-
[t] he cases in which the minority can maintain 
such an action are therefore, confined to those 
in which the actions complained of are of a 
fraudulent character or beyond the powers of 
the company.
Then Hamilton J. turned to consider RUSSELL V WAKEFIELD 
WATERWORKS CO. (1875) L.R. 20 Eq. 474 where Sir George
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Jessel held : -
[b] ut this is not a universal rule, that is a 
rule subject to exceptions and the exceptions 
depend very much on the necessity of the case, 
that is the necessity for the court doing 
j ustice....
He turned finally to HEYTING V DUPONT [1964] 1 W.L.R. 854 
(C.A.) where Lord Justice Harmond stated
[t]here are cases which suggest that the rule 
is not a right one and that an exception will 
be made where the justice of the case demands 
it.
Hamilton J. then considered that there is an exception to 
the rule where the justice of the case demands it. It is 
not clear however how the constitution impacts on the 
justice of the case.129
The idea that there could be further exceptions was 
dealt with in PRUDENTIAL ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD. V NEWMAN 
INDUSTRIES LTD. AND OTHERS [1982] Ch. 209. There the 
Court of Appeal stated that in their view "the interests
129 In GAIMAN V NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR MENTAL HEALTH [1971] 
Ch. 317 at 335 the argument was raised that the directors of a 
company must exercise their powers in accordance with the 
principles of natural justice. That argument was dismissed by 
Megarry J.
Hamilton J. may be suggesting that the presence of a written 
constitution in the Irish jurisdiction raises a presumption of 
natural justice in the way directors exercise their powers. The 
constitutional right to protection of private property contained 
in article 43.1 strengthens such a suggestion.
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of justice" as an exception would not be applied.130
This thesis believes that it is not possible for the 
judiciary to close off the exceptions to the rule in FOSS 
V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461. They flow from the words 
of Wigram J. where he states "the claims of justice would 
be found superior to any difficulties arising out of 
technical rules." As such if the "claims of justice" 
require a fifth exception to the rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE 
(1843) 2 Hare 461 it must be allowed.131
Hamilton J.'s constitutional reference is equally 
hard to understand in the light of the company's status 
in the constitution. The judgment failed to deal with one 
important element of the argument: the issue of corporate 
personality.132 133
The matter of the effect of the Constitution on 
corporate personality has proved to be a difficult one. 
The corporation has been disqualified from holding rights 
that are classified as personal. For example, the
130 Keane (1991: p.279) agrees; he states " [i] t is thought 
that the exceptions to the rule are so clearly defined that in 
practice the Irish courts would be reluctant to extend them."
131 See Keane (1991: p. 278) for a survey of the case law on 
the fifth exception. See also Barnes (1987: pp.92-95) and 
Oserheimen (1987: pp.1-13).
132 See QUINN'S SUPERMARKETS LTD V ATTORNEY GENERAL [1972] 
I . R . 1 and PRIVATE MOTORISTS' PROVIDENT SOCIETY V ATTORNEY 
GENERAL [1984] I.L.R.M. 88 for an analysis of the corporations 
position.
133 For a consideration of the nature of the separate legal 
entity of the corporation see, Smart (1990: pp.126-136) where he 
argues that the legal personality of the corporation differs from 
that of the individual. Rules of law which were developed for the 
individual need substantial modification for application to the 
corporation. See further, Tapper (1994: pp.350-353).
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corporation has no right of private property134 or 
freedom of worship.135 The Constitution in Ireland has 
meant that the corporation has been degraded to a second 
class constitution existence through fixed wording which 
uses human characteristics to convey rights.136 For 
example, the preclusion of the corporation from holding 
private property in Ireland on the grounds that the words 
"man, in virtue of his rational being..." can not apply 
to a corporate being.137
Taking the ambiguous nature of the corporation under 
the constitution into consideration it is not easy to see 
how exactly Hamilton J. is seeking to apply the 
Constitution.
Statutory Exceptions.
The thesis now turns to consider other exceptions to 
the rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 4 61 in both
Ireland and the U.K. The statutory exceptions provide 
shareholders with a cause of action which does not 
require the organs of the company as instigators.
Section 210 of the U.K Companies Act 1948 was 
designed to remedy situations where a winding up of the
134 Article 43.1.
135 Article 44.2.1 states; freedom of conscience and the free 
profession and practice of religion are, subject to public order 
and morality, guaranteed to every citizen. See further MC GEE V 
ATTORNEY GENERAL [1974] I.R. 284.
136 See for example Article 40.1 where it refers to "human 
persons".
137 Article 43.1.
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company was not applicable, and there was no fraud on the 
minority.136 It proved cumbersome, as it contained the 
proviso that the same grounds for a just and equitable 
winding up must be established before any relief could be 
granted. The section proved difficult to minorities in 
private companies but the presence of the "just and 
equitable" grounds precluded its use by minorities in 
public companies. Instone (1981: pp.1316-1318) states,
the committee:-
[u]nfortunately, in summarising this 
recommendation in para. 153 of the report, used 
language which evidently misled the Department 
of Trade into supposing that the Committee 
intended the new jurisdiction of the Court to 
be coextensive with its power to make a winding 
up order. It is this limitation (embodied in 
section 210 (2) (b) of the 1948 Act) which long
ago gave rise to a general recognition that the 
section was inadequate.
It was almost impossible for a minority within a 
public company to establish any of the grounds needed for 
a "just and equitable" winding up, such as the substratum 
of the company has gone, or that the basis of association 
between the members and the directors has broken down.139
In 1962 the Jenkins Committee recommended that the 
just and equitable grounds be removed from section
138 This was the intention of the Cohen Committee (1945) upon 
which the U.K Companies Act 1948 is based.
139 See the U.K. Companies Act 1948, section 210 (2) (b) .
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210.140 This recommendation was not implemented until 
1980, when section 210 was replaced and re-enacted by- 
section 75 of the Companies Act 1980.141 The same 
provisions are now contained in section 459 of the 
Companies Act 1985, as amended by the Companies Act, 
198 9.142 143 The amendment in 198 9 added the words "of 
members generally". This widened the scope of the section 
which had been criticised as still too restrictive.144
In Ireland the 1963 Companies Act implemented many 
of the recommendations of the Jenkins Committee 
(1962) .146 The 1963 Act contained section 205 which is 
substantially based on section 210 of the U.K. 1948 
Companies Act. Section 205 does not contain the
140 The Committee also recommended the introduction of the 
term "unfairly prejudicial".
141 The recommendation of the Jenkins Committee that the 
available remedies should be amended to allow a court order 
requiring that the company to institute legal proceedings was 
never implemented. This is despite judicial dissatisfaction with 
the present system; see the comments of Knox J. in SMITH V CROFT 
(NO.2) [1988] Ch. 144 above.
142 Schedule 19, para. 11.
143 For a comparison of section 459 and the exceptions to the 
rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 HARE 461, see Griffin (1992a: 
pp.389-393) .
144 See Bouchier (1991: pp. 132-143) for a consideration of 
the effect of the 1989 amendment. See also Griffin (1992b: pp.83- 
88) and Stapledon (1993: pp.94-97) for an examination of the 
problems which have arisen since 1989.
145 For an examination of the most recent cases, see Mercer 
and Shilling (1994: pp.2-3) and Mays (1994: pp.3-4).
146 The timing of the Irish Act is not unrelated to the 
Report of the Jenkins Committee (1962) the year before.
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restrictive just and equitable grounds.147
The Irish legislation is thus less obviously 
restrictive. Section 205 of the 1963 Act provides:-
[a]ny member of a company who complains that 
the affairs of the company are being conducted 
or that the powers of the directors of the 
company are being exercised in a manner 
oppressive to him or any of the members 
(including himself), or in disregard of his or 
their interests as members, may apply to the 
court for an order under this section.
Section 205 has been successfully used by minorities 
in private companies, but is difficult for minorities in 
public companies to use.148 Even the remedies provided by 
the courts for those actions of private company members 
points to a specific problem with judicial thinking in 
minority v majority actions. The most frequent remedy 
granted under section 205 is an order for the majority to 
purchase the shares of the minority.149 This remedy is an 
unusual choice when the court has a discretion to remedy 
unscrupulous conduct even where no legal rights have been
147 The recommendations of the Jenkins Committee (1962) with 
regard to the minority protection section were applied as well 
as the recommendations of the Cox Committee (195 9). The further 
recommendations of the Jenkins Committee with regard to the court 
order requiring companies to institute legal proceedings were 
not.
148 The first recorded judgment given on the section was not 
until 1974 in RE WESTWINDS HOLDINGS LTD., H.C., UNREPORTED, 21 
MAY 1974.
149 This was the remedy applied by Keane J. in RE GREENORE 
TRADING COMPANY LIMITED. [1980] I.L.R.M. 94.
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infringed and power to make such order as it sees fit.
Logically, if the majority have by their behaviour 
caused the minority to seek a remedy and the minority 
have fulfilled the criteria of section 205, the majority 
should be the ones who have their shares bought out. For 
the court to use its powers to exclude the minority from 
the running of the business makes commercial sense but 
does not, it is submitted, result in an equitable or fair 
solution.
The lack of any substantial case law on section 205 
suggests that something is wrong either with the 
application of the section or with the section itself. 
Keane (1991: pp. 284-285) is of the opinion that the
section is very successful; in fact the lack of case law 
is attributable to its success. He states:-
[t]he volatile and quarrelsome Irish 
temperament makes the possibility of 
internecine warfare between shareholders in 
such companies more likely than in the 
neighbouring jurisdiction. It is all the more 
surprising, therefore, to find that so few 
decisions have been given by the Irish courts 
on the section since its enactment. Experience 
suggests, however, that while recourse to the 
section is more frequent than the number of 
decisions would indicate, a great many 
applications are settled without the court 
being called upon to adjudicate.
While Keane's observations may in some way explain the 
lack of case law, it is not entirely satisfactory when 
minorities within public limited companies are
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considered.150
As well as using the procedure under section 205 of 
the Companies Act 1963, a member of the company may 
petition to have the company wound up. If the court is 
satisfied that the company's affairs are being conducted 
or that the powers of the directors of the company are 
being exercised in a manner oppressive to any member or 
in disregard of his interest as a member, it will wind up 
the company. The court must also consider that the 
winding up is justified in the general circumstance. The 
court may also dismiss the petition and instigate an 
action under section 205. The individual member has thus 
twin statutory exceptions to the rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE 
(1843) 2 Hare 461.
Minorities in Public Limited Companies.
The minority protection legislation is more 
applicable to the private limited company, than the 
public limited company. The area of minority protection 
in both the U.K. and the Irish jurisdiction failed to 
come to terms with the increasing use of the Stock 
Exchange as a source of finance. The lack of use of 
minority legislation against publicly quoted companies 
certainly suggests that there is some problem with its 
applicability to the problems of the minority shareholder
150 Keane (1991: p. 284) does admit that the legislation is 
more likely to be used by minorities in private limited 
companies.
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within the public limited company.151
In attempting to frame minority legislation that is 
equally applicable to both public and private companies, 
the legislature has failed to recognise that the nature 
of minorities in public and private companies are 
fundamentally different. In the U.K. the legislation 
effectively ignores the needs of minority shareholders 
within public companies.152 In Ireland the legislation is 
more applicable to both minorities but has been no more 
effective than its U.K. counterpart.
The relationships between shareholders and directors 
within private companies are essentially closer and more 
personal than those in public companies.153 This makes it 
easier to legislate for any problems that might arise. 
The ratio of private companies to public companies in 
Ireland would also suggest that the legislation be 
primarily aimed at the problems of minorities in private 
companies.
In 1925, the number of private companies in the 
Irish state was 1,088; the number of public companies was
151 The Jenkins Committee (1962) referring to all types of 
companies, considered the minority legislation under-utilised. 
Only two applications for relief were brought under s. 210 since 
its introduction in 1948. They were SCOTTISH CO-OPERATIVE 
WHOLESALE SOCIETY V MEYER [1959] A.C. 324 (H.L.) and RE H.R.
HARMER LTD. [1958] 3 ALL E.R. 689, C.A.
152 By maintaining legislation which is difficult to use: see 
above comments on the Companies Act 1985, section 459.
153 While the two forms of business may share similar 
articles of association, the nature of their shareholdings are 
entirely different. On this particular point see Chapter five.
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368 . 154 155 In 1956, the number of private companies in 
Ireland was 7,3 85; and public companies had remained 
virtually static at 3 7 2155. In 1982, the number of
private companies was 69,432; and the public companies
numbered 337 . 157 By 1987, private companies numbered 
92,811; and public companies 349.158
The above figures are of importance as they indicate 
the dominance of the private company as the premier form 
of incorporated business in Ireland. As such the
Companies legislation is aimed at that form. The public
company is an essentially different creature than its 
private counterpart. It is nonetheless a significant, 
"high profile" form of business.
The legislation as framed and used to date can only 
discourage the minority within public companies.159 A 
minority shareholder in a public company is unlikely to
154 Report of the Cox Committee (1958) .
155 In 1933 only 24 of those public companies were listed on 
the Dublin Stock Exchange; Meenan (1970: pp.146-7).
156 By 1957 the number of quoted companies had risen to 80; 
Meenan (1970: pp.146-7).
157 Department of Industry and Commerce (1987) .
158 In 1995 the number of quoted companies was 90; Irish 
Independent (19 95).
159 Further there is no finance available from the company. 
Griffin (1992c: pp.137-139) examines the law regarding the 
funding of shareholder actions. He concludes:-
[i] t has been clearly established and confirmed by 
recent case law that it is a fundamental principle of 
company law that a company should not be involved in 
providing money for the defence of a minority 
petition, in which the dispute in question is in 
reality one as between the shareholders.
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pursue a costly legal action, which will only result in 
his shares being bought by the company. He could have 
sold his shares on the Stock Exchange in the first 
place.160 Another reason why the legislation is little 
used by minority shareholders is that they look to the 
institutional investors to protect their interests.161
Conclusion.
The rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461 is no 
longer a rule which has general application.162 There are 
four well established exceptions to the rule at common 
law and the open-ended potential for others under the 
heading "interests of justice." The two statutory 
exceptions are wide, and provide the member with a course 
of action procedurally less cumbersome than the 
exceptions at common law.163 It can no longer be said 
that it lies with the organs of the company to instigate 
an action for a wrong to the company.
160 While this point is valid for the U.K. exchange it must 
be tempered by the size of the Irish Stock Exchange where 
liquidity is sometimes difficult. See Nuki (1994: p. 3) . Also only 
a small number of public companies are listed on the Irish Stock 
Exchange.
161 See chapter three, 3.3 The Effect of the Institutional 
Investor.
162 For an examination of the Australian experience with the 
rule in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461, see Sealy (1989a:
pp.52-57) . There he concludes that the Australian judiciary are 
willing to minimise the common law procedural obstacles that 
assemble under the rule.
163 For a consideration of the combination of the rule in 
FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 HARE 461 and the English statutory
exception, see Graham (1989: pp.66-67).
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1.7 The Unworkable Model.
This chapter set out to describe a model company. 
Three aspects of the model were regarded as of particular 
importance, SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) 
the memorandum and articles of association, and the rule 
in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461. SALOMON V SALOMON 
& CO. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) established the company as a 
legal entity separate and distinct from its members and 
promoters. The legal entity was governed by the 
memorandum and the articles of association which provided 
its direction, structure and regulation. The rule in FOSS 
V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461 interacts with both the
decision in SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) 
and the ownership and control mechanisms in the articles 
of association, by placing any cause of action for a 
wrong to the company in the hands of the organs of the 
company and maintaining the company as the proper 
plaintiff.
It has been shown that the decision in SALOMON V 
SALOMON & CO. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) has been seriously
eroded. The motives of the members and promoters are no 
longer separate and distinct from that of the company. 
The company is no longer ubiquitously considered to be a 
separate legal entity. The memorandum which purports to 
provide the company with its direction through the 
objects clause is no longer of importance due to the 
statutory remedies for ultra vires transactions. The
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contractual import of the articles of association have no 
longer any certainty and the member has no longer a 
general right to rely on the provisions thereof. The rule 
in FOSS V HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 Hare 461 has many
exceptions, to the extent that it can no longer be said 
that the organs of the company instigate an action for a 
wrong done to the company or that the company is the 
proper plaintiff. The model is no longer workable.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS.
Part 1.
2.0 The Board of Directors as the Management Orcran.
This chapter continues the hypothesis outlined in 
the previous chapter, that the model company has been 
eroded. This chapter describes a model board of 
directors, then examines how it has been degraded to a 
secondary organ. As in chapter one the description is in 
two parts. In Part 1 the thesis examines the model role 
of the board as the management organ of the company. In 
Part 2 the chapter turns to examine the way in which the 
board of directors has been degraded as the management 
organ of the company.
The model board of directors is created through the 
registration procedure in the Companies Acts 1963-1990. 
That registration procedure involves the provision of a 
memorandum and optional articles of association. The 
articles of association provide the management structure 
of the company and the Companies Acts provide for the 
appointment of the first directors. Thus the directors 
are appointed and vested with power in the same procedure 
as gives rise to the separate entity of the company.1 The 
directors then exercise that power in pursuit of the 
objects of the company, all the while being regulated by 
the procedures in the articles of association, the
1 SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [1897] A.C. 22, (H.L.)
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Companies Acts and the fiduciary duties which arise in 
the appointment to the board and which are owed to the 
company as an entity.2
The Vesting of Power.
The registration procedure for the incorporation of 
a company has been dealt with in detail in chapter one.3 
This section of the thesis touches on the impact of the 
registration procedure on the board of directors.
As has been discussed in the first chapter, one of 
the most significant consequences of incorporation is 
that the company is itself a legal person.4 This is in 
essence an artificial device as the "person" of the 
company can in no way act for itself. Cairns L.J. 
discussed this in FERGUSON V WILSON (1866) L.R. 2 Ch. 77 
at 89 where he stated:-
[t]he company itself cannot act as its own 
person; it can only act through directors and 
the case is, as regards those directors, merely 
the ordinary case of principal and agent.
The company acts through the board of directors as an
2 "The articles constitute the contract between the company 
and the member in respect of his rights and liabilities as a 
shareholder. Furthermore, it is to be remembered that the 
management of the company is entrusted to the directors, who have 
to exercise their powers in the interests of the company as a 
whole" per Neill L.J. in BURR V HARRISON AND OTHERS, (C.A.) CIVIL 
DIVISION, UNREPORTED, 25 MARCH 1994.
3 See chapter one, 1.2 The Memorandum, Articles of
Association and Section 25.
4 SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [1897] A.C 22, (H.L.).
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organ of the company. That organ is created by the
registration of articles of association.5
The registration procedure required by the Companies 
Acts provides for the appointment of the first directors 
and secretary,6 and thereafter for the appointment of 
directors to be placed in the hands of the general
meeting.7 As Gower (1979: p.140) states:-
the theory seems to be that the company, as 
such, has, in its constitution, appointed its
agents and clothed them with authority; the act
which gives birth to the company operates as an 
appointment and delegation by the company.
It is the company which delegates powers to the 
directors. The extent of that power depends on the
article which delegates it. The usual case is that the
directors may exercise all the powers of the company
which are not by the Acts or the articles required to be
exercised by the company in general meeting.8 Essentially 
the board of directors can do whatever the company may
5 Companies Act 1963, sections 11-15.
6 The first directors of a company must be named in
the particulars delivered with the memorandum to the Registrar
of Companies in order to fulfil the requirements of the Companies
(Amendment) Act 1982, section 3. Those named in the particulars 
become the directors of the company upon the issuing of the 
certificate of incorporation by the registrar.
7 See Companies Act 1963, Table A.
8 As per Companies Act 1963, Table A, article 80.
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do. Thus the board may not act illegally or ultra vires.9 
The powers of the board are vested collectively and thus 
must be exercised collectively.
As can be seen from chapter one, the articles of
association contain an article which delegates the
management function upwards from the general meeting to 
the board of directors.
Ussher states:-
the article most commonly used in these islands for 
over a century to delegate powers of management to 
the board of directors has been consistently 
interpreted by the courts as vesting exclusive
management powers in the board. (198 6: p. 85)
The company once the incorporation procedure is complied 
with is "born" with its management structure, fully 
vested with power, in place.
Regulation bv the Articles of Association and the 
Companies Acts.
Table A, articles 92-100, provide for the retirement
of directors by rotation and their re-election by the
general meeting.10 Any casual vacancies may be filled
until the next general meeting, and both the board and
the general meeting may appoint additional directors.
9 Note here that the directors are pursuing the objects of 
the company. They can only use their powers in pursuit of those 
objects. If they operate outside the objects that transaction 
will be ultra vires and invalid. See chapter one 1.2 The 
Memorandum, Articles of Association and Section 25.
10 Usually by ordinary resolution.
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Power to remove a director lies with the general meeting, 
who may do so by ordinary resolution.11
The Companies Act 1963, section 174 provides that 
all companies must have at least two directors. The 
adoption of the "two directors" rule is another feature 
selected from the recommendations of The Jenkins 
Committee (1962). The requirement was designed as a 
protective measure for shareholders, and to avoid 
difficulties arising from the death of a sole director. 
The intention of the Jenkins Committee (1962) was to 
"check the present spate of irresponsible 
incorporations."12 The measure is strictly enforced. 
Carroll J. in RE HUNTING LODGES LTD. [1985] I.L.R.M. 75 
dealt with a wife who was a nominal second director. She 
stated that the wife:-
cannot evade liability by claiming that she was only 
concerned with minding the house and looking after 
the children. If that was the limit of her 
responsibilities she wanted, she should not have 
become a director of the company, or having become 
one she should have resigned. Any person who becomes 
a director takes on responsibilities and duties, 
particularly where there are only two. The balance 
sheet and profit an loss account and directors' 
report should have been signed by her. A director 
who continues as a director but abdicates all 
responsibility is not lightly to be excused.13
11 Companies Act 1963, section 182.
12 Cmnd. 1749, paras. 20, 25.
13 Carroll J. found that Mrs. Porrit had in fact 
participated in the business of the company and that applying the 
definition of Pennycuick V.-C. in IN RE MAIDSTONE BUILDING 
PROVISIONS LTD. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1085 she came within the ambit
of the Companies Act 1963 section 297 (1) (fraudulent trading).
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Apart from the requirement that there must be two 
directors, the Companies Acts do not contain any further 
qualifications for a director to fulfil. There is no 
objective requirement that they have any knowledge of the 
fiduciary character of their function, or of the 
procedural restrictions on their powers. There are though 
persons the Companies Acts specifically exclude from 
holding office as directors.
The Companies Act 1990, Part VII provides for the 
disqualification and restriction of directors and other 
officers on conviction on indictment of any indictable 
offence in relation to a company, or involving fraud or 
dishonesty. Such persons are disqualified from holding 
office as an auditor, director, or other officer, 
receiver, liquidator or examiner or be in any way, 
whether directly or indirectly, concerned or take part in 
the promotion, formation or management of any company.
The Companies Act 1963, section 176 prohibits a body 
corporate from holding office as a company. This is a 
further adoption of the recommendations of the Jenkins 
Committee (1962) 14 which was designed to prevent the use 
of a multiplicity of corporate personalities to shield 
directors from their responsibilities.
Some companies do require directors to fulfil a 
share qualification before they can be appointed. This is 
a matter for the general meeting to decide upon and the 
standard form articles of Table A do not contain such a
14 Cmnd. 1749, para. 84.
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provision.
As mentioned above, directors' powers are conferred 
collectively on the board as a whole. Thus that power 
can, prima facie, only be validly exercised at a board 
meeting which complies with the notice and quorum 
requirements. It was decided in BROWN V LA TRINIDAD 
(1887) 37 Ch. D. 1 (C.A.) that notice in the context of
board meetings means reasonable notice with regard to the 
practice of the company.
Voting is by way of a majority decision but if the 
minority are not notified of a board meeting then such 
votes at the meeting are ineffective. The logic behind 
this was set out by Jessel M.R. in BARBER'S CASE (1877) 
5 Ch. D. 963 (C.A.) at 968. In that case it was held that 
the meeting was invalid and ineffective; and non constat 
that the persuasive oratory of the minority would not 
have induced the majority to change their minds. Table A 
provides that a resolution in writing signed by all the 
directors entitled to receive notice of meetings shall be 
valid as if a meeting had been held and a resolution 
voted on.
From this it can be gathered that neither an 
individual director or any group of directors has powers 
to delegate vested in him or it. The board will only have 
power to delegate their authority if the articles or 
memorandum expressly authorise them to do so. Table A 
does provide power to so through article 112 which 
states:-
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[t] he directors may entrust to and confer upon a 
managing director any of the powers exercisable by 
them upon such terms and conditions and with such 
restrictions as they may think fit, and either 
collaterally with or to the exclusion of their own 
powers, and may from time to time revoke, withdraw, 
alter or vary all or any of such powers.
This article provides a means by which wide powers can be 
conferred upon a managing director and yet may be 
withdrawn if necessary. Essentially the terms of the 
managing director's appointment will define the scope of 
his powers.
In HOLDSWORTH Sc C O . V CADDIES [1955] 1 W.L.R. 352
the appointment of a managing director to a holding
company provided that he should perform the duties and
exercise the powers in relation to the businesses of the 
holding company and its subsidiaries, as would be
assigned to him by the board of the holding company. 
Problems arose, and the board directed him to confine his 
attentions to the business of one of the subsidiaries. It 
was held that this did not amount to a breach of the 
service contract, even though he was no longer fulfilling 
managerial functions in relation to the company which 
employed him.15 The Court further held that the post of 
managing director does not carry, by virtue of its 
nature, certain specific functions. It is up to the
15 A board resolution was passed which read " [t]he board 
decided that the managing director confine his attentions to 
British Textile Manufacturing Co., Ltd. only. Permanent 
arrangements for management at Balne Mills will be made later." 
It was held that this did not breach the contract of service and 
that even if it did such breach did not go to the root of the 
contract.
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parties to define the scope of the appointment.
The wording of article 112 is important. The words 
"to the exclusion of their own power" are an implicit 
acknowledgement of the ability of the board to divest 
themselves of their own powers in favour of a managing 
director. It is therefore possible that, if the board did 
not reserve to themselves a power of supervision in any 
appointment of a managing director, the board could not 
exercise the powers conferred during the period of the 
appointment. Therefore it is possible for the board to 
substitute the managing director for the board's function 
as a primary organ, the managing director exercising such 
powers as agreed, the board exercising such powers as 
retained and the general meeting exercising residual 
powers. The general meeting retains the ultimate veto of 
removing the board and managing director, thus retaining 
theoretical control. Any breach of a managing director's 
contract by the board or the general meeting would give 
rise to damages as provided by the Companies Act 1963, 
section 182 (7) thus providing one disincentive for 
removal.
2.1 The Model Fiduciary.
An individual director stands in a fiduciary 
relationship to his company. A fiduciary has 
power to deal with the property of another, and 
it is assumed therefore to occupy a position of 
trust and confidence in relation to that other, 
whom we might loosely call the beneficiary. 
Ussher (1986: p.200)
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The law with regard to the fiduciary relationship of the 
director with the company has evolved in piecemeal. The 
fiduciary duties by no means form a coherent code, and 
are in general drawn from particular decisions of the 
courts. Many duties overlap and so an act by a director 
may breach many duties at once.15
It was noted above that the general meeting is but 
one of the two primary organs present in the company. In 
practice the powers of the company are mostly vested in 
the board of directors not the general meeting. The board 
either exercises that managerial power itself or 
delegates it to professional managers. It is of great 
importance to see what duties are owed by directors, 
particularly as the power to manage moves further away 
from the originating source of the general meeting.
The fiduciary duties owed by directors have been 
generally described in terms of trustee status.17 This 
relates specifically to the origins of Companies 
themselves. Companies, prior to the Joint Stock Companies 
Act 1844 were unincorporated and the constitutional 
document was a deed of settlement vesting the assets of 
the company in trustees. The early case law tended to use 
the words "fiduciary" and "trustee" interchangeably.18
15 See Flannigan (1989: pp.285-322) and Bayne (1986) for a
consideration of the law regarding directors as fiduciaries.
17 For a consideration of the use of the trustee analogy see 
Mac Cann (1991c: pp.56-61).
18 Sealy (1962: p.69) discusses the use of the term 
"fiduciary" and traces its judicial usage to the 1840's. For a 
consideration of the use of the terms "fiduciary" and "trustee",
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In ATT. GEN. V BELFAST CORPORATION (1855) 4 Ir. Ch. 
Rep. 119 at 160 Maziere Brady L.C. attributed the word 
"trustee" to the relationship between the office holder 
and the corporation in which he holds office. In GRIMES 
V HARRISON (1859) 26 Beav. 435 the directors of a
building society were held liable for breach of trust 
while the actual trustees escaped liability. The court 
was of the opinion that the trustees had only a
supervisory role, acting on the instructions of the 
directors. It was common at that time for the trustees
and directors to be different persons and the court of
equity treated the directors as trustees in so far as 
they dealt with the company's property.19
With the advent of incorporated companies, the 
analogy with trustees became less appropriate. The 
courts, though, continued to apply the law to directors 
as if they were trustees. In RE GERMAN MINING CO. EX P. 
CHIPPENDALE (1853) 4 DE G.M. & G. 19 the courts carried 
this concept to extremes by granting directors a
trustee's right to be indemnified as the beneficiaries of 
the members.
There are some similarities between the duties of 
directors and trustees, in that, while the board 
exercises its power collectively, the fiduciary duties 
are owed by the individual. This compares exactly with 
the trustee who acts jointly but owes duties of good
see Lowry (1994a: pp.1-12).
19 See further Gower (1979: pp. 571-572) .
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faith severally to the beneficiaries. It must be noted 
though that this alone is not sufficient to confer 
trustee status on the director.
Romer J. in RE CITY EQUITABLE FIRE INSURANCE CO. 
[1925] Ch. 407 sought to clarify the issue. He stated at 
p.426:-
[i] t is sometimes said that directors are 
trustees. If this means no more than that 
directors in the performance of their duties 
stand in a fiduciary relationship with the 
company, the statement is true enough. But if 
the statement is meant to be an indication by 
way of analogy of what those duties are, it 
appears to me to be wholly misleading. I can 
see but little resemblance between the duties 
of a director and the duties of a trustee of a 
will or of a marriage settlement. It is indeed 
impossible to describe the duty of a director 
in general terms, whether by way of analogy or 
otherwise. The position of a director of a 
company carrying on a small retail business is 
very different from that of a director of a 
railway company. The duties of a bank director 
may differ widely from those of an insurance 
director, and the duties of a director of 
another. In one company for instance, matters 
may normally be attended to by the manager or 
other members of the staff that in another 
company are attended to by the directors 
themselves. The larger the business carried on 
by the company the more numerous and the more 
important the matters that must of necessity be 
left to the managers, the accountants and the 
rest of the staff. The manner in which the work 
of the company is to be distributed between the 
board of directors and the staff is in truth a 
business matter to be decided on business 
lines...
It has thus been the case that directors are not per 
se in a position analogous to a trustee.
The fiduciary relationship between a director and a 
company imposes a set of duties of good faith which are
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virtually identical to the duties imposed on a trustee. 
It is when dealing with these duties, that the analogy 
with a trustee seems to be applied. The analogy can not 
be extended further as the duties of skill and care owed 
by a director to the company are completely different to 
those of a trustee to the beneficiary.20
Another reason why the word "trustee" has been 
used is because of the judicial use of the constructive 
trust to remedy situations where a fraud has been 
committed by a director. Directors are only trustees in 
exceptional circumstances, such as when they have 
committed a fraud.21 The directors who have become 
constructive trustees have become so, essentially through 
the fraud they have committed. A comparison between the 
duties of such a constructive trustee and the fiduciary 
duties of a director who is running a company in the 
normal course of business is not at all appropriate. The 
nature of the constructive trustee's duties arises from 
his fraud, whereas the fiduciary nature of the duties 
owed by the director, acting in the normal course of 
business, arises upon accepting his position as a 
director. In LINDGREN V L. & P . ESTATES LTD. [1968] Ch. 
572, (C.A.) an argument that "directors-elect" are in a
20 See Gower (1979: pp.602-603) .
21 For a consideration of the applicable principles 
regarding constructive trustee status, see RUSSELL V WAKEFIELD 
WATERWORKS CO. (1875) L.R. 20 Eq. 474, BELMONT FINANCE
CORPORATION V WILLIAMS FURNITURE LTD. (NO.2) [1980] 1 ALL E.R.
3 93 and ROLLED STEEL PRODUCTS (HOLDINGS) LTD. V BRITISH STEEL 
CORPORATION [1986] Ch. 246.
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fiduciary relationship with the company was rejected.22 
The duties begin once the appointment takes place.
If the director is not a trustee but is in a 
fiduciary relationship with the company, from where does 
this fiduciary relationship arise? The weight of case law 
would suggest a connection between agency and the 
fiduciary relationship.23
The company, through its adoption of articles of 
association, has in the same instance appointed the 
directors as agents. This agency is created by article 
80. Ussher (1986: p.201) states:-
[t]he term "fiduciary" is of comparatively 
recent coinage; it is a generic term covering 
a variety of relationships, most of which are 
a species of agency, and of which that between 
a director and his company is only one.
Gower (1979: p.571) states : -
[n]evertheless, to describe directors as 
trustees seems today to be neither strictly 
correct nor invariably helpful. In truth, 
directors are agents of the company rather than 
trustees of its property. But as agents they 
stand in a fiduciary relationship to their 
principal, the company.
22 REGAL (HASTINGS) LTD. V GULLIVER [1942] 1 ALL E.R. 378 
was distinguished by Danckwerts L.J. as the directors in that 
case had made a profit from their position and the action had 
been brought against them when they were no longer directors, on 
behalf of the company, by a new board.
23 See Cairns L.J in FERGUSON V WILSON (1866) L.R. 2 Ch. 77 
above.
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The connection between agent and fiduciary is further 
substantiated by the case law dealing with directors who 
have become agents for the shareholders with which we now 
deal.
As a general rule the fiduciary duties of directors 
are owed to the company alone, not the individual members 
or even potential members.
This was established in PERCIVAL V WRIGHT [1902] 2
Ch. 421 by the judgment of Swinfen Eady J. An earlier 
Irish authority proposition for this can be found in 
SMITH V CORK & BANDON RAILWAY CO. (1870) 5 I.R. Eq. 65
where Christian L.J. stated:-
I am aware that there have been cases in which, for 
some purposes, directors of joint stock companies 
have been assimilated to trustees as for example, in 
the not permitting them to make their office a 
source of private profit - but that they are actual 
trustees for each individual shareholder is a 
proposition which presents itself to my mind with 
all the effect of novelty...
It can occur, though, that the directors stand in a 
direct fiduciary relationship with the shareholders when 
the directors assume some form of agency position for the 
members.24 When this has occurred the case law has drawn 
a clear connection between the agency and fiduciary 
status of the directors. In BRIESS V WOOLLEY [1954] A.C. 
333. (H.L.) the directors were authorised by the members
to negotiate on their behalf with a potential takeover
24 For an examination of this concept, see Collins (1992: 
pp.556-562).
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bidder. The directors in that case had assumed the status 
of agents for the members, and so also had a fiduciary 
relationship with them.25
The law has evolved since then to a position where 
a relationship which falls short of agency may give rise 
to a fiduciary relationship.26 In COLEMAN V MEYERS [1977] 
2 N.Z.L.R. 225 (N.Z.C.A.) Woodhouse J. held that a full
agency relationship may not be a necessity in order to 
give rise to a fiduciary relationship between the 
directors and shareholders in a small private company. He 
stated at p.324 that a fiduciary relationship could 
arise:-
depending upon all the surrounding 
circumstances and the nature of the 
responsibility which in a real and practical 
sense the director has assumed towards the 
shareholder...
The implications of the case are important. It is 
clear from the case that Woodhouse J. was certain that an 
agency relationship will also give rise to a fiduciary 
one.27 The creation of a category of responsibility which
25 See also WEIR V BELL (1878) 3 EX.D. 23 8 where Bramwell 
L.J. stated "every person who authorises another to act for him 
in the making of any contract, undertakes for the absence of 
fraud in that person in the execution of the authority given, as 
much as he undertakes for its absence in himself when he makes 
the contract." See also MAIR V RIO GRANDE RUBBER ESTATES LTD. 
[1913] A .C . 853.
26 For an examination of the evolving concept of the 
"fiduciary", see Mason (1994: pp.238-259).
27 For an examination of this case and a consideration of 
the position generally in Australia, see Ashe (1994: pp.24-26) .
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falls short of agency but which still gives rise to a 
fiduciary duty, creates an area of responsibility which 
hitherto had not existed for directors.
Further weight has been given to the proposition 
that directors may in certain circumstance depending on 
the nature of their responsibility become fiduciaries for 
the members. In SECURITIES TRUST LTD. V ASSOCIATED 
PROPERTIES LTD. H.C., UNREPORTED, NOVEMBER 19 1980 the 
directors of a company suppressed important information 
in the offer documents of a potential take-over bid. 
McWilliam J. discussed the directors' fiduciary 
responsibility:-
I have not been addressed on the duty of 
directors towards their own members or their 
position as agents or otherwise vis a vis the 
shareholders on such a transaction but, 
although a director is not a trustee for the 
shareholders, directors are to some extent in 
a fiduciary position...
While fiduciary duties to the members can 
potentially arise in agency or quasi-agency situations, 
the position has remained ambiguous as to when exactly 
this relationship can be established. Ussher (1986: 
p.2 06) comments on this by stating that there may be : -
an emergent fiduciary duty owed by directors to 
members to disclose material facts when the 
members' rights are to be directly affected by 
proposals to which the directors are party or 
privy, provided that the directors are trusted 
and relied upon to do so by the members, which 
will not of course, always be the case.
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The agency which arises from article 80 also gives 
rise to the fiduciary duties owed to the company by the 
directors.28 The company as an entity is formed complete 
with a separation of ownership and control. The articles 
and the Companies Acts regulate the interaction of the 
board and the general meeting. The separation of 
ownership and control gives rise to a fiduciary 
relationship which has evolved a number of specific 
duties, owed individually by the directors.
In this context, the question may arise as to when 
the directors are appointed agents of the company. The 
answer is that if Table A or its equivalent is adopted, 
the directors are appointed as agents as and from 
incorporation of the company.
28 Hunter Q.C. in GILMORE V DENNYS Q.B., UNREPORTED, 17
DECEMBER 1993 stated:-
[t]he potential for conflict within a joint stock 
company is obvious. Whether the shareholders number in 
their thousands or whether there is just a handful of 
shareholders, who in economic terms at least can be 
regarded as in substance a partnership, there are in 
the nature of business life likely to be differing 
alliances of interest which will form and disband and 
differences of opinion which will arise and then 
disappear in an ever-changing kaleidoscope depending 
on the particular issue. The structure and 
constitution of the modern registered company is 
designed to provide a mechanism for the efficient 
resolution of such disputes while giving proper 
recognition to the legitimate rights and interests of 
all concerned.
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Part 2.
2.2 The Degraded Board of Directors.
In this second section of the chapter, the thesis 
argues that the model board of directors is no longer the 
primary organ of the Table A company. The delegation of 
the control power vested in the board by the general 
meeting through article 8 0 is unclear and open to 
interference from the general meeting. The acceptance of 
the judiciary of the appointment of directors to serve 
another interest has eroded the board as the primary 
management organ and lessened the fiduciary duties owed 
to the company.
The fiduciary duties owed to the company have been 
successively defined in terms of the major component 
element of the company; the shareholders rather than the 
company. Thus the duty is no longer owed to the company 
but to the shareholders. Consequentially the existence of 
a large block of shareholders with interests other than 
the company's can distort the intention of the fiduciary 
duties.29
The fiduciary duties of directors to avoid conflict 
of interest and fettered discretion have been eroded by 
the recognition of nominee directors and the ability of 
shareholders to waive the duties owed in the articles of 
association. The statutory duty contained in section 53
29 See chapter four.
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of the Companies Act 1990 further erodes the management's 
ability to make decisions in the interest of the company 
as it introduces a duty to the employees. The directors 
must also comply with a quasi-duty to the shareholders 
arising from the Companies Act 1963, section 205, not to 
act oppressively or in disregard of their interests. This 
duty is complex as decisions of the board may be judged 
oppressive or in disregard of the interests of the 
members even though the directors were acting in good 
faith and within their legitimate powers.30
The final and perhaps the most complete erosion of 
the board's power to manage is the existence of a large 
group of shareholders within the company who have 
interests other than the company's to pursue. This is 
especially prevalent in public limited companies listed 
on the Stock Exchange, where institutional shareholders 
predominate.
2.3 Members' Power to Interfere in Management Decisions.
While it is clear that the company has two organs, 
the general meeting and the board of directors, their 
exact relationship to each other is ambiguous. While 
article 8 0 delegates the management power of the general 
meeting upward to the board, the extent of that
30 RE IRISH VISITING MOTORISTS BUREAU LTD. H.C., UNREPORTED,
27 JANUARY 1972 . See also the English decision RE A COMPANY, 
EX.P. SCHWARCZ (NO.2) [1989] B.C.L.C. 427 and Lowry (1994c:
pp.606-609).
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delegation needs to be explored.
The original concept of the relationship was that 
the general meeting was the company proper, and that the 
board of directors were purely acting as the agents of 
the company. The board had no separate autonomy and was 
subject to the total control of the general meeting.
An example of this concept can be found in ISLE OF 
WIGHT RAILWAY V TAHOURDIN (1883) 25 Ch. D. 320, (C.A.)
where the directors of a company sought to prevent the 
holding of a general meeting, one purpose of which was to 
appoint a reorganisation committee to review the 
management of the company. Cotton L.J. at p.329 stated:-
[i] t is a very strong thing indeed to prevent 
shareholders from holding a meeting of the company, 
when such a meeting is the only way in which they 
can interfere, if the majority of them think that 
the course taken by the directors, in a matter intra 
vires of the directors, is not for the benefit of 
the company.
By the turn of the century the practical implications of 
shareholder interference in management had forced a 
rethink in the defining factors of the relationship as we 
shall demonstrate from the case law below. The articles 
of association became the focus of such judicial 
attention.
The first expression of this rethinking came in 
AUTOMATIC SELF-CLEANSING FILTER SYNDICATE CO. V 
CUNINGHAME, [1906] 2 Ch. 34, (C.A.) where the court
decided that the division of power between the board and
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the general meeting was entirely dependent on the terms 
of the articles of association. Once powers were 
conferred on the board, the general meeting could not 
fetter their exercise. The case is important in that it 
involved a discussion of the nature of an article which 
was a predecessor to article 80 of the present Table A. 
The article which delegated the management power of that 
company was held to constitute a contract whereby the 
members agreed that the directors alone shall manage the 
company.
This expression did not receive universal approval 
as there were differences in the articles of ISLE OF 
WIGHT RAILWAY V TAHOURDIN (1883) 25 Ch. D. 320, (C.A.)
and AUTOMATIC SELF-CLEANSING FILTER SYNDICATE CO V 
CUNINGHAME, [1906] 2 Ch. 34, (C.A.) which could
differentiate the two decisions. It was not until SALMON 
V QUIN & AXTENS LTD. [1909] 1 Ch. 311. (C.A.); [1909]
A .C . 442, (H.L.)31 that it was universally accepted that
the general meeting cannot interfere with the powers of
31 See also the judgment of Buckley L.J. in GRAMOPHONE AND 
TYPEWRITER LTD. V STANLEY [1908] 2 K.B. 89. There he stated:-
even a resolution of a numerical majority at a general 
meeting of the company cannot impose its will upon the 
directors when the articles have confided to them the 
control over the company's affairs. The directors are 
not servants to obey directions given by the 
shareholders as individuals; they are not agents 
appointed by and bound to serve the shareholders as 
their principals. They are persons who may by the 
regulations be entrusted with the control of the 
business, and if so entrusted they can be dispossessed 
from that control only by the statutory majority which 
can alter the articles.
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the board32 unless they act in conflict with the 
Companies Acts or the articles. 33 34
The Companies Act 1963 complicated matters by 
redrafting the previous delegation article.35 
Article 80 now reads as follows:-
[t]he business of the company shall be managed 
by the directors, who may pay all expenses 
incurred in promoting and registering the 
company and may exercise all such powers of the 
company as are not, by the Companies Act 1963 
to 1983 or by these regulations, required to be 
exercised by the company in general meeting, 
subject, nevertheless, to any of these 
regulations, to the provisions of the Act and 
to such directions, being not inconsistent with 
the aforesaid regulations or provisions, as may 
be given by the company in general meeting; but
32 There Farwell L.J. stated " [a]ny other construction 
might, I think be disastrous, because it might lead to an 
interference by a bare majority very inimical to the interests 
of the minority who had come into the company on the footing that 
the business should be managed by the board of directors."
33 See further JOHN SHAW & SONS (SALFORD) V SHAW [193 5] 2 
K.B, 113 where Greer L.J. stated
[a] company is an entity distinct alike from its 
shareholders and its directors. Some of its powers 
may, according to its articles, be exercised by 
directors, certain other powers may be reserved for 
the shareholders in general meeting. If powers of 
management are vested in the directors, they and they 
alone can exercise these powers. The only way in which 
the general body of the shareholders can control the 
exercise of the powers vested by the articles in the 
directors is by altering their articles...
and also the approval of this principle by Budd J. in NASH V 
LANCEGAYE SAFETY GLASS (IRELAND) LTD. (1958) I.L.T.R. 11.
34 Another example of this is found in SCOTT V SCOTT [1943] 
1 ALL E.R. 582 where it was held that the general meeting could 
not by ordinary resolution require the directors to declare an 
interim dividend. See also BRECKLAND GROUP HOLDINGS LTD. V LONDON 
& SUFFOLK PROPERTY LTD. [1989] B.C.L.C. 100.
35 Companies Act 1908, Table A, article 71.
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no direction given by the company in general 
meeting shall invalidate any prior act of the 
directors which would have been valid if that 
direction had not been given.
The Companies Act 1963 had substituted the word 
directions above, for the word regulations, which had 
been present in the old form Table A. This substitution 
gave rise to speculation that the change of wording had 
somehow changed the balance of power between the general 
meeting and the board.
Lang (1973: p. 241) was of the opinion that this
balance of power had shifted completely to the 
shareholders, who could now issue commands to the board 
on the management of the company.36 Sullivan (1977: 
p.569) discussing the U.K. article 80, opines that the 
general meeting can by an ordinary resolution overrule 
the board.37 The basis of his argument is that article 80 
only places the management function generally in the 
board. Thus the general meeting can interfere with the 
management function on specific issues.38
36 By ordinary resolution as opposed to special resolution.
37 For an opposing view of the U.K. position prior to 1985, 
see MacKenzie (1983: pp.99-102) and Sealy (1989b: pp.26-28).
38 In the U.K. the position that the general meeting cannot 
interfere with the management function by way of ordinary 
resolution is now expressly provided in an updated version of 
article 80; Companies (Tables A-F) Regulations 1985 (S.I. 1985 
No. 805) article 70. But see Lord Wedderburn of Charlton (1989: 
pp.401-408) where he states :-
[o] ne finds indications that a different rule may 
apply where what is in issue is control of company 
litigation--the initiation, defence or compromise of 
actions--and that this function may not be regarded as
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Ussher (1975: pp.303-304) on the other hand
dismisses these arguments. He maintains that while the 
Courts will be bound to interpret "directions" as being 
ordinary resolutions, those resolutions are subject to 
the proviso that they are "not inconsistent with the 
aforesaid regulations." The word "regulations" refers to 
the other articles of Table A. Thus the logic follows 
that the members in general meeting may not by ordinary 
resolution interfere with powers conferred on the board 
by the articles.
While Ussher disagrees with the wide interpretation 
accorded to the articles by Lang, he does conclude that 
there is some uncertainty about the scope of the general 
meeting's power to issue directions. Ussher (1986: p.88) 
states:-
[t]he new form of article 80 is best avoided by 
company draughtsmen, not only to avoid the 
uncertainties of it, but also to fulfil the 
expectations of most company promoters who would 
like to see matters of management exclusively the 
province of the board. The older form of article or 
a new form which deletes all mention of directions 
from the general meeting, should therefore be 
adopted.
Mac Cann (1991: p. 421) considers both the arguments of 
Ussher, Lang and the case law on article 80. He 
concludes : -
merely part of the management of the company's 
business. Indeed, so uncertain are the decisions that 
writers have left open the possibility that the board 
and the general meeting may here enjoy parallel powers 
in some manner over actions in the company name.
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the wording of article 71 was different in certain 
respect from article 80 of Table A of the Principal 
Act and accordingly these cases would no longer seem 
to represent good law in Ireland. Article 80 is
understood to mean that the members may by ordinary
resolution validly interfere with the directors' 
general powers of management. In the case of other 
powers which have been expressly reserved to the
directors by statute or by the articles themselves, 
the members can only interfere by special
resolution.
Thus the adoption of Table A article 80 will not delegate 
the power of management upwards to the directors.39 In 
most facets of the management of the company the general 
meeting may interfere by ordinary resolution.40 In the 
case of a specific power delegated to the board41 the 
members may not interfere save through a special 
resolution.42 If a power is conferred by statute to the 
board then the members may not interfere at all, even 
through a special resolution.43
39 See Flynn (1991: pp.101-117) for a consideration of the 
interpretation of the wording of article 80. He concludes that 
on the wording of the article the managerial power is subject to 
interference through an ordinary resolution.
40 See RE EMMADART LTD. [1979] Q.B. 540 where Brightman J. 
stated:-
[t] he board can also properly act on an ordinary 
resolution of the shareholders conferring the 
requisite authority on the board provided that this 
does not contravene any provision in the articles.
41 Such as the power to elect a chairman under article 104.
42 See CLARK V WORKMAN [1920] 1 I.R. 107 where Ross J.
stated "the company cannot interfere in the subject-matter of the 
delegation unless by special resolution"; and KEHOE V WATERFORD 
AND LIMERICK RAILWAYS (1888-89) 21 L.R. Ir. 221.
43 The general meeting can remove the directors of the 
company by special resolution and substitute a more compliant 
board. It should be noted that while it is unclear to what extent
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The general meeting is thus maintained as the 
primary managerial organ as its decisions will bind the 
board of directors.44
2.4 Directors Appointed to Serve Another Interest.
The second area where the managerial discretion of 
the board has been interfered with, is through the custom 
or practice of the appointment of directors whose 
function is to represent a particular interest. The 
fiduciary duties of a director can become somewhat 
complex when a director is appointed by a particular 
group of shareholders or debenture holders. The intention 
is clearly that the director act primarily in what he 
perceives the interest of his appointor to be. If he 
fails to do this, he will lose his place on the board.45
The Accepted Position.
[T]ake a nominee director, that is, a director 
of a company who is nominated by a large 
shareholder to represent his interests. There 
is nothing wrong in it. It is done every day. 
Nothing wrong, that is, so long as the director 
is left free to exercise his best judgment in 
the interests of the company which he serves.
an ordinary resolution may interfere with the management of the 
company, it is clear that the same votes may achieve the more 
draconian measure of replacing the board.
44 Save for the above exceptions.
45 As he can be removed by ordinary resolution, pursuant to 
the Companies Act 1963, section 182.
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This dissenting judgment of Lord Denning in BOULTING V 
A.C.T.A.T [1963] 2 Q.B. 606 at 626 referred specifically 
to the issue of the director appointed to serve another 
interest. Lord Denning's opinion is clear. The director 
must be left free to exercise his judgment bona fide in 
the interests of the company.46 A representative director 
is not prima facie in conflict with his fiduciary 
obligations.47
A director once appointed, while representing a 
particular interest, has to have regard to the duties he 
owes to the company.48 This position in equity and the 
extent to which directors owe these duties was considered 
in SCOTTISH CO-OPERATIVE WHOLESALE SOCIETY V MEYER [1959] 
A . C . 324 (H.L.) . In this case Scottish Co-operative
Wholesale Society (S.C.W.S.) formed a subsidiary company 
to manufacture rayon. The society appointed three 
representative directors to the board of its subsidiary. 
The manufacture of rayon was strictly controlled until 
1952. When the controls were removed, S.C.W.S.
46 PERCIVAL V WRIGHT [1902] 2 Ch. 421.
47 Lord Denning continues:- "but if he is put on terms that 
he is bound to act in the affairs of the company in accordance 
with the directions of his patron, it is beyond doubt 
unlawful..."
48 In JOHN CROWTHER GROUP PLC. V CARPETS INTERNATIONAL PLC. 
[199Ó] B.C.L.C. 460 Vinelott J. held that where directors 
undertake to exercise their powers in relation to the management 
of tljie affairs of a company in a manner which would fetter their 
ability to act in the future in what may then appear to them to 
be the best interests of the company, a term ought to be implied 
to the effect that such undertaking is subject to the limitation 
that the directors will not thereby be required to do anything 
that would be inconsistent with the fiduciary duties they owe to 
the company.
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transferred the rayon business from the subsidiary to 
itself. The subsidiary consequently had no function.
An application was brought by one of the minority 
shareholders against S.C.W.S. under the Companies Act 
1948, section 21049 on the ground of oppression. One of 
the arguments put forward concerned the duties of the 
representative directors. Lord Denning considered these:-
[w]hat, then, is the position of the nominee 
directors here? Under the articles of
association of the company, the society was 
entitled to nominate three out of the five
directors, and it did so. It nominated three of 
its own directors and they held office, as the 
articles said, "as nominees" of the society. 
These three were, therefore, at one and the 
same time directors of the society--being three 
out of twelve of that company--and also 
directors of the company--three out of five
there. So long as the interests of all
concerned were in harmony, there was no 
difficulty. The nominee directors could do
their duty by both companies without
embarrassment. But, so soon as the interests of 
the two companies were in conflict, the nominee 
directors were placed in an impossible
position.50
The presumption raised in SCOTTISH CO-OPERATIVE 
WHOLESALE SOCIETY V MEYER, [1959] A.C. 324 (H.L.) and
BOULTING V A.C.T.A.T [1963] 2 Q.B. 606 is that the 
position of such a director is an accepted one, unless
49 Now the U.K. Companies Act 1985, section 459, (as amended 
by the Companies Act 1989, Sched. 19, para 11) .
50 Inactivity in a conflict situation will also constitute 
a breach of duty; COLDMAN V HILL [1919] 1 K.B. 443.
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that director is in conflict.51 52 Then his position is 
untenable, and he must presumably resign.53
Of interest in this area is the way the legislators 
of Ghana sought to deal with this problem. The Ghana 
Companies Code 1963 (Act 179) at section 203 (3) states:-
[i]n considering whether a particular 
transaction or course of action is in the best 
interests of the company as a whole, a 
director, when appointed by, or as a 
representative of, a special class of members, 
employees or creditors may give special, but 
not exclusive, consideration to the interests 
of that class.
51 The same difficulties arise when directors of a company 
are also directors of a rival competing company. Chatterton V.-C. 
in MOORE V M'GLYNN [1894] 1 I.R. 74 considered this situation. 
There a trustee had been left the testator's business to run for 
the beneficiaries. He subsequently set up his own business in 
competition with the testator's. Chatterton V.-C. stated:-
I am not prepared to hold that a trustee is guilty of 
a breach of trust in setting himself up in a similar 
line of business in the neighbourhood, provided that 
he does not resort to deception, or solicitation of 
custom from persons dealing at the old shop.
The same conclusion was reached by the House of Lords in BELL V 
LEVER BROS LTD. [1932] A.C. 161. For a contrary view, see HIVAC 
LTD. V PARK ROYAL SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS LTD. [1946] 1 ALL E.R.
3 50 where it was held that working for a competitor in any 
situation where a disadvantage might accrue to the company, was 
not allowable.
52 Further, see THOMAS MARSHALL (EXPORTERS) LTD. V GUINLE 
[1978] 2 W.L.R. 116 where it is suggested that competing is per 
se a breach of duty and that it would inevitably lead to other 
fiduciary breaches. Although it was an employees duty of good 
faith that was at issue in that instance, Megarry V.-C. accepted 
an analogy with the duties of a director. The same argument would 
apply to representative directors. See also Christie (1992: 
pp.506-520) where he concludes that the "[c]ourts should 
unhesitatingly acknowledge that these judgments are inconsistent 
with long established principles of Equity regulating directors . "
53 Or abstain from voting.
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Thus the code accepts that the representative director 
will consider interests other than the company's. 54 55
The position in Ghana received implicit approval in 
KUWAIT ASIA BANK E.C. V NATIONAL MUTUAL LIFE NOMINEES 
LTD. [1990] B.C.L.C. 868 where it was held that a nominee 
director may owe a duty to the person who appointed him, 
that duty is secondary and subject to the director's 
overriding duty to the company itself.
The position of representative director is an
accepted one. The representative director is not prima 
facie in conflict with his fiduciary duties by virtue of 
his appointment.56 When the interests of his appointor
and the company do conflict, the director is allowed
54 The position of nominee directors was accepted by The 
Bullock Committee (1977: Cmnd. 6706, Chapter 8, para. 40) its
only comment was to recommend that no representative director 
should be appointed to act in a particular way.
55 This approach is mirrored by the judicial approach to 
liquidators who may have potential conflicts of interests. Dillon 
L.J. in RE ESAL (COMMODITIES) LTD. [1989] B.C.L.C. 59 stated:- 
"these sort of potential conflicts do not in practice give rise 
to any serious difficulty because they are well known to the 
experienced insolvency practitioner." Hoffmann J. in RE ARROWS 
LTD. [1992] B.C.C. 121 stated:-
[i] t is by no means uncommon in the case of an
insolvency of a substantial group of companies for 
cross-claims and conflicts of interest to arise 
between companies in the group. That does not usually 
deflect the court from appointing a single firm of
insolvency practioners in the first instance to deal 
with the whole insolvency of the group, leaving the 
question of potential conflict of interests to be
dealt with if and when it arises."
For a consideration of when the liquidators conflict may be too 
acute see; RE WALLACE SMITH & CO. LTD. [1992] B.C.L.C. 970.
56 See Lord Denning above in SCOTTISH CO-OPERATIVE WHOLESALE 
SOCIETY V MEYER [1959] A.C. 324 (H.L.).
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consider interests other than the company's.57
The thesis now turns to consider how the acceptance 
of the representative director by the judiciary impacts 
on the fiduciary duties. 58 59
Fiduciary Duties Considered.
Nominee and multiple directors are widely used, 
yet there are few cases dealing with the 
question of the applicability of the fiduciary 
duties generally owed by directors to these 
categories of director. Nor are there any 
statutory provisions in England, Australia and 
New Zealand to be discussed which regulate 
nominee or multiple directors or attempt to 
clarify this issue. Boros (1989: p.211)60
It is the contention of this thesis that the acceptance 
of the representative director by the judiciary has 
eroded the fiduciary safeguards contained in the model 
company. Further the acceptance of a secondary fiduciary
57 KUWAIT ASIA BANK E.C. V NATIONAL MUTUAL LIFE NOMINEES 
LTD. [1990] B.C.L.C. 868.
58 Rohatyn (1993: p.64) considers that major institutional 
shareholders need to be actively involved in the performance 
oversight functions of boards of directors. This could be done 
by creating a cadre of professional directors, chosen from the 
ranks of men and women with extensive business and management 
experience. These directors would not be the representatives of 
the institutions, but would report to them as their conduit and 
as their eyes and ears.
59 See Avory J. in KREGOR V HOLLINS (1913) 109 L.T. 225 
where he discusses the position of conflict of duties.
60 See further Boros (1989: pp.211-219) for an examination 
of the position of representative directors in the commonwealth 
jurisdictions.
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duty owed to the representative director's appointor 
degrades the board of directors' managerial discretion.
It is difficult to see how the duty of the director 
to act bona fide in the interests of the company can be
reconciled with the position of a representative
director.61 62 The duty is to act in the interests of the 
company as a separate entity, 63 64 not the members,
employees,65 creditors66 or a group of the members.
The representative director is appointed to serve a 
particular interest; that of his appointor. This is in 
conflict with the duty to act in the interest's of the 
company as an entity. The courts have allowed the
61 Lord Greene M.R. in RE SMITH & FAWCETT LTD. [1942] Ch. 
304 at 306, C.A. on the subject of the directors duty of good 
faith stated "[t]hey must exercise their discretion bona fide in
what they consider not what a court may consider is in the
interests of the company, and not for any collateral purpose."
62 Gibson L.J. in NICHOLAS V SOUNDCRAFT ELECTRONICS LTD. 
[1993] B.C.L.C. 360, considering the interests of the company,
was of the opinion that it may be necessary for directors to take 
steps which are prejudicial to some of the members in order to 
secure the future prosperity of the company or even its survival.
63 As per SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [1897] A.C. 22, (H.L.)
64 Regarding the duty to act in the interests of the company 
see RE W. & M. ROITH LTD. [1967] 1 W.L.R. 432 and also RE LEE
BEHRENS AND CO. LTD. [1932] ALL E.R. 889.
65 This remains the position in equity but note the position 
under the Companies Act 1990, section 52 creates a duty to the 
employees which is considered infra at page 122.
65 Creditors interests may warrant consideration where the 
company is insolvent; WALKER V WIMBORNE (1976) 137 C.L.R. 1.
Further in that case directors who pursued a general policy in 
disregard of the individual companies within a group and in
favour of the larger group were held to breach the duty to act
in the interests of the company.
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position of representative director to stand.57
There were originally some restrictions on a 
representative director. At first the line was drawn 
where the interests of the director's appointor and the 
company's were in conflict. The director's position was 
then "impossible".58
This has since been modified to allow the director 
to legitimately consider interests other than the 
company's.59 Thus the position of representative director 
is accepted even where the interest's of the company and 
the interests of the representative director's appointor 
are in conflict.
This is not a correct statement of the law.70 The 
position of representative director is in conflict with 
the fiduciary duty to act bona fide in the interests of 
the company. Thus his very appointment to serve another 
interest breaches the duty to the company.
As well as conflicting with the duty to act "bona
57 Boros (1990: pp.6-10) concludes:-
[n]ominee directors and multiple directorships in 
competing companies both give rise to a real 
possibility of conflict between the duty owed by the 
director to a principal or other company and that owed 
to the company.
58 As per Lord Denning above in SCOTTISH CO-OPERATIVE 
WHOLESALE SOCIETY V MEYER [1959] A.C. 324 (H.L.).
59 KUWAIT ASIA BANK E.C. V NATIONAL MUTUAL LIFE NOMINEES 
LTD. [1990] B.C.L.C. 868.
70 It at least lacks consistency. In BRENTS BREWERY CO. LTD. 
V HOGAN [1945] 2 ALL E.R. 66 and in D.C. THOMSON & CO. LTD. V
DEAKIN [1952] 2 ALL E.R. 361 it was held that it is wrong to
induce another to act inconsistently with the duty of fidelity 
which he has undertaken by contract or trust to perform.
Ill
fide in the interests of the company", the representative 
director may not place himself in a position where his 
personal interests and his duty to his principal 
conflict.71 The rule does not rely on fraud or absence of 
bona fides.72 The representative director may have 
difficulty complying with this duty.73
Yeo (1990: pp.149-150) considers the position of
representative and interlocking directors. He states:-
[t] he duty of undivided loyalty is a frail 
doctrine that poses difficulties and is 
unworkable in practice. It is submitted that
the doctrine should be reconsidered especially 
where there are so many nominee and
interlocking directors.... their dual or 
multiple fiduciary responsibilities to their 
other companies may inevitably lead to
conflicts of interests These problems are
likely to increase as businesses become bigger 
and more international...
The courts are still not responding to 
these changes. The resolution of the courts to 
the dilemma faced by these directors is that a 
director has a duty of loyalty to both
companies and he serves both to their best
interests. This is, however, not a readily 
workable option for directors in the face of 
commercial reality.74
The managerial discretion of the board of directors
71 PATTEN V HAMILTON [1911] 1 I.R. 4 7 see also above Part 1,
2.1 The Model Fiduciary.
72 Per Lord Russell in REGAL (HASTINGS) LTD. V GULLIVER 
[1942] 1 ALL E.R. 378 at 386.
73 In particular if the words of Lord Cranworth L.C. in 
BROUGHTON V BROUGHTON (1855) 5 De G.M. & G. 164 are applied.
There he stated "the rule really is that no one who has a duty 
to perform shall place himself in a situation to have his 
interest conflicting with his duty."
74 See also Crutchfield (1991: pp. 136-142).
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can be further restricted by the shareholders within the 
^company.75 Additional pressures can be brought to bear on 
the directors' managerial discretion by introducing a 
remuneration system which ties the directors' interests 
to that of the shareholders. This is done through giving 
the directors share options which are large enough to 
create such a coincidence of interests.76 The interests 
of the principal77 are no longer the primary concern. The 
directors and the shareholders are acting in tandem and 
the concept of the company as a separate entity is 
further eroded. The duty to the company no longer 
impacts.
In particular representative directors in public 
limited companies listed on the Stock Exchange have 
complex problems.78
The nature of their appointment is to represent the 
interests of the institutional fund at board level.79 The
75 And indeed by the workings of the marketplace, See Riley 
(1992: pp.782-802) where he states;-
[t] he discipline on management to pursue shareholders' 
interests is compounded, it is claimed, by an 
efficient market in corporate control: the tendency of 
management to shirk or to pursue its own interests at 
the expense of the shareholders will be regulated by 
their fear of takeovers and the consequential loss of 
managerial power.
76 See Meredith (1993: pp.48-49) for a consideration of this 
issue.
77 The company.
78 There institutional investors appoint directors to 
represent their interests.
79 See chapter three.
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representative director receives his remuneration from 
the institutional fund. He has a personal interest in its 
performance,80 also, he may receive share options from 
the company. Thus the representative director can 
potentially be in conflict with both the company81 and 
the institutional fund.82
McGough (1994: R8) comments on the growing
phenomenon in the U.S. where mutual-fund managers sit on 
the board of companies in which their fund holds 
shares.83 He points out that the practice is laden with 
potential conflicts of interest.84
These conflicts can arise in a number of ways. The 
position of director also attracts lucrative personal
80 Through that remuneration and his career with his primary 
employer.
81 Through his remuneration from the institutional fund.
82 Through his personal interest in the share options.
83 McGough (1994: R8) also found that some fund managers had 
acquired personal shareholdings in companies at a lower per-share 
price than their funds had. This in itself seems to be a conflict 
of interest. Further, some fund managers had acquired seats on 
boards when working for previous employers and retained them when 
they moved employers. Their present employers refrained from 
investing in those companies because of the personal involvement 
of those fund managers. This raises the point that the personal 
involvement of these fund managers in a successful company has 
affected the funds performance as it could not invest in that 
company.
84 McGough (1994: R8) points also to difficulties which 
arise due to insider trading laws. Fund managers who are also 
directors on the boards of companies their funds invest in have 
to thread a very fine line to comply with insider trading 
provisions. The position of insider can sometimes be a positive 
detriment to the fund managed by the director. McGough provides 
an example of one such fund manager. His fund had to suffer 
through the price dive as any sale prior to a public announcement 
would have been a violation of the insider-trading laws.
114
stock options which could lead to a fund manager 
hesitating to dump a company's stock from a fund while 
sitting on that company's board, waiting for personal 
options to rise. McGough (1994: R8) provides an example 
of one such fund manager where he states:-
[t]hat's the situation facing Martin Whitman of 
Third Avenue Value Fund, with assets of $114 
million. He serves not only on the board but as 
chairman of a financial company that has given 
him stock options. And he personally owns a 
chunk of stock. As a director of Danielson 
Holding Corp., New York, he earns only 
"$75,000" according to last spring's proxy 
material. But stock options promise to give him 
much more. He received options to purchase
210,000 shares at $3 apiece, the 1993 proxy 
material shows. With the stock at $7.50 on the 
American Stock Exchange, Mr. Whitman has a
paper profit of $945,000 ---- and a big
incentive to avoid having his fund dump the 
stock.
At present regulation of representative directors in the 
United States is inadequate. 85 86
85 See Grundfest (1994: pp.963-1024) for an examination of 
the role of the Commission.
86 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's purpose is 
to administer federal securities laws that seek to provide 
protection for investors. The purpose of these laws is to ensure 
that the securities markets are fair and honest and to provide 
the means to enforce the securities laws through sanctions where 
necessary. The United states Congress created the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. The S.E.C. is an independent, nonpartisan, quasi­
judicial regulatory agency.
The Commission is made up of five members: a Chairman and 
four Commissioners. Commission members are appointed by the U.S. 
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for five 
year terms. The Chairman is designated by the President. Terms 
are staggered; one expires on June 5th of every year and not more 
than three members may belong to the same political party.
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The final fiduciary duty which impacts on the 
representative director is the duty of a director not to 
fetter his discretion. Gower states the position as 
follows:-
[t]hus it seems clear as a general principle, 
despite the paucity of reported cases on the 
point, that directors cannot validly contract 
(either with one another or with third parties) 
as to how they shall vote at future board 
meetings .87
Is it not the case that a representative director is 
agreeing to vote, if not in a particular way, then at 
least in a particular interest. Does this not in itself 
conflict with the duty to not to fetter his discretion?88
The position of the representative director is one 
which presents unique difficulties. The case law on the 
specific issue of representative directors, while sparse, 
indicates an acceptance of the position of representative 
director as legitimate. The fiduciary duties owed by
Under the direction of the Chairman and the Commissioners, 
the staff ensures that publicly held entities, broker-dealers in 
securities, investment companies and advisers, and other 
participants in the securities markets comply with federal 
securities laws. These laws were designed to facilitate informed 
investment analyses and decisions by the investing public, 
primarily by ensuring adequate disclosure of material 
information. As such, at present they do not cover the behaviour 
of representative directors (Office of Public Affairs 1992).
87 For a further consideration as to whether directors can 
in fact agree to vote a particular way in the future, see Kenyon- 
Slade (1993: pp.218-220).
88 See CLARK V WORKMAN [1920] I.R. 107 where Ross J. 
considers directors decisions must be taken "unfettered by any 
undertaking or promise".
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directors seem to be in conflict with that accepted 
position of representative director.
This thesis maintains that at very worst the 
position of representative director is in conflict with 
the concept of a fiduciary. At best the director is 
surrounded by a mire of duties which if complied with 
tnake his position untenable.
I
The above case law on the representative director 
accepts this position. The fiduciary safeguards owed to 
the company are thus eroded and the judiciary allow the
I
general meeting to further influence the managerial 
discretion of the board of directors.
2.5 The Erosion of the Fiduciary Safeguards.
As can be seen above in Part 1 the act of formation 
creates the agency which gives rise to the fiduciary 
duties owed individually by the directors.89
Thus the director owes a duty to act in good faith 
in the interests of the company as a whole. The test for 
that duty is subjective. If that individual director 
believes that what he is doing is in the interests of the 
company then the court will not interfere.90
89 Above Part 1, 2.1 The Model Fiduciary, p. 86. See also
Bare and Bowen (1988a: pp.317-348).
90 Even if that decision might appear to be to the detriment 
of the company; RE GRESHAM LIFE ASSURANCE SOC. [1872] L.R. 8 Ch. 
446. Although this is now in doubt as the court applies an 
objective test to determine the directors belief. See chapter 
four for a full consideration of this objective test.
117
In PERCIVAL V WRIGHT [1902] 2 Ch. 421 a director
bought shares from a member without disclosing that the 
board were at the time negotiating for the purchase of 
all the shares of the company at a much higher price. The 
shareholder subsequently found out and sought to bring 
the director to account. Swinfen Eady J. held that the 
director owed a duty to the company as a whole and not to 
the individual shareholders. The shareholder could not 
succeed.91
A director may not place himself in a position where 
his personal interests and his duty to his principal 
conflict.92 Lord Cranworth L.C. in ABERDEEN RAIL CO. V 
BLAIKIE BROS (1854) 1 Macq. (H.L.) 461 stated:-
no one having such duties to discharge shall be 
allowed to enter into engagements in which he 
has or can have a personal interest conflicting 
or which may possibly conflict with the 
interests of those whom he is bound to 
protect.93
A director must exercise his power for the purpose 
which it was conferred. If the directors exercise their 
power for an improper purpose they are liable 
accordingly.94
91 Note the insider trading provisions in the Companies Act 
1990 would now cover this type of behaviour.
92 GABBETT V LAWDER (1883 ) 11 L.R. Ir. 295. For an 
examination of this doctrine at work, see Hopkins (1990: pp.220- 
223) and Stallworthy (1993: pp.C80-81).
93 For an examination of this duty, see Bean (1994: pp.266-
272) .
94 HOWARD SMITH LTD. V AMPOL LTD. [1974] A.C. 821.
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Directors may not enter into agreements as to how 
they should vote at future board meetings.95 Their 
discretion to make decisions must remain unfettered.96
The difficulty for the judiciary in interpreting a 
phrase like "bona fide in the interests of the company as 
a whole" is that the company is an artificial entity. How 
are the interests of such an artificial entity to be 
determined? The judicial answer has been to look at the 
component parts of the entity. If that criteria is 
applied then the general meeting is the significant 
element.97 Cases such as PARKE V DAILY NEWS LTD. [1962] 
Ch. 927 and HUTTON V WEST CORK RAILWAY CO. (1883) 23 Ch. 
D. 654 bear this out. Ussher (1986: pp.220-221) states:-
" [n]o one else, no other interest group, comes 
within the definition of the company as a 
whole...
Thus the fiduciary duty to act "bona fide in the 
interests of the company as a whole" does not mean to act 
objectively in the interest of the company as an 
entity.98 It means generally to act in the interests of
95 Contrast this with the freedom shareholders have to enter 
into voting agreements.
96 CLARK V WORKMAN [1920] 1 I.R. 107.
97 See the Report of the Second Savoy Hotel Investigation 
(1954) .
98 Indeed in NICHOLAS V SOUNDCRAFT ELECTRONICS LTD. AND 
ANOTHER [1993] B.C.L.C. 360 the court held that the welfare of 
a parent company was in the interests of the company. Note also 
the implications of this judgment for SALOMON V SALOMON [1897]
A .C . 22, (H.L.).
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the members." Thus the directors' managerial discretion 
is further eroded due to the judicial definition of their 
fiduciary duty. They now must act "bona fide in the 
interests of the members."100 Taking this judicial 
definition one step further, the existence of a large 
group of shareholders with interests other than the 
company's can abuse the intention of the fiduciary 
duty.101
Another problem regarding the fiduciary duties is 
that they can be waived by the general meeting.102 Table 
A articles 84-87 expressly provide for such waiver.103 
104 Thus Gower (1979: p.601) comments:-
waiver clauses have, as we have seen in
99 See chapter five for a complete analysis of the duty to 
act "bona fide in the interests of the company."
100 In IN RE WINCHAM SHIPBUILDING BOILER AND SALT CO. (18 78) 
9 Ch. D. 322 Jessel M.R. stated " [i]t has always been held that 
the directors are trustees for the shareholders, that is, for the 
company."
101 See chapter three, 3.1 The Interests of the Institution.
102 In BRAY V FORD [1896] A.C. 51 Lord Herschell stated
[i]t has therefore, been deemed expedient to lay down 
this positive rule. But I am satisfied that it can be 
departed from in many cases, without any breach of 
morality, without any wrong being inflicted, and 
without any consciousness of wrongdoing. Indeed, it is 
obvious that it might sometimes be to the advantage of 
the beneficiaries that their trustee should act for 
them professionally rather than a stranger, even 
though the trustee were paid for his services.
103 That is as long as the disclosure requirements in the 
Companies Act 1963, section 194 regarding directors' interests 
in contracts are complied with.
104 See also, Grantham (1993: pp.245-271).
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relation to directors' contracts continued to 
be inserted in articles and since they appear 
in Table A, they must be regarded as 
permissible and, at any rate to some extent, as 
effective... If, however, blanket waiver 
clauses of this sort are effective it enables 
a considerable hole to be driven in the 
equitable principle.. 105 106 107
From the above, and from the examination of the
fiduciary duties regarding representative directors, it 
can be seen that the fiduciary obligations have been 
degraded. The board itself no longer owes effective
fiduciary obligations to the company as an entity.
Complicating the issue for the board of directors
are the statutory duties owed. The Companies Act 1990, 
section 52 provides:-
[t]he matters to which the directors of a company 
shall have regard in the performance of their 
functions shall include the interests of the 
company's employees in general, as well as the 
interests of the members.
105 An even more alarming development has been the apparent
ability of directors to contract to act in a particular way at
future board meetings. This would appear to be allowable as long 
as some benefit accrues to the company thus the duty to act bona 
fides in the interests of the company is complied with. Where 
exactly this leave the duty of a director not to fetter his 
discretion is unknown. For a full discussion on this point see 
FULHAM FOOTBALL CLUB LTD. AND OTHERS V CABRA ESTATES PLC. [1994] 
1 B.C.L.C. 363.
106 See also Cranston (1992: pp. 197-211) for an examination
of the shareholders ability to release the director from his
fiduciary obligations.
107 Consideration of this area has occurred in Australia and 
New Zealand. There it is proposed that the shareholders' power 
to validate or ratify an act of the board or individual director 
which is in breach of duty, be removed. See Sealy (1991: pp.175-
179) .
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It should be emphasized that the duty is owed to the 
employees in general. This makes it difficult to 
determine who may enforce the duty in the first place. 
Section 52 (2) continues
[a]ccordingly, the duty imposed by this section on 
the directors shall be owed by them to the company 
(and to the company alone) and shall be enforceable 
in the same way as any other fiduciary duty owed to
the company by its directors.
Thus the duty is grafted onto the existing fiduciary 
duty. The best "interests of the company" include the 
interests of the employees.
What is the position if "the financial interests of 
the members" is not the same as "the best interests of 
the company"? Such a situation could arise in a takeover 
bid where the financial interests of the members and the 
employees could be at odds with each other. At present 
the answer is that the shareholders' interest is 
paramount. The directors are required to have regard to 
the interests of the employees but must act in the
"interests of the company", which equates to the 
shareholders' interest.108 Thus the statutory addition 
has added nothing to the fiduciary duty except perhaps a 
slight confusion. The duty to act in the interests of the 
company as an entity is thus further eroded as the
directors must consider the quasi-duty to the
108 See chapter four for an analysis of the judicial 
definition of the "interests of the company."
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shareholders created by the Companies Act 1963, section 
205 .
The Companies Act 1963, section 205 concerns the 
right of a shareholder to take an action alleging 
oppression or disregard of their interests by the 
directors or members. The director has thus some sort of 
quasi-duty109 not to act oppressively or in disregard of 
the members' interests. This poses complex 
responsibilities as directors may be perfectly within 
their legitimate powers in taking a particular course of 
action, but yet their actions could still constitute 
oppression110 and give rise to a remedy under section 
205 .
One example of this was RE CLUBMAN SHIRTS LTD. 
[1983] I.L.R.M. 323 H.C.111 where a minority shareholder 
alleged that the sale of the business without consulting 
him was an exercise of the board's powers oppressive to 
him. This lack of consultation prevented him112 from 
being informed of the financial affairs of the company. 
O'Hanlon J. dealt firstly with the directors' contention
109 It is not in fact a duty at all but gives rise to an 
awareness on the board of directors part that their actions may 
lead to an application under section 205.
110 In RE GREENORE TRADING CO. LTD. [198 0] I.L.R.M. 94 
oppression was defined as conduct which is "burdensome, harsh and 
wrongful." See also RE JERMYN STREET TURKISH BATHS LTD. [1971] 
1 W.L.R. 1042.
111 See also RE IRISH VISITING MOTORISTS BUREAU LTD. H.C., 
UNREPORTED, 27 JANUARY 1972 where it was held that acts may be 
oppressive even where the directors act honestly and in good 
faith.
112 As he claimed he was so entitled.
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that the directors were acting within the powers 
conferred on them by the articles of association, where 
he stated:-
[t]his proposition may be correct in strict law, but 
it would be a highly unusual course for any board of 
directors to adopt when they propose to dispose of 
the whole business undertaking of the company for a 
consideration which will yield not a penny to the 
shareholders, as happened in the present case. A 
minority shareholder is entitled to have such a 
transaction, completed without his knowledge or 
consent, subjected to the closest scrutiny to ensure 
that he has been dealt with fairly by those who 
controlled the destinies of the company.
While O'Hanlon J. was unsure as to whether the 
conduct complained of constituted "oppression" within the 
meaning of the section, he was of the opinion that the 
petitioner had made a case for limited relief.113 That 
relief entailed the purchase by the majority shareholders 
of the petitioner's shares, based on the value at the 
date he should have been consulted.
Thus the duties owed to the company have been 
circumvented in many ways. The idea that the duties are 
owed to the company is certainly not the case. The 
directors' discretion to act objectively in the interests 
of the company as an entity has been eroded. The final 
erosion of the directors' discretion to act is the quasi­
duty arising above. It restricts even the directors'
113 In considering whether a case for relief has been made 
the court should have regard to the facts of each case and not 
exclusively to narrow legal definitions; SCOTTISH WHOLESALE CO­
OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD. V MEYER [1959] A.C. 324 (H.L.).
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legitimate power to act.
2.6 The Board of Directors as a Secondary Organ.
Every company has two primary organs, the board 
of directors and the company in general 
meeting. When a person subscribes for shares in 
a company, he recognises that the enterprise 
which the company has been formed to pursue 
will need direction and management and that 
directors will in due course be appointed to 
discharge that responsibility.
The words of Hunter Q.C. above in GILMORE V DENNYS Q.B., 
UNREPORTED, 17 DECEMBER 19 93 refer to the model company 
where the board is a primary organ. The above chapter has 
shown that the model board of directors has been degraded 
to a secondary organ.
Thus actions of the board are open to the influence 
of the members through the confusion regarding the 
delegation of the managerial control in article 80, the 
acceptance of representative directors, the 
interpretation of fiduciary duties in terms of members' 
interests, the ability of the members to waive fiduciary 
duties and the coercive influence of section 205 which 
have all resulted in the inability of the board to act 
objectively in the interests of the company.
Outside Influences.
The thesis now turns in the next chapter to examine 
the external extra-constitutional influences on an
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already degraded board of directors.
The board of directors does not operate in a vacuum. 
It is open to influences other than those within the 
corporate structure. The presence of a large block of 
institutional investors in public limited companies 
creates a very strong lobby.114
The institutions significant voting rights allow 
them access to the board.115 Other organisations such as 
the Stock Exchange, the City Panel on take-overs and 
mergers, and the institutional associations all support 
the institutional view point. This thesis now considers 
their influence on the model corporate structure.
114 With interests which may differ from the company's.
115 Through representative directors and extra-constitutional 
meetings, termed institutional briefings.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR.
3.0 Introduction.
This chapter examines the significance of
"institutional shareholder dominance" within the 
shareholding population of public limited companies. It 
establishes that such a dominance does exist, then 
continues to examine the impact of the institutional 
presence on the degraded model legal company structure.
The presence of the institutional investor (a term 
described below) impacts on the degraded model in two 
ways. First, the interests of the institutions can be 
materially different to those of the legal entity. 
Second, the size of the institutional shareholding within 
companies enables the institutions to gain an input into 
the managerial discretion of the board of directors, 
through representative directors and informal extra­
constitutional meetings with the management.
The thesis then combines the hypothesis of the 
degraded model with an account of the influence of the 
institutions in a take-over situation. It can then be 
shown that the model legal structure is not just degraded 
but destroyed altogether.
3.1 The Interests of the Institution.
The use of the phrase "institutional investor"
127
denotes shares held by institutions such as pension 
funds, insurance companies, and other private investment 
funds in companies listed on The Stock Exchange.1 Those 
shares are purchased by the institutions, and are managed 
on behalf of their clients. Managers are appointed by the 
institutions. Each fund manager is given a block of 
funds. A particular strategy is assigned. It may be 
either to generate income, maximise capital gains, or 
some combination of the two, from the fund. The 
investment manager then structures his investment, and 
turn-over of shares to that particular goal.
The investment manager has a number of tools to use 
in obtaining the goal of his fund. Firstly, he can 
structure his investment in companies on the basis of 
their past performance in generating either income or 
capital gains. Second, he can turn-over the shares in his 
fund in order to maximise the gain to his fund of short 
term market fluctuations.2 Third, and less formally
1 Blank et al (1979: p.16) define the "institutional 
investor" as insurance companies, pension funds, investment 
trusts and unit trusts.
2 The first two tools above have been the subject of 
academic research since the early I960's. The focus of this 
research centres on the relationship between turnover activity 
within a given fund and the performance of that fund.
Put simply, is there any benefit to the fund if the manager 
is aggressive rather than passive? Ippolite (1989: pp.1-23)
studied this phenomena over the period 1965-84. He concluded that 
while there did seem to be a gain to the funds where turnover was 
high, the cost of the transactions meant that the net gain was 
small. That raises an important point about the investment 
manager as an employee of the institution. The manager's function 
is not just to manage the fund allotted to him, he must be 
aggressive in his management as it attracts attention. The 
passive manager is unlikely to be regarded as a good manager even 
though his fund is performing adequately or well.
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acknowledged, is the institutional manager's power to 
utilise the voting capacity of the shares the fund has 
purchased.3 4
The fund manager is also under pressure to perform 
better than his competitors whether they be from other 
funds outside his institution or internal funds of the 
same nature. This competition between the funds managed 
by the various institutions is a short term one.5 The 
performance of the various funds are compared both 
quarterly and annually and so the investment manager must 
achieve the funds goal over a twelve month period.6 Thus 
a fund manager has a in built bias towards the short
3 Thus fund managers who have common interests and large 
shareholdings can appoint directors or remove them to secure that 
combined interest, they may also have an input into the 
management organ through informal briefings.
4 Stewart (1993: pp.34-41) found that as institutional
shareholders assert their prerogatives of ownership, they 
necessarily clip the power of corporate management.
5 For a consideration of the short-term pressures fund 
managers are subjected to, when their performance is evaluated 
on a quarterly basis, see Innovation Advisory Board (1990).
6 The British Labour Party (1987) stated:
[m]any industrial companies find it [the City] values 
their shares by present profits rather than future 
prospects, and that those who fail the test are 
vulnerable to takeover. The perverse result is to 
inhibit management from investment in research and 
development which will only show a return in the long 
term, for fear that the necessary reduction in 
distributed profit will reduce share prices in the 
short-term. Thus the short-term perspective which the 
City adopts in share dealing obliges industry to 
manage on the same short-term horizon.
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term.7 8
Russell and Montague-Jones (1990) comment on this. 
They state:-
[i] t is estimated that 65% of U.K. listed 
companies are owned by institutional investors, 
such as insurance companies and pension funds. 
Institutional investors are generally under a 
duty to maximise investment returns and such 
returns are publicly compared with those of 
their competitors on a quarterly basis. This 
leads to accusations that their approach is 
orientated towards short term profits, and that 
this in turn encourages companies to maximise 
short term earnings per share. (1990: p. 5) 9
It clearly creates pressures on the fund manager to 
utilise the third tool above to ensure the company 
behaves according to his investment strategy.10
7 Nicholas Brady then U.S. Treasury Secretary in February 
1990, quoted in Marsh (1990: p.6) regarding short-termism stated,
they:-
[c]an't possibly contribute in an important way to 
performance, much less to national goals...we need to 
create a climate where business leaders can 
concentrate on the long-term objectives rather than 
worrying about the next quarter's earnings... the 
Treasury is examining aspects of the corporate 
governance process which will encourage both the 
executives and institutional investors to think long 
term.
8 When the Stock Exchange assumed its modern form, the 
process of division between finance and industrial capital had 
a habit of shorter term investment; For a consideration of this 
historical development see, Cottrell (1975) and Ingham (1984) .
9 This is clearly at odds with the interests of the clients 
of a pension fund as it is long term performance which really 
matters.
10 For a full consideration of the short-term orientation 
see; Law (1986: pp.80-83) and Cosh et al (1990).
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Sheridan and Kendall describe the communal interests
as follows
[t] he starting point is, as we have already- 
indicated, to understand that the institutions 
are investors, and see themselves as such, not 
as owners. Their interest is in their funds and 
the performance of the funds, rather than the 
companies they have invested in, and they are 
judged, publicly, on their funds' performance. 
(1992: p . 9 6 ) 11
This communal emphasis on the fund's performance 
does damage a company's ability to perform.12 The 
Innovation Advisory Board (1990) stated:-
[t]he damage to companies may typically occur 
as follows:- the shorter the performance period 
the more a fund manager will opt for shares 
likely to deliver the short-term profits 
esteemed by market makers; moreover, if his 
portfolio starts to under-perform the fund 
manager may go even more short-term; in 
response, the companies give priority to the 
sought-after short-term profits in preference 
to R&D and other innovative investments.
11 They have another interest to serve in that they are also 
in a fiduciary relationship with their clients, see Moffat (1993: 
pp.471-496) and Nolan (1994a: pp.58-60).
That fiduciary relationship requires them to get the best 
performance from the fund, see Peters (1989: p p .871-872,876),
Quick (1990: p.76) and Irish et al (1994: pp.10-23).
12 Clarkham (1990) discusses the lack of proprietorial 
behaviour by fund managers who:-
[f]or all practical purposes regards shares as if they 
were commodities, objects of value like gold or cocoa 
or porkbellies to be traded, but without any intrinsic 
qualities or value other than that of being readily 
tradeable in an active market... What the company does 
itself is largely irrelevant... Nothing matters about 
it except what may affect the immediate movement of 
its share price. . . It is a buy at 180 and a sell at 
230 .
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Sheridan and Kendall are clear that : -
[i]n general, however, the institutions still 
appear to be not so much concerned with 
corporate planning, marketing strategies, 
organisational developments, succession 
planning, R & D, technological developments and 
strategic alliances, which is the essence of 
what companies are really about. (1992: p. 97)13
14
Miles (1993: pp.1379-1396) considers all the
arguments regarding short-termism and concludes:-
[w] hat our results show is not that short- 
termism certainly exists, but that those who 
believe it does not exist do need to explain 
something about the operation of the security 
market which makes longer-term cash flows 
appear to be discounted at much higher rates 
than shorter-term flows.15
To conclude, the institutional investor has a distinct 
interest which may be at odds with the interests of the
13 In Canada the short term approach of the institutions has 
led some companies to pursue individual private investors who 
will give the company's management greater freedom to pursue 
strategies that are better for the company in the long term; Bart 
(1994: pp.10-13).
14 For an economic perspective on the impact of the 
institutional shareholder on corporate strategy, see Lowe et al 
(1994 : pp.245-257) .
15 In the U.S. corporate managers have difficulties 
reconciling the demands of the market place with the long term 
goals of their companies. As institutional investors have become 
more sophisticated they have also become more demanding and more 
likely to exercise voting power and influence; McConville (1993: 
pp.29-32) .
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company invested in.16
Russell and Montague-Jones (1990: p.5) maintain that 
institutions hold 65% of the shares publicly quoted on 
the stock exchange.17 Phillips and Drew (1990) maintain 
that institutions hold 70% of U.K. equities. Sheridan and 
Kendall (1992: p.92) using a survey completed by The
Independent in November 1991, maintain that the 
institutional holdings are larger than either Phillips 
and Drew or Russell and Montague-Jones allow. In 1991 The 
Independent survey reported that institutions held 83.9% 
of the equities on the London Stock Exchange. That figure 
represented an increase from 1990 of 1.9% and an increase 
of 11.9% from the start of the decade.18 Anonymous 
(1994b: p.4) places institutional ownership at about 80%.
Whatever the true figure, the sources quoted in the 
previous paragraph indicate the influence that 
institutional shareholders have over quoted companies.19
16 Nigel Lawson then Chancellor of the Exchequer on the 9 
June 1986, quoted in Nickel and Wadhwani (1987) stated:-
[t]he big institutional investors nowadays 
increasingly react to short term pressure on 
investment performance. As a consequence many British 
industrial managers complain that their institutional 
shareholders are unwilling to countenance long-term 
investment or a sufficient expenditure on research and 
development.
17 The Wilson Committee (1977) found that institutional 
holdings in equities had increased from 26.6% in 1966 to 42.5% 
in 1975. It also forecast that percentage would rise by 50% by 
1980 and that by the year 2000 it would be between 69% and 84%.
18 1980.
19 For a consideration of the size and increasing influence 
of the institutional shareholder in corporate governance in 
Canada, see Montgomery and Leighton (1993: pp.38-46).
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The figures translated across to voting power are 
extremely significant. The combined voting powers of 
institutions within companies normally confers ordinary 
resolution powers, and indeed within some companies the 
combined institutional votes carry special resolution 
powers. Examples of this can be seen from the 1990 annual 
reports of U.K. companies. 117 shareholder accounts 
control 55% of B.T.R.'s share capital; 500 control 77% of
B.P. (thus conferring special resolution powers), 353 
control 63% of Shell; 100 control almost half of I.C.I. 
and 450 control 70% of Hanson.
The figures for the Irish stock exchange are even 
more startling. According to the Irish Stock Exchange 
figures for 1989 , 20 13 shareholder accounts control 78% 
of A.I.B. Further, Three shareholders, Irish Life, I.B.I. 
Nominees, and Ulster bank control 40% of A.I.B.'s share 
capital. Four shareholders, Irish Life, Standard Life, 
Prudential Assurance Co., and I.B.I. Nominees control 60% 
of James Crean Pic. Five shareholders, A.I.I.B., I.B.I., 
Irish life, Standard Life and Bank of Ireland Nominees 
hold 54% of the share capital of C.R.H. Pic.
The size of the institutional investment in the 
overall equities market is enormous.21 The small size of 
the Irish market and the dominance of a core group of 
institutions makes the Irish market particularly
20 O'Neill (1989: pp.104-111).
21 It is also likely to increase over the next decade as 
individuals build investible assets in retirement and saving 
plans, see Clowes (1993: p.l).
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susceptible to institutional pressures due to the 
likelihood of a coincidence of interests between the 
major institutions.22
From the above we have established that the 
institutions have an interest other than the company's to 
pursue. They also own a significant majority of the 
shares in the marketplace.
3.2 Institutional Input into Managerial Discretion.
The thesis now turns to survey the institutional 
input into managerial power. In order to do this the 
thesis divides the section in two. The first section 
regards the normal life of the company where the 
institutional investor can impact on the managerial 
discretion of the board through representative directors 
and through informal contacts. The second section regards 
the company in a take-over situation. There the interests 
of the company and the institutional shareholder are 
opposed. The degraded model is thus exposed and the 
dominance of the shareholders' interests prevails to the 
detriment of the company's interest.
Normal Life of the Company.
The position of the representative director was
22 One of the disadvantages of going public is the need to 
conform to the investment strategy of the institutional investor, 
see Fletcher (1994: pp.20-24).
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explored in detail in the last chapter. This chapter does 
not intend to comment any further on the representative 
director save to bring its relevance to bear on the 
present argument. The position of representative director 
is an accepted one.23 The position of dominance within 
listed companies of the institutions confers significant 
voting rights on them. The institutions can thus appoint 
directors to represent their views.24
The Cadbury Report (1992) contained some 
recommendations regarding the involvement of 
institutional shareholders in companies. 25 26 Sir Adrian 
Cadbury stated:-
23 See chapter two 2.4 Directors Appointed to Serve Another 
Interest.
24 Institutional shareholders are encouraged to take an 
active role in regulating companies. This can be seen clearly in 
the report of the Cadbury Committee (1992) which was set up in 
May 1991 by the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock 
Exchange and the accountancy bodies. The impetus for the setting 
up of such a committee was the concern of the sponsoring bodies 
at the lack of confidence in British financial reporting and in 
the value of audits.
25 Sir Adrian Cadbury, regarding the impetus for the Cadbury 
Report, stated :-
[t]he underlying factors were seen as the looseness of 
accounting standards, the lack of a clear framework 
for ensuring that directors kept under review the 
controls in their businesses and the competitive 
pressures on companies and on auditors made it 
difficult for auditors to stand up to demanding 
boards. (1993: p.l)
While financial reporting was the concern of the Cadbury 
Committee it did touch on institutional involvement.
26 For a consideration of the main recommendations of the 
Cadbury Committee, see Osman (1992: pp.24-25).
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[t]he last section of the Report is addressed 
to the shareholders. We welcomed the 
Institutional Shareholders Committee's (I.S.C.) 
call for regular and systematic contact between 
institutional investors and companies. They 
urged their members to take a positive interest 
in such matters as the composition of the board 
and the appointment of a core of ned's (non­
executive directors) of the necessary calibre, 
experience and independence. The I.S.C. also 
advised their members to use their voting 
rights; we supported that and recommended that 
institutional investors should disclose their 
policy on voting. (1993: p.9)27
The London Stock Exchange (L.S.E.) has made it a 
condition of listing that the directors state in the 
Annual Report whether they have complied with The Cadbury 
Report (1992) and give reasons for non-compliance.28 The 
whole emphasis of The Cadbury Report (1992) is on placing 
more control in the hands of the shareholders.29
Both The Ryan Report (1992) and The Cadbury Report 
(1992) emphasised the need for institutional involvement 
in corporate governance. This is a recognition of not 
just a feature of corporate governance but a fundamental 
shift in the way the market place is working.
27 See Finch (1992a: pp.581-595) for a critical analysis of 
the Cadbury Committee's approach to institutional shareholders.
28 Regarding the Cadbury Committee (1992), Davis (1993: 
pp.58-59) suggests that a committee of supervision should be set 
up representing the City institutions. Its role would be to 
supervise and develop corporate governance from the starting 
point of the Cadbury code of conduct. For a more critical 
analysis of the Cadbury report, see Finch (1994b: pp.51-62) and 
Dine (1994: pp.73-79).
29 See Star (1994: p. 17) where she considers that 
institutional shareholders are increasingly taking on the role 
of powerful lobbyists. She concludes that the institutions see 
the board of directors as a vital link in expressing their 
concerns.
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Dissatisfaction at a company's performance leads the 
institutional investor to two distinct choices, get 
involved in the company or sell the shares. Some 
institutions choose to use their voting rights, others 
sell the shares.
The present market environment is dominated by 
institutional investors, thus the majority of buyers in 
the market place are institutions. An institution unhappy 
with a company's performance will have to sell its shares 
to another institution. This will become more and more 
difficult and the more attractive option will be to get 
involved in the company.30 Ryan commented as follows:-
[t] he present tenuous relationships between 
directors and shareholders are ultimately 
unsustainable. A majority of the shares in 
almost all large PLCs is held by institutions. 
The sheer size of some of these institutions 
(and especially the pension funds) will compel 
them to behave more like proprietors and less 
like punters. Trading shares among themselves 
will offer smaller and smaller rewards. More 
and more, the performance of the funds depends 
on the performance of the large companies, 
whose shares they must hold more or less 
permanently in their portfolios. Fund managers 
will therefore be forced to take a direct 
interest in underperforming firms. This means 
being active in the choice and appointment of 
directors. Indeed, there could be advantages in 
Non-Executive directors having close links with 
institutional shareholders who are long term 
shareholders. It would give the Non-Executive 
directors a constituency to back them up, and 
any loss of independence they might suffer 
would be more than counterbalanced by their 
increased weight when dealing with management.
30 See Marckus (1994: p.21) regarding the removal of Maurice 
Saatchi as Chairman of Saatchi & Saatchi Pic. Mr Saatchi alleged 
that his removal was instigated by a fund manager at Harris 
Associates of Chicago who threatened the board of directors with 
removal.
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(1993: p.6)
As well as encouragement from the above Commissions 
and the Stock Exchange, the Institutional Shareholders 
Committee31 (I.S.C.) encourages its members to take an 
active role in the companies in which they invest.32 Thus 
the institutions are being encouraged from all sides to 
use their voting power to elect directors.
Those representative directors are representing an 
interest which is clearly not the company's, yet the law 
holds that no conflict arises between the nature of their 
appointment and their fiduciary duties.33
The institutions also influence managerial 
discretion through extra-constitutional informal 
briefings. 34 35 Sheridan and Kendall (1992: p. 83) comment
31 An organisation set up to represent the views of the 
institutional shareholders. For a consideration of how this 
organisation impacts on directors, see Evans (1991: pp.183-184).
32 Institutional Shareholders' Committee (1992: pp.7-8).
33 Again see chapter two, 2.4 Directors Appointed to Serve 
Another Interest.
34 Marsh (1990: pp.108-109) states :-
there has been a move away from using stockbrokers and 
their analysts as the principal intermediaries between 
companies and their institutional investors, in favour 
of more direct dialogue. The use of this additional, 
direct channel may well be helping to improve 
communications.
35 Stahl (1994: pp.34-40) considers that the practice of 
investor relations can mean the difference between a strong 
company and a lackluster one. Investor relations represents the 
main contact between public companies and shareholders and 
analysts, and it is the basis by which brokerage firms and their 
sales department make a market in an institution's stock.
139
on this : -
[t]he connection between annual general 
meetings and policy-making is remote. 
Commenting on A.G.M.'s, it has been remarked 
that never have so many given so little 
information to so few. The shareholders simply 
do not attend what is, in theory, a key company 
meeting. As an effective policy-making arena, 
the A.G.M. is a joke. The real owners of the 
company - the institutions - do not use the
A.G.M. to promote their interests, preferring 
to put their points in private. Even when there 
are the upheavals. . . still the exception rather 
than the rule, incidentally - they are agreed 
on by the institutions in private meetings 
outside the A.G.M. The A.G.M merely ratifies 
these decisions formally. 36 37
Finch (1992b: p.185) commenting on this stated:-
[i]nstitutional shareholders have historically 
made unremarkable use of the meetings and 
resolutions processes to work against 
incompetent management. Their approach has 
tended to be one of investigation "behind the 
scenes" and reliance on private discussions 
with chairmen and senior executives.
In June 1991 Norwich Union sought to oust the board 
of the environmental controls company, Trace.38 The 
chairman of the board, Sir David Nicholson, referring to 
Mr. Michael Sandland, chief investment manager of Norwich
36 Amen (1994: pp. 49-50) considers the advantages of 
informal contact with institutional shareholders. He also 
recommends formalising these contacts.
37 Useem et al (1993: pp.175-189) estimates that the next 
decade is likely to see institutional shareholders increase their 
involvement in corporate affairs.
38 Sunday Times (1991) .
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Union, and the attempt to remove the board, stated:-
Sandland wants to be seen as the white knight 
of corporate governance. It is politically 
motivated and it is vindictive. It is one thing 
to own shares in a company but they are trying 
to run the company. These people have no 
experience of industry and their power should 
be curtailed. The institutions have become 
arrogant and they need to be regulated. 39 40
Mr. Sandland felt that the action was justified and he 
stated in reply, " [c] ompanies are getting the message now 
that it is far better to pay attention to the first quiet 
phone call or letter and act of their own accord. "41 42
The Irish Stock Exchange also encourages the smaller 
shareholders to look to the institutions to exert
39 The institutions themselves are concerned about the level 
of access they have obtained into the managerial discretion. See 
Connon (1994: p.24) where it was reported that Scottish Widows 
one of the U.K.'s largest institutional investors is asking 
companies for a formal undertaking that they will not disclose 
price-sensitive information in the course of meetings with fund 
managers!. The institutions are worried that the new insider 
trading [legislation contained in the Criminal Justice Act 1993 
would cqver their activities.
40 ! In the U.K. the Criminal Justice Act 1993 which took 
effect in early 1994 makes individuals "insiders" if they have 
price sensitive information through their work irrespective of 
the nature of their work. The Stock Exchange has published a 
guidance statement; Stock Exchange (1994). See also Smith (1994: 
pp.89-90) and Wotherspoon (1994: pp.419-433) for an analysis of 
the insider provisions.
41 Norwich Union is one of the largest institutional 
investors and Mr. Sandland is also the chairman of the 
Institutional Shareholders Committee.
42 See also Anant and Barr (1994: p.3) where they examine 
the increasingly activist behaviour of institutional shareholders 
in certain U.S. companies.
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pressure on the directors. 43 44
The view of the Irish Stock Exchange (I.S.E.) and 
indeed the L.S.E. on this issue is that regulation of 
listed companies is a matter for the shareholders.45 46
Further encouragement comes from The Irish 
Association of Investment Managers (I.A.I.M.) (1991: p.4)
they state : -
[g]ood informal communications between 
companies and investors/analysts are an 
integral part of a normal and healthy market. 
Because of the size of their shareholdings, and 
their fiduciary responsibilities , institutional 
investors are under a strong obligation to 
exercise their influence in a responsible 
manner. Formal methods of communication do not 
necessarily establish the type of direct 
relationship which enables directors and 
shareholders to obtain a deeper understanding 
of each other's aims and requirements.47
43 In Britain the Trade Secretary Michael Heseltine is 
quoted as saying that the big institutional shareholders should 
regulate the pay of executives; Anonymous (1994a: pp.49-50).
44 While equivalent insider trading regulations exist in the 
Irish jurisdiction they have not been enforced. For a 
consideration of these provisions, see McCormack (1992: pp.105- 
111) and for an analysis of the problems regarding the insider 
legislation see, Lynch (1994: pp.189-192) and Linnane (1994a:
pp.218-222).
45 The General Manager of the Irish Stock Exchange Mr. Tom 
Healy quoted in Dalby (1994: p.3) stated "it is fair to say that 
in many cases it is only the large shareholders who are capable 
of taking responsibility".
46 Buckley (1992) recommended the building of a strong 
relationship between the investment manager and the management 
of companies invested in.
47 Companies in the U.S. are concerned with the increasing 
role of the institutions in the corporate environment. They are 
particularly concerned about the motivation and reasonableness 
of the activist institutional investors and their impact on 
corporate governance and management; Cordtz (1993: pp.24-28).
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Sir Adrian Cadbury in his paper to the Institute of 
Directors in Ireland commented on this:-
[t]here are a number of reasons for thinking 
that the institutions are looking at their 
shareholder role in a new light. First, there 
is the I.S.C. report on the Responsibilities of 
Institutional Shareholders in the U.K., to 
which I have already referred. This encourages 
the members of the I.S.C. to take a positive 
interest in the boards of the companies in 
which they have invested and to put their 
voting power to good use. Second, the 
institutions now own such a high proportion of 
U.K. equities that collectively they have a 
commercial interest in improving the way in 
which their companies are run, rather than 
selling out - given that they can only sell to 
each other. Third, the increasingly activist 
role of shareholders in the U.S. is likely to 
find its way over here, given the stake which 
American investors have in British industry. 
(1993: p . 10 ) 48
Lee and Tweedie (1981: p.138) surveyed 136 institutional 
investors regarding sources and use of financial 
information. A large percentage of those interviewed49 
visited the companies invested in.50 The purpose of the 
visits were stated as the assessment of the ability of 
corporate management.51 Commenting on these visits Lee
48 For a pro-shareholders activist approach, see Hagaman 
(1992 : p.22) .
49 94%.
50 50% of those that visited companies visited "frequently1 . 
No precise definition of "frequently" was provided in the report.
51 The possibility that institutional directors might be 
considered shadow directors under the provisions of the Companies 
Act 1990 section 27 seems remote. In particular see RE HYDRODAN
(CORBY) LTD. (1994) B.C.C. 161 where the influence needed to 
impose shadow director status was set at a very high level. See 
further, Bhattacharyya (1994: pp.151-152) and Campbell (1994:
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and Tweedie (1981: p.144) state:-
[cjompany visits by institutional investors and 
stockbrokers are of obvious importance to 
them... We would, therefore, recommend that the 
investing community investigate this area with 
a view to establishing, more clearly than was 
possible in this study, the nature and purpose 
of such visits. In particular, it would appear 
to us to be an area which deserves some 
official attention, especially in view of the 
provisions of the Companies Act 1980, with a 
view to providing institutional investors and 
stockbrokers with accepted guidelines for such 
visits...
The managerial discretion of the board of directors 
is thus fettered by institutional input into the decision 
making process.52 53 The board are no longer acting in 
what could be objectively called the interests of the 
company and it must certainly be questioned as to whether 
they could subjectively believe their actions are in the 
interests of the company as an entity.54
pp.609-614).
52 This is not a recent development. Lord Shawcross stated 
"it is right that the institutions should increasingly interest 
themselves in the management of the companies in which they 
invest..." (Chairman of the Panel quoted in, Panel on Takeovers 
and Mergers 1978)
Also the Chairman of the Prudential Assurance Company, one 
of the largest institutional shareholders in the U.K. was quoted 
in the Financial Times (1970) saying that his company was always 
prepared to bring pressure to bear on the management of companies 
which were showing poor results.
53 See further Gamble (1993: p. 2) for a consideration of the 
institutional shareholders interference in managerial discretion.
54 Bishop (1994: p p .SS16-SS17) concludes that institutional 
shareholders with close relationships to company bosses do not 
guarantee ideal corporate governance.
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Faced with institutional pressure from within55 and 
from the external environment,55 57 the director has no 
choice but to act in the financial interests of the 
institutions. 58 59 Thus during the normal life of the
company, the presence of the institutional investor 
erodes the model legal structure even more, through the 
additional input into the managerial discretion they have 
obtained.60 That input comes with no added 
responsibilities.61 They are still shareholders not
55 Through representative directors.
56 Through extra-constitutional institutional input.
57 Black (1992: pp.811-893) considers that the existing 
regime in the U.S. should be changed to facilitate shareholders 
activism. He sees institutional investors as a valuable 
constraint on managerial discretion. See also Hilton (1993: 
p.14) .
58 Ball (1990) points out that more institutional
intervention is being used than is commonly supposed and that 
this is not a good thing.
59 Agrawal and Mandelker (1992: pp.15-22) found that 
corporations with large institutional ownership are more likely 
to maximise shareholder wealth.
60 Gage (1993: pp.11-12) found that institutional
shareholders are invading board rooms and executive suites in an 
effort to boost stock prices by dictating corporate policy. To 
hold back investor interference, some corporations are looking 
for ways to direct their stock to ideal institutional
shareholders. To manage investors more aggressively, some 
companies have begun using outside detective firms to track 
shareholders and find out their favourite types of stock or 
industries, hold and sell patterns, history of interference with 
management and any buying and selling moves. Corporations are 
using shareholder intelligence to send reassuring messages to 
nervous shareholders and to target potential investors 
sympathetic to management's long term goals.
61 In the U.S. the Securities and Exchange Commission 
changed its rules in October 1992 in order to facilitate 
increased shareholder activism. See Silverstein (1993 : pp.46-47) .
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directors and as such owe no duty to the company. 62 63
Take-over Situation.
The model company contains a separation of ownership 
and control. The control element is created in the 
registration procedure which also gives rise to the 
fiduciary duties owed by the directors as agents. From 
chapter two it can be seen that the board's power as a 
management organ has been degraded.64 The above65 has 
shown that the presence of the institutional investor has 
further degraded the management organ of the company. 
This section turns to examine a specific set of 
circumstance in which the degraded model legal company is 
all but destroyed, the take-over.66
A "take-over" may be defined as a transaction 
or series of transactions whereby a person 
(individual, group of individuals or company) 
acquires control over the assets of a 
company.67 (Blank et al 1979: p. 3)
62 See chapter one, Equitable Considerations Concerning 
Members Voting Rights.
63 Chernoff (1992: p.l) considers that increasing activism 
carries with it certain responsibility on the part of the 
institutions to maintain long-term positions in portfolio 
companies.
64 See chapter two, Part 2.
65 Chapter three, Normal Life of the Company.
66 For a consideration of the theory that take-overs are a 
mechanism of disciplining corporate management, see Farrar et al
(1988: p .520).
67 Where the offeree company is a public company a take-over 
can occur, by agreement between the controllers of the companies, 
by purchasing the shares on the Stock Exchange and by means of
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It is in these circumstance that the interests of the 
institutional shareholders and the company conflict.68 
The representative director is thus representing a view 
which is in conflict with his fiduciary duty. The 
informal institutional input into the discretion of the 
board also represents the institutional interest.
This though, may not be enough to secure control 
over even the degraded board.69 70 The City Code on Take­
overs and Mergers71 thus places control over the 
acceptance of a bid in the hands of the members.72
a "take-over" bid.
68 The interest of the institutions is to get the best price 
for their shares, not to accept or reject a bid which would 
benefit or not, the company. See 3.1 The interests of the 
institution.
69 In the event of a successful take-over the board are 
likely to lose their positions.
70 The status of the Code in the Irish jurisdiction is 
uncertain at present. The Panel on Take-overs and Mergers have 
ceased to act in the Irish Jurisdiction. See Graham (1993).
71 The Code was issued by the City Working Party set up in 
1959 and the Code was issued in March 1968. The Code is the main 
control over take-overs and mergers. The membership of the City 
Working Party represented the City associations and the 
institutions. The administration of the Code is undertaken by the 
Panel on Take-overs and Mergers. The Panel is made up of the 
representatives of the sponsoring organisations under a non­
executive chairman and Deputy Chairman nominated by the Governor 
of the Bank of England. For a consideration of the work of the 
Panel and the regulation of take-overs in the U.K. generally, see 
Bare and Bowen (1988b: pp.1293-1325).
72 As Gower (1979: p. 696) states :-
[t]he prime concern of the Code is the protection of 
the shareholders of the offeree company. This is 
secured, first, by requiring that the ultimate 
decision whether or not to accept an offer must rest 
with the shareholders themselves rather than with the 
management of the offeree company.
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Ultimate control rests with the institutions who owe no
fiduciary obligations to the company and who have a 
distinct interest other than the company's. 73 74
The Code ensures that the shareholders make the 
decision on whether the take-over should succeed rather 
than the management.75 This by-passes the directors' duty 
to act in the "interests of the company" and leaves the 
institutions free to act in their own interests.76 This 
can lead obviously to the institutions approving a take­
over because it maximises the share price rather than 
being in the "interests of the company."77
The Code places stringent obligations on the offeree 
company's directors. It requires that shareholders be
73 Blank et al (1979: p.16) state :-
[ijnsurance companies and pension funds are interested 
primarily in income and seldom sell any of their 
investments; however, as a company which attracts a 
take-over bid is in all probability one which is not 
obtaining the optimum return from its assets, they may 
well favour a take-over bid in respect of a company in 
which they hold shares.
74 For a consideration of the present and likely future role 
of the Panel, see Calcutt (1990: pp.203-207).
75 Other regulations impact on Take-overs. The Yellow Book 
(1994: Chr.2, s. 6) states the importance of the Code and 
continues to regulate content of offer documents, listing 
particulars, timing of offers and inspection of documents. The 
Competition Act 1991, aims to prevent any restriction on 
competition. It amends the Mergers Take-overs and Monopolies 
(Control) Act 1978, and creates a competition authority to this 
end. See also Linnane (1994b: pp.319-320).
76 A decision of the panel that finds that the Code has been 
broken will be accepted by the Stock Exchange Council as proof 
of a breach. The Stock Exchange is then open to take such action 
as it wishes.
77 See Burr (1994: p.l) on the issue of institutional 
investors support of take-overs as maximising share price.
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givjen sufficient information and advice to enable them to
i
reach a properly informed decision.78 Directors must also 
take competent independent advice and communicate it to 
the shareholders.79 The directors are also entitled to 
ci culate their own views.80 The offeree directors are 
prohibited from taking any frustrating action without the 
approval of the shareholders in general meeting.81 The 
board may not, without the approval of the shareholders 
in general meeting, issue any authorised but unissued 
shares, issue or grant options in respect of unissued 
shares, create or issue convertibles, sell, dispose or 
acquire assets of a material amount or agree to do so, 
enter into contracts other than in the ordinary course of 
business.82 The directors should only act in their 
capacity as directors without regard to their personal or 
family shareholdings or their personal relationships with 
the company, taking into consideration only the interests 
of the shareholders as a whole and the interests of 
employees and creditors.83
Breach of the Code may lead the Panel to a number of
78 General principle 4 and Rule 23 .
79 Rule 3.1.
80 Rule 25.
81 General principle 7.
82 Rule 21.
83 General principle 9. While this principle looks to be an 
reasonable one, it is in fact attempting to redefine the 
considerations of the directors away from that of the corporate 
entity.
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sanctions.84 They may censure a party/advisor privately 
or publicly.85 In serious cases the panel may recommend 
to the Stock Exchange that the facilities of the 
securities market be withheld from the offending 
company.86
If the board of directors breach the Code or attempt 
any defensive measures they may be open to an action 
under the Companies Act 1963, section 205.87
The net result of the Code would appear to be to 
empower the institutional shareholder to the detriment of 
the legal entity of the company. 88 89 Sir John Clarke, 
formerly of Plessey P.L.C., considered that 35 fund 
managers had decided the take-over of his company. Fund 
managers:-
84 For an examination of the practical workings of the code, 
see Snaith (1990: pp.98-106).
85 Press interest in take-overs and mergers makes the 
likelihood of a public censure a significant deterrent.
86 The decisions of the Panel where held to be not open to 
judicial review (on the facts in this particular case) : R V PANEL 
ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS EX PARTE DATAFIN AND PRUDENTIAL-BACHE 
SECURITIES INC. [1987] B.C.L.C. 104. But for an argument that the 
decisions maybe open to challenge, see Morse (1992: pp.596-599). 
For a consideration of the favourable treatment the Panel 
receives from the courts regarding judicial review and on how the 
various enforcement mechanisms available to the Panel work, see 
Ferran (1989: pp.349-352).
87 See chapter two, 2.5 The Erosion of the Fiduciary 
Safeguards.
88 For the Panel's viewpoint on their role see, Lord 
Alexander of Weedon (1990: pp.203-216).
89 For a more critical analysis of the role of the Panel, 
see Morse (1991: pp.509-524).
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who did not know one end of a shop floor from 
another, who had no interest in the company or 
any knowledge of what it did, who had no 
interest in the employees of the company. 
Thirty-five people who had one interest alone: 
short term gain. Thus was the fate of a great 
company sealed. (Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, 1989)
Thus once a take-over situation occurs the board 
transfers control of the legal entity to the general 
meeting.90 The legal entity is no longer considered in 
the decision, as the members owe no duty to consider it's 
interests. Any semblance of the model company is thus 
removed.91
There is though one qualification on this. The board 
of directors may, if they believe that it is in the 
interests of the company oppose a take-over bid.92 
The thesis now turns to consider the practicality of this 
qualification.
90 Laing (1990) considers the present take-over regime very 
destructive. He states:-
[b]y the time it becomes evident that our totally free 
market in corporate control is seriously damaging to 
the nation, it will be too late.
91 For an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
take-overs to the economy and to the individual firm, see Ramsay 
(1992: pp.369-397) .
92 PEEL V L.N.W. RY. [1907] 1 Ch. 5.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY.
4.0 The Interests of the Company.
In this chapter, the thesis considers the fiduciary 
duty of the director to act in the interests of the 
company.1 The origin of this duty has been dealt with 
above in chapter two.2 In this chapter the application of 
the duty is considered in the context of the overall 
question, does the duty protect the interests of the 
corporate entity? The thesis examines, first, how the 
courts have determined the interests of the corporate 
entity and second, how they have sought to determine 
whether the directors acted in accordance with that 
subjective duty. The delegation of the control power to 
the board carries with it a duty to act in the "interests 
of the company."3
1 For a consideration of the concept of loyalty arising 
generally, see Fletcher (1993).
2 Chapter two, 2.1 The Model Fiduciary.
3 The relationship between the directors and the company is 
described by Sharwood J. in SPERING'S APPEAL 71 Pa. 11; cited by 
Fuller C.J. in the U.S. Supreme Court in BRIGGS V SPAULDING 
(1891) 141 U.S. 132:-
[t]hey are undoubtedly said in many authorities to be 
trustees, but that, as I apprehend, is only in a 
general sense, as we term an agent or any other bailee 
intrusted with the care or management of the property 
of another. It is certain that they are not technical 
trustees. They can only be regarded as mandataries, 
persons who have gratuitously undertaken to perform 
certain duties...
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The test for the duty is subjective.4 In RE GRESHAM 
LIFE ASSURANCE SOC. [1872] L.R. 8 Ch. 445, it was held 
that if the directors subjectively believe that what they 
are doing is in the interests of the company as a whole, 
the court will not interfere with their decisions.5
It is certain that directors must consider the 
"interests of the company" when exercising the managerial 
discretion delegated to them by the members in the 
articles of association. If they do not, the decision may 
be invalid.6 In RE W.& M. ROITH LTD. [1967] 1 W.L.R. 432, 
a shareholder and director entered into a contract of 
service with one of the companies whereby on his death 
his wife would be entitled to a pension for life. The 
court decided that no consideration had been made as to 
whether the transaction benefited the company. The only 
reason for the arrangement was to provide for the widow. 
Thus the court held that the transaction was not binding 
on the company. Directors must consider the interests of 
the company if a decision is to be valid.7
4 Lord Greene M.R. in RE SMITH & FAWCETT [1942] Ch. 304 
considered that directors must exercise their powers "bona fide 
in what they considered - not what a court may consider - is in 
the interests of the company and not for any collateral purpose."
5 It may no longer be the case that the directors could act 
objectively to the detriment of the company. The judiciary have 
developed objective criteria to ascertain the subjective belief 
of the director which would preclude detrimental behaviour as 
unreasonable.
6 See BISHOPSGATE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LTD. (IN 
LIQUIDATION) V MAXWELL (NO. 2) [1994] 1 ALL E.R. 261 (C.A.) and
for a examination of the above case and the duty to act in the 
interests of the company generally, see Nolan (1994b: pp.85-88).
7 See also RE LEE BEHRENS AND CO. LTD. [1932] ALL E.R. 889.
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The question still remains as to what they should 
consider in order to constitute the "interests of the 
company." The corporation as an artificial entity lies at 
the core of the judicial quandary. To determine the 
"interests of the company" the judiciary are applying a 
mechanism which is geared towards natural persons, to an 
artificial entity.8 9
An artificial entity by its nature poses legal 
problems.10 It is difficult to describe or define the 
rights and duties of an artificial entity without using 
human metaphors, so the courts use a term like "the 
interests of the company. 1,11 This leaves open the
8 Mac Cann (1991a: pp.80-85) and Mac Cann (1991b: pp.104- 
109) considers that the company as a whole means the company as 
a separate entity but that this in turn means that:-
[i]n determining what is for the benefit of the 
company as an abstraction one must have regard to the 
interests of the general body of shareholders, present 
and future, rather than the interests of individual or 
particular shareholders.
9 For a consideration of how the judiciary have applied the 
duty, see Riley (1989: pp.87-93).
10 For example see chapter one above at p. 6 6 on the
constitutional status of the legal entity.
11 Dixon J. in MILLS V MILLS (1938) 60 C.L.R. 150 (Aust .
H.C.) found that:-
[w]hen the law makes the object, view or purpose of a 
man or body of men, the test of the validity of their 
acts, it necessarily opens up the possibility of an 
almost infinite analysis of the fears and desires
proximate and remote which, in truth form the compound
motives usually animating human conduct. But logically 
possible as such an analysis may seem, it would be 
impracticable to adopt it as a means of determining 
the validity of the resolutions arrived at by a body 
of directors,....
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In determining the "interests of the company" the 
courts have strictly construed section 18 (2) of the
Companies Act 1963. It reads:-
[f]rom the date of incorporation mentioned in 
the certificate of incorporation, the 
subscribers of the memorandum, together with 
such other persons as may from time to time 
become members of the company, shall be a body 
corporate...
The Act itself thus describes the parts of the corporate 
entity as the directors and the members.13 14 Thus, logic 
would dictate that if the "interests of the company" are 
to be determined from its component parts, then the 
members would be the dominant element, as the duty is 
imposed on the directors.
Consideration was given to this issue by the Report 
of the Second Savoy Hotel Investigation (1954). There, a 
Board of Trade Inspector was appointed to report on the 
legality of the directors' actions in trying to remove an 
asset15 from the company's control so as to take it 
beyond the reach of a take-over bidder. The report
question as to what the company' (s) interests is/are.12
12 In RE HALT GARAGE (1964) LTD. [1982] 3 ALL E.R. 1016
Oliver J. dismissed the concept of an abstract test of the 
benefit of the company in favour of a test to determine whether 
the exercise of power was genuine.
13 Including future members.
14 The same formula has been applied by the English 
judiciary since the 19th century; Finch (1991: pp. 87-119) .
15 The Berkeley Hotel.
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suggested that the duty to the company is not fulfilled 
by the directors acting in the interests of a section of 
the shareholders.15
The Report continued that it was not enough to act 
in the short term interests of the company alone. Regard 
must be taken of the long term interests of the company. 
The basis for this is that the duty is not confined to 
the existing body of shareholders, but rather even future 
shareholders must be considered.17 The long term view 
must be "balanced" against the short term interests of 
the present members. The shareholders' interest is the 
only one under consideration.18 19
The Report of the Second Savoy Hotel Investigation, 
(1954) equates the "interests of the company" with the 
interests of the shareholders.20 The only question at
16 For a consideration of the directors duty to act bona 
fide in the interests of the company, see FULHAM FOOTBALL CLUB 
V CABRA ESTATES PLC. (1992) B.C.C. 863. For an analysis of the
above case and a consideration of the difficulties surrounding 
the duty to act "bona fide in the interests of the company," see 
Lowry (1993a: pp.576-585).
17 See also PERCIVAL V WRIGHT [1902] 2 Ch. 421.
18 In KOEHLER V BLACK RIVER FALLS IRON CO. (1862) 67 U.S. (2 
BLACK) 715 the court considered that directors:-
hold a place of trust, and by accepting the trust are 
obliged to execute it with fidelity, not for their own 
benefit, but for the common benefit of the 
stockholders of the corporation.
19 The Cadbury Committee (1992) considering directors duties 
only found a role for directors, shareholders and auditors.
20 Lord Wilberforce in RE WESTBOURNE GALLERIES [1973] A.C. 
360 discussed the relationship of the legal entity to the 
individual within it. He stated:-
a limited company is more than a mere legal entity,
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issue is how to balance the long term and short term 
interests of the shareholders.21
Lord Wedderburn of Charlton (1993: pp.220-262)
stated:-
[t]he shareholder's property in his share and 
the "interests of the company" as the 
shareholders' interests alone, became pillars 
of the modern law with no plurality of other 
interests acknowledged (such as those of the 
employees) as they have, in whole or in part, 
been accepted by neighbouring company laws as 
a natural and necessary part of their 
enterprise law...
Further to this it would appear that although there 
is technically a separate personality of the company, the 
directors will not be fulfilling their duty if they act 
on the basis of the economic advantage to the corporate 
entity. Evershed M.R. in GREENHALGH V ARDERNE CINEMAS 
[1951] Ch. 286 (C .A .) addressed the issue in connection
with members voting in general meeting, where he stated:-
the phrase 'the company as a whole' does not 
(at any rate in such case as the present) mean 
the company as a commercial entity as distinct 
from the corporators.22
with a personality in law of its own:... there is room 
in company law for recognition of the fact that behind 
it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, 
expectations and obligations inter se which are not 
necessarily submerged in the company structure.
21 See the considerations of Hayek (1979: p.82) where he 
argues that directors should act in the interests of the 
shareholders alone. See also Friedman (1972: p.177).
22 He also considered that the interests of the company 
meant the corporators as a general body. See also the decision 
of Dillon L.J. in LEE PANAVISION LTD. V LEE LIGHTING LTD. [1991]
B.C.C. 620. For a consideration of the "elusive concept," see
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The directors can for example recommend dividends to the 
members23 rather than ploughing the profits back into the 
company to increase its size and wealth.
The extent to which the judicial definition has
remained restricted is illustrated in PARKE V DAILY NEWS 
LTD. [1962] Ch. 927. The issues in the case arose out of 
the sale of the newspaper, the News Chronicle and Star. 
The Cadbury family, who controlled the selling company, 
wished to distribute the proceeds of the sale amongst the 
employees who would be made redundant by the sale. A 
shareholder sued to restrain them from doing so, arguing 
that the duty of the directors was to the shareholders. 
The directors argued that their prime duty was to the 
shareholders, but that the board must also take into 
consideration the interests of the employees. Plowman 
J.24 replied to this argument: -
no authority to support that proposition as a 
proposition of law was cited to me; I know of
none, and in my judgment such is not the law.25
In HUTTON V WEST CORK RAILWAY CO. (1883) 23 Ch. D 
654 a railway company whose undertaking had been
Farrar (1987: p.55)
23 Article 117.
24 He clearly asserted that the benefit of the company means 
the benefit of the shareholders as a whole.
25 Note that the Companies Act 1990, section 52 imposes a 
duty on the directors to have regard to the employee's interests. 
See chapter two, 2.5 The Erosion of the Fiduciary Safeguards 
regarding the impact of this duty.
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transferred to another company and whose affairs were 
being wound up, could not pay gratuitous compensation to 
its former employees or to its directors for loss of 
employment. There was no express power to make the 
payments in its memorandum of association, and the power 
could not be claimed to be incidental to carrying out the 
company's object of running a railway. This was now 
unobtainable as the company's undertaking had been 
transferred. The payment could not be justified as being 
in the "interests of the company" by encouraging the 
employees to work hard in the future, and so increase the 
company's profits, because there were no profits to be 
earned after the company had ceased its own undertaking.
In NICHOLAS V SOUNDCRAFT ELECTRONICS LTD. AND 
ANOTHER [1993] B.C.L.C. 360 the interests of a parent 
company which was the majority shareholder in the 
subsidiary was held to be in the interests of that 
subsidiary.25 In DAWSON INTERNATIONAL PLC. V COATS PATONS 
PLC. AND OTHERS [1989] B.C.L.C. 233 Lord Cullen stated 
"when directors were concerned with the shares of 
shareholders, they owed a fiduciary duty to them and so 
were obliged to act in their best interests."27
Grantham (1993: p.245) states:-
26 See Lowry (1994b: pp.160-165), Griffin (1994: pp.28-31) 
and Lower (1994a: pp.210-213) regarding parent companies 
activities involving their subsidiaries.
27 Further to this in a take-over situation Lawton L.J. in 
HERON INTERNATIONAL V LORD GRADE, ASSOCIATION COMMUNICATIONS CORP 
PLC. AND OTHERS [1983] B.C.L.C. 244 stated " [w]here the directors 
must only decide between rival bidders, the interests of the 
company must be the interests of the current shareholders."
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[i]n the history of the modern company the 
shareholder has held a privileged position, for 
although the company's separate identity is a 
fundamental tenet of company law the 
shareholder's place as proprietor has only 
recently been questioned. It is perhaps not 
surprising therefore that for nearly a century 
the unanimous assent of shareholders has held 
the status of an overriding authority, able to 
cure procedural defects, overcome statutory 
requirements and validate almost any act within 
the capacity of the company.
The duty to act in the "interests of the company" has 
been judicially defined as acting in the interests of the 
shareholders. 28 29
In specific cases, though, there has been some 
movement towards other interests, such as creditors.30 
Street C.J. in KINSELA V RUSSEL KINSELA PROPERTY LTD. (IN 
LIQUIDATION) [1986] 4 N.S.W.L.R. 722 stated:-
[i]n a solvent company the proprietary 
interests of the shareholders entitle them as 
a general body to be regarded as the company 
when questions of the duty of the directors 
arise. If, as a general body, they authorise or 
ratify a particular action of the directors, 
there can be no challenge to the validity of 
what the directors have done. But where a 
company is insolvent the interests of the
28 See also HOWARD SMITH LTD. V AMPOL PETROLEUM LTD. [1974] 
A.C. 821 for a consideration of the directors duty to act in the 
interests of the shareholders.
29 In RE OLYMPIA AND YORK ENTERPRISES AND HIRAM WALKER 
(1986) 59 O.R. (2d) 254 H.C., the High Court of Ontario, 
referring to a take-over situation found that it was the 
directors' duty to take all reasonable steps to maximise value 
for all the shareholders.
30 For a detailed analysis of this development, see Grantham 
(1991a: pp.1-18), Grantham (1991b: pp.576-581), Grantham (1993: 
pp.245-2 71) and Dawson (1991: pp.203-209).
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creditors intrude.31
It was held in RE FREDERICK INNS LTD. H.C., UNREPORTED, 
29 MAY 1990 that where a company is insolvent or 
threatened with insolvency, the directors in 
administering the affairs of the company, are under a 
duty to have regard to the interests of the creditors.32
That, though, has been the extent of the judicial 
demarcation.33 During the lifetime of the company the 
judicial opinion has not yet conflated the "interests of 
the company" with the interests of the employees, 34 35
31 For the English equivalent, see THE LIQUIDATOR OF THE 
PROPERTY OF WEST MERCIA SAFETYWEAR LTD. V DODD AND ANOTHER, THE 
TIMES, LAW REPORT, 24 NOVEMBER 1987. For a consideration of this 
case and the position of a duty to the creditor generally, see 
Finch (1989: pp.23-25).
32 See also the Australian High Court judgment, WALKER V 
WIMBOURNE (1976) 13 7 C.L.R. 1. For an examination of the
evolution of the judicial recognition of creditors interests, see 
Kettle (1994: pp.91-95) and Petkovic (1989: pp.166-170).
33 Even the effectiveness of this concession has been 
questioned, particularly regarding the lack of any definition of 
when the directors have to have regard to their interests. See 
Hawke (1989: pp.54-60) there he concludes:-
the directors, acting in the interests of the company, 
can be rest assured that, as long as the company 
remains on the right side of "doubtful solvency," any 
consideration for creditors' interests need only be 
minimal.
34 Although regard must be had to their interests under the 
Companies Act 1990, section 52 it is a subordinate interest to 
the members. Of note here is the inference by Costello J. in IN 
THE MATTER OF SELUKWE LTD. H.C., UNREPORTED, 2 0 DECEMBER 19 92 
that the interests of the employees may predominate in an 
examinership.
35 In RE WELFAB ENGINEERS LTD. [1990] B.C.L.C. 833 the 
directors of an insolvent company resolved that the company's 
undertaking should be sold. The directors sold the undertaking 
at a lower price than could have been obtained, as the acceptance
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the creditors,36 the consumers of the company's products, 
or even the general public interest.37
Thus, to summarise, during the life of the company 
the equitable duty of directors to act in the "interests 
of the company" has been judicially defined as meaning, 
not the company as an entity, but the component parts of 
that entity. The relevant component parts of that entity 
consist of the members and the directors. The directors 
are the ones to whom the managerial power has been
delegated. That power is not unfettered, it has attached 
to it a duty of loyalty. That duty is expressed 
conventionally as the duty to act bona fides in the
"interests of the company".
The duty is aimed at the directors and so their
interest as a component of the entity is negligible.
The members are thus the dominant interest in the
corporate entity. The directors must balance the long and 
short term interests of the shareholders in order to 
serve the "interests of the company." Thus the judicial 
definition of the interests of the corporate entity 
comprehends the interests of the members this in turn
of the lower bid would secure the employees jobs. The court in 
weighing the interests of the creditors and the employees found 
that the directors had not breached their duty of loyalty by 
favouring the employees' interests.
36 See RE WINCHAM SHIPBUILDING BOILER AND SALT CO. (1878) 9 
Ch. D 322, WILSON V LORD BURY (1880) 5 Q.B.D. 518 and KUWAIT ASIA 
BANK E.C. V NATIONAL MUTUAL LIFE NOMINEES LTD. [1990] B.C.L.C. 
868 .
37 See EVANS V BRUNNER MOND & CO. (1921) 1 Ch. 359 for an 
argument that the directors may have a duty to act in the public 
interest.
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further restricts the discretion of the director and 
erodes the model company.38 Directors do not owe a duty 
to act in the interests of the corporation as a separate 
legal entity.39 There is no distinction between the 
interests of the members and the corporate entity. They 
are one and the same: thus SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [1897] 
A . C . 22 (H.L.) is further eroded.
4.1 The Profit Rationale.
This discussion of the case law indicates that the 
dominant element of the interests equation is the
interest of the shareholders. This replicates the
traditional economic theory where the assumption is that 
the directors make supply and output decisions to 
maximise profits.40 It is this seeming parallel between 
the economic theory and the judicial definition of the
38 Ferrara (1992: pp.341-365) considers that there are
legitimate corporate interests separate from shareholder's 
interests. The hostile take-over market of the 1980's and the 
growth in numbers and influence of large institutional investors 
has increased the conflict between these interests. Despite the 
growing demands from institutional shareholders for a greater 
emphasis on maximizing market price, corporate obligations should 
be cast in terms of enhancing earnings over a reasonable period.
39 For an analysis of the extent of the directors' duty to 
the company itself, to individual shareholders, to company 
employees and the extension of the duty in limited circumstances 
to creditors, see Mac Cann (1991f: pp.3-8) and Mac Cann (1991g: 
pp.3 0-35) .
40 Hirshleifer (1980: p.479) discusses this with regard to 
the "Fisher Separation Theorem" which deals with the neo­
classical model of the company and maintains that the only 
legitimate purpose of the corporation is profit maximisation.
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interests of the company that this section of the thesis 
seeks to examine.41 42
Placing the shareholders' interest in a dominant 
position within the "interests of the company" carries 
with it an assumption that the shareholder aims to get a 
return on his investment, profit.43 Traditional economic 
theory assumes that companies behave in a profit 
maximising manner.44 The law, while assuming that the 
companies aim is profit, has not entirely accepted profit 
maximisation as the legal reality.
Bowen L.J. in HUTTON V WEST CORK RAILWAY CO. (1883) 
23 Ch. D. 654 at 672, states:-
[a] railway company, or the directors of the 
company, might send down all the porters at a 
railway station to have tea in the country at 
the expense of the company. Why should they 
not? It is for the directors to judge, provided 
it is a matter which is reasonably incidental 
to the carrying on of the business of the 
company; and a company which always treated its 
employees with draconian severity, and never 
allowed them a single inch more than the letter 
of the bond, would soon find itself deserted -
41 For further consideration of the traditional theory, see 
Baumol (1977) and Marris (1964) .
42 See Begg et al (1991: p. 102) where they argue that 
companies attempt to maximise profits. Also see Sloman (1991: 
p. 139) for the traditional economic theory on profit 
maximisation.
43 Nisbet (1994: pp.154-156) considers that the managers are 
assumed to be working for the shareholders.
44 Friedman (1953: p. 22) states:-
[u]nless the behaviour of businessmen in some way or 
other approximated behaviour consistent with the 
maximisation of returns, it seems unlikely that they 
would remain in business for long.
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at all events, unless labour was very much more 
easy to obtain in the market than it often is.
The law does not say that there are to be no 
cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and 
ale except such as are required for the benefit 
of the company...
Thus Bowen L.J. accepts that directors can justify 
decisions which do not bring a measurable profit to the 
shareholders, once they argue that some benefit will 
accrue at some later stage. Taking the "cakes and ale" 
example, directors can justify expenditure on employee 
entertainment by arguing that it benefits the company in 
some way, for example it may encourage employees to be 
more productive and encourage loyalty.
Bowen L.J.'s judgment is also moving away from the 
economic assumption that the only legitimate function of 
a company is to maximise profits. The implicit assumption 
both from Bowen L.J. and The Report of the Second Savoy 
Hotel Investigation (1954) is that decisions which do not 
appear to bring profit to the shareholders can be 
justified as being in the long term interests of the 
shareholders or as balancing the interests of the present 
and future shareholders.
The Bowen L.J. judgment and The Report of the Second 
Savoy Hotel Investigation (1954) are not entirely turning 
away from any economic basis for their rationale. Coase 
(1937: pp.386-405) points out that individuals within
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companies do not behave in a profit maximising manner.45 
They may, for example, accept a position within the 
company which is lower paid than that obtainable outside 
the company or even elsewhere within the company, but 
which carries greater responsibility or job 
satisfaction.46
The separation of ownership and control also dilutes 
the drive for profit maximisation. The owners no longer 
run the company, they pay directors to carry out that 
function. Those directors, if we apply the Coase (1937: 
p. 3 86) example, may behave in a manner not consistent 
with profit maximisation.47 They may, for instance, make 
decisions based on the desire to see the firm grow in 
size, thus increasing their salary, as the larger the 
firm, the higher the directors' salaries.48 They may also 
place great emphasis on research and development which 
effect future profits, but which do not maximise profits. 
Begg et al (1991: p.102) state
[a]lthough the shareholders clearly want the 
maximum possible profit, the directors who 
actually make the decisions have the
45 See Duxbury (1991: pp.300-311) regarding the work of 
Coase. For a modern statement of Coase work and the relationship 
between owners and controllers, see Grossman and Hart (1986: 
pp. 6 91-719) . For an over view of the economic theories regarding 
control in corporations, see Mintzberg (1983: pp.119-162)
46 See also Sloman (1991: p.244) and Alchian (1950: pp.211- 
221) for alternative theories to profit maximisation.
47 See also Begg et al (1991: p.102).
48 See Williamson (1974) and Koopmans (1957: pp.140-141) 
regarding controllers' motivation in decision making.
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opportunity to pursue different objectives. Do 
the managers and directors have an incentive to 
act other than in the interests of the 
shareholders?49 50
The thesis now turns to consider the wider 
development of the judicial application of economic 
theory to the directors' duty to act in the "interests of 
the company."
The purpose or function of the company has been 
variously defined as either profit,51 employment52 or 
social.53 In implying a purpose to the company, the
49 Baumol (1959: p.27) suggests that rather than achieve
maximum profits the directors will attempt to achieve the minimum 
profit level acceptable to the shareholders to keep them from 
exercising their powers of dismissal. Chandler (1977: p. 10)
stated "in making administrative decisions, career managers 
preferred policies that favoured the long-term stability and 
growth of their enterprises to those that maximized current 
profits." For further consideration of this view, see Galbraith 
(1967 : p.171) .
50 Williamson (1974: p.19) stated:-
[t]he justification for the profit maximisation 
assumption is its usefulness, and whereas this may be 
substantial for some purposes, it may be less valuable 
for others.
51 See above on maximisation of profit.
52 See Gower (1979: p.66) on Industrial Democracy and also 
The Bullock Committee (1977).
53 Henry Ford in DODGE V FORD MOTOR COMPANY (1919) 204 MICH. 
459; 170 N.W. 668 suggested that the interests of the 
shareholders should be totally subordinated to those of the 
employees, consumers and the general public. He stated:-
[m]y ambition is to employ still more men; to spread 
the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest 
possible number, to help them build up their lives and 
their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest 
share of our profits back into the business.
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judiciary have recognised the "profit" motive as the 
singular factor in defining the "interests of the 
company".
Profit must accrue to someone, so the judiciary have 
had to decide which of the component parts of the company 
gets the "profit."54 The company itself is made up of 
complex relationships. Shareholders, directors, 
employees, creditors and consumers all have relationships 
with the company which could objectively be considered as 
part of the "interests of the company."
The shareholders have been singled out by the 
judiciary as the recipients of the "profit" of the 
company, and thus the dominant interest in any definition 
of the "interests of the company."55 But concessions must 
be made to the other interests within the company.56 They 
must also receive "profit". The employees receive wages, 
pension and educational benefits. The creditors receive 
"profit" through payment from the company. This is 
necessary to generate the further profit for the
54 In SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. LTD. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) 
Lord Watson said:-
[a]ny person who holds a preponderating share in the 
stock of a limited company has necessarily the 
intention of taking the lion's share of its profits 
without any risk beyond loss of the money which he has 
paid for, or is liable to pay upon his shares....
55 See above 4.0 The Interests of the Company.
56 See Gower (1979: pp.62-66) for a consideration of the 
company's social responsibilities.
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shareholders.57
The courts have maintained the approach that 
"profit," when defining the "interests of the company", 
means "profit" for the owners; this much is clear.58 
The judicial definition of the members interests' 
includes the long term interests of the members. "Profit" 
for the owners can thus be calculated long or short term 
and may not be dependent on measurable factors.59
If "profit" is defined in the short term, then the 
duty of the directors to act in the "interests of the 
company" is a restrictive one. The short term definition 
equates to maximisation of profit. Directors can only 
make decisions which they believe will bring the maximum 
available "profit" to the owners. This would be 
impractical and would not allow the directors any scope 
for long term planning.60
If "profit" is defined in the long term, then the 
duty is less restrictive. It can allow decisions which do 
not immediately bring "profit" to the owners. Examples of 
this are donations to charity which will increase the 
good will and public standing of a company, expenditure
57 It is justifiable as being in the interests of future 
shareholders.
58 See above 4.0 The Interests of the Company.
59 For example how do you measure the effect on future 
profit of a donation to charity or expenditure on employee 
working conditions and education.
60 See Bean (1993: pp.24-35) where the difficulties 
of the role of manager in maximising wealth when there 
are a number of choices available and his fiduciary 
status are examined.
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on labour relations, research and development, health and 
safety, and employee education, which will all bring 
"profit" in the long term.
The Report of the Second Savoy Hotel Investigation 
(1954) which has been mentioned above, found that the 
directors must have regard to the long and short term 
interests of the shareholders. A balance must be found 
between these long and short term interests. Thus 
decisions which do not appear to bring profit to the 
present shareholders can be justified as being in the 
interests of future shareholders.
That definition of "profit", with its long term 
element, allows decisions which can in fact bring 
"profit" to others. Charitable donations by companies, 
and gratutious payments to their employees represent a 
tangible short-term "profit" to the recipients. From the 
point of view of the company those payments are 
"beneficial" or "profitable" only in an intangible sense, 
both in the short and long term.
It would appear that the judiciary have redefined 
"profit" and who that "profit" should enure to in order 
for the directors to comply with their duty to act in the 
"interests of the company." "Profit" in the long term may 
be dependent on considerations which are not measurable 
in the short term if at all. Thus the judicial definition 
of "profit" is intangible.
This forces first a re-definition of "profit" and 
second a re-definition of who it should accrue to. The
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judiciary appear to allow directors to make decisions 
which bring no tangible profit to the shareholders.61 
These may be justified as being in the long term 
interests of the company.62 Thus the definition of 
"profit" the judiciary are applying contains an element 
of social responsibility which is not measurable in any 
tangible sense.
If the assumption is also that "profit" must accrue 
to the owners, when in fact this is not entirely true, a 
re-examination of ownership is necessary.
Decisions of directors which make donations to 
charity, employee benefits, and similar peripheral 
payments are allowable legally. The ostensible grounds 
for this is that profit (albeit intangible or long term) 
enures to the company. The real explanation may be 
different. Such peripheral disbursements may be explained 
as exemplifying the power and control of the board. As 
such, the general meeting might be disposed to query the 
untrammelled exercise of this power.
There is thus scope within the judicial definition 
of the interests of the company to allow profit to accrue 
to elements other than the shareholders.
In the next section the thesis examines how the 
judiciary is divided as to how far this judicial re­
definition of profit and ownership goes. It also examines 
how the market environment for listed companies has
61 For example a donation to charity.
62 Per Bowen J. above.
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restricted the directors' ability to make decisions which 
do not bring short term profit to the shareholders.
4.2 When to Apply the Duty.
Having attempted to define the component aspects of 
the interests of the company, the judiciary have set 
about formulating a test which will ensure that the 
owners' investment is looked after correctly. The cases 
concern first; the subjective belief of the director and 
second; the interests of the company.
The subjective nature of the duty means that the 
belief of a particular director must be ascertained. In 
order to do this the courts have introduced objective 
criteria.
The Subjective Belief.
The difficulty in ascertaining motives or 
purposes, and how far they are genuine, is 
notorious. "The Devil himself knoweth not the 
thought of man," said Brian C.J. in 1477. Here 
there is not one man, but a Board of seven 
men.63
The duty in RE SMITH AND FAWCETT [1942] Ch. 3 04 is wholly 
subjective; thus any attempt to examine whether a 
director complied with that duty must also be an attempt 
to ascertain the subjective belief of a particular
63 Sir Robert Megarry V.-C. in CAYNE & ANOTHER V 
GLOBAL NATURAL RESOURCES PLC. Ch. D., UNREPORTED, 12 
AUGUST 1982.
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director.64 A definitive statement on this method of 
examining the director's intention is found in HINDLE V 
JOHN COTTON LTD. (1919) S.L.R. 625 at 630:-
[w]here the question is one of abuse of powers, 
the state of mind of those who acted, and the 
motive on which they acted, are all important, 
and you may go into the question of what their 
intention was, collecting from the surrounding 
circumstances all the materials which genuinely 
throw light upon that question of the state of 
mind of the directors so as to show whether 
they were honestly acting in the discharge of 
their powers in the interest of the company or 
were acting from some bye-motive, possibly of 
personal advantage, or for another reason.65
Another test which has been applied introduces a 
further element of objectivity. The director, himself, 
may subjectively assert that he acted in the interests of 
the company, but his statement must be examined as to 
whether the decision was reasonable.66 Berger J. in TECK
64 The basis for introducing an objective test can be 
seen in the words of Bowen L.J. in HUTTON V WEST CORK 
RAILWAY CO. (1883) 23 Ch. D. 654 where he states:-
[b]ona fides cannot be the sole test, otherwise 
you might have a lunatic conducting the affairs 
of the company, and paying away its money with 
both hands in a manner perfectly bona fide yet 
perfectly irrational.
I65 See also HAMPSON V PRICE'S PATENT CANDLE CO. 
(1876i) 45 L.J. Ch. 437; RE DAVID PAYNE & CO. LTD. [1904] 
2 Ch., 608 and HENDERSON V BANK OF AUSTRALASIA (1888) 4 0
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66 In BURR V HARRISON AND OTHERS, (C.A.) CIVIL 
DIVISION, UNREPORTED, 25 MARCH 1994 Hoffmann L.J. 
stated : -
[i] f no rational board could honestly have 
thought that carrying on the business was in 
the interests of the company, the conclusion
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CORPORATION LTD. V MILLAR (1972) 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288
applies this test. He states:-
[t] he directors must act in good faith. Then 
there must be reasonable grounds for their 
belief. If they say that they believe there 
will be substantial damage to the company's 
interests, then there must be reasonable 
grounds for that belief. If there are not, that 
will justify a finding that the directors were 
actuated by an improper purpose.67
Another attempt at a set of criteria was expounded 
by Kirby P. dissenting in DARVALL V NORTH SYDNEY BRICK & 
TILE CO. LTD. (NO.2) (1989) 7 A.C.L.C. (Court of Appeal 
of New South Wales) 659 at 676. He stated what he 
considered to be the general principle
although not conclusive, the court can look at 
the declared intentions of directors in order 
to test their assertions (which will often be 
self protective) against the assessment by the 
court of what, objectively, was in the best 
[sic] interests of the company at the relevant 
time.
This requires that the decision be a reasonable one and 
that it be objectively in the best interests of the 
company.66 Thus, again, there is the presumption that 
there is an obtainable economic benefit to the company.
must inevitably follow that the board acted 
from some improper motive of their own.
67 See also the judgment of Evershed M.R. in 
GREENHALGH V ARDERNE CINEMAS LTD. [1951] Ch. 286 (C.A.) .
68 As opposed to just in the interests of the 
company.
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In order for the board to fulfil this test, which is a 
further attempt to ascertain the subjective belief of a 
director, the board must show that the best option was 
chosen.
In CHARTERBRIDGE CORPORATION. V LLOYDS BANK [1970] 
Ch. 62, the directors of a company, which formed part of 
a group, considered the interests of the group as a whole 
rather than giving consideration to the separate 
"interests of that company alone." The court held that if 
this occurs, the proper test:-
in the absence of actual separate consideration must 
be whether an intelligent and honest man in the 
position of a director of the company concerned 
could.... have reasonably believed that the 
transactions were for the benefit of the company.
In RE OLYMPIA AND YORK ENTERPRISES AND HIRAM WALKER 
(1986) 59 O.R. (2d) 254 (H.C.) the High Court of Ontario 
considered the subjective nature of the duty:-
how is the Court to determine their purpose? In 
every case the directors will insist their 
whole purpose was to serve the company's 
interest. And no doubt in most cases it will 
not be difficult for the directors to persuade 
themselves that it is in the company's best 
interests that they should remain in office. 
Something more than a mere assertion of good 
faith is required... If they say they believe 
there will be substantial damage to the 
company's interests, then there must be 
reasonable grounds for that belief.69
69 See also the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 
in NORLIN CORP. V ROONEY [1984] FED. SEC. L. REP. (para) 
91, 5 64 regarding reasonable grounds.
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The point must not be lost here that the evolution of the 
objective standard is purely a method of ascertaining the 
subjective belief of a particular director. 70 71 As we 
shall see from the next section the objective tests of 
the interests of the company differ in emphasis.
Defining the Objective Interests.
The element of objectivity which has been 
introduced by the judiciary in attempting to ascertain 
the directors' belief also impacts on how the judiciary 
define the interests of the company. The Report of the 
Second Savoy Hotel Investigation (1954) contains a 
statement of the balance to be maintained by directors 
between the long and short term interests of the 
shareholders. This balance is by its very nature hard to 
maintain and the courts themselves produce decisions 
which do not maintain that balance.72
The case law seems to follow two distinct lines of 
thought. In the first, exhibited in CHARTERBRIDGE 
CORPORATION. V LLOYD'S BANK [197 0] Ch. 62 at 74, and in
70 In the U.S. once a prima facie showing is made 
that directors have a self-interest in a particular 
corporate transaction, the burden shifts to them to 
demonstrate that the transaction is fair and serves the 
best interests of the corporation and its shareholders; 
SCHWARTZ V MARIEN (1975) 37 N.Y. 2d. 487.
71 In CAYNE & ANOTHER V GLOBAL NATURAL RESOURCES 
PLC. , Ch. D., UNREPORTED, 12 AUGUST 1982 Sir Robert 
Megarry V.-C. considered that the objective tests were of 
little use if the director could not be cross examined as 
to his belief.
72 How do you define the interests of future 
shareholders?
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ALEXANDER V AUTOMATIC TELEPHONE COMPANY. [1900] 2 Ch. 56 
at 72 this definition of the duty follows that in RE 
SMITH AND FACWETT [1942] Ch. 304. This defines a duty of 
good faith to the company. That duty is only imposed 
where the director seeks to advance interests other than 
those of the company. Thus the director is free to make 
decisions based on a long term benefit to the company.73
The second line of thought is represented by the 
requirements detailed in ABERDEEN RAILWAY CO. V BLAIKIE 
BROS. (18 54) 1 Macq. (H.L.) 461 and TECK CORPORATION LTD. 
V MILLAR (1972) 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288.74 75 This looks at
whether the "interests of the company" are being 
served.76 Thus, the board must achieve the best interests 
of the company, in order to fulfil their fiduciary
73 He does not have to choose the best option 
available.
74 For a further analysis of TECK CORPORATION LTD. V 
MILLAR (1972) 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288, see EXCO CORP. V NOVA
SCOTIA SAVINGS & LOAN CO. (1987) 35 B.L.R. 149 where
Richard J. stated
[e]ven the test laid out by Berger J. in the 
Teck case requires further refinement if it is 
to be applied generally. When exercising their 
power to issue shares from treasury the 
directors must be able to show that the 
considerations upon which the decision to issue 
was based are consistent only with the best 
interests of the company and inconsistent with 
any other interests.
75 See also RE ALBERTA LTD. AND PRODUCERS PIPELINE 
INC. (1991) 80 D.L.R. 4th 359.
76 See also the judgment of Wilson J. in WHITEHOUSE 
V CARLTON PTY. LTD. (1987) 162 C.L.R. 285.
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duty.77 The way in which the courts have examined these 
standards within the two lines of thought are also
fundamentally different.
In the first line, the court looks to see if "some" 
benefit accrued to the company, if it did, then the 
director's decision must be reasonable, and so the duty 
is complied with. Applying this test, decisions of the 
board regarding charities, pensions and night baseball78 
have been upheld, even though the benefit which accrued
to the company was not as great as other decisions by the
directors would have allowed. With this test the
director's decision does not have to be the best choice 
available, it only has to lead to "some" benefit accruing 
to the company.79
The test, while excluding options for the directors 
which do not benefit the company, leaves the choice of 
beneficial options to the directors. Thus, the directors 
may choose the least beneficial option and still comply 
with their fiduciary duty.
77 This would parallel the economic theory on 
maximisation of profit.
78 SHLENSKY V WRIGLEY (1968) 237 N E . 2d. 776.
79 An extreme example of this first line of thought 
is the judgment of Kenny J. in P.M. P.A. INSURANCE CO. 
LTD. V NEW IRELAND ASSURANCE CO. LTD., H.C., no official 
transcript exists; reported IRISH TIMES. OCTOBER 23, 1975 
where he stated that the management of a company 
entrusted to the directors:-
would not be interfered with unless it was in 
breach of the articles of association or was 
dishonest or grossly incompetent.
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In SHLENSKY V WRIGLEY (1968) 23 7 N E . 2d. 776 the
Illinois Court of Appeal upheld a board decision which 
was not aimed at maximising the company's profits. The 
directors of a baseball team did not wish to install 
floodlights for night games as they believed that 
baseball was a day-time activity. They justified their 
decision on the basis that the night games would lower 
the property values of the houses in the neighbourhood. 
This in the long term would reduce the crowd attendances 
at the night games. It must be said that the benefit to 
the company in that case was extremely tenuous, but yet, 
it comes within the test in HINDLE V JOHN COTTON LTD. 
(1919) S.L.R. 625 above. Thus, social responsibility by 
the company to the detriment of profit could constitute 
a benefit to the company and thus be in the "interests of 
the company."
In summary, the overall philosophy behind this first 
train of thought by the judiciary is its aim to arrive at 
the subjective intention of the board. To do this the 
court limits its function to ensuring that the directors' 
do not exercise their discretion other than in the 
interests of the company. The best interests of the 
company of is of no real concern, as long as some benefit 
accrues. This "hands off" approach by the judiciary can 
only be explained in terms of a judicial understanding, 
that the world of business makes particular subjective 
demands on directors. The judicial role in a business 
environment is not, therefore, to impose liability on the
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basis that the option the directors choose, while 
beneficial to the company, was not the most beneficial.80
It should be noted that the decisions exemplifying 
this train of argument eschew the maximization of profits 
as the sole goal of a company. Accordingly the judiciary 
allow a certain amount of flexibility to directors with 
regard to "peripheral" payments; and though they may not 
directly and immediately enure to the benefit of 
shareholders, the judiciary will sanction such payments 
if it deems that the directors believe the company will 
be thereby advantaged.81
The second train of thought that has been applied 
looks objectively at the range of choices available to 
the directors and chooses the "best" option. If this 
option was not the one chosen by the directors, then they 
have not complied with their duty.82 The "best" option is
80 See the Supreme Court of Delaware in SMITH V VAN 
GORKOM (1985) 488 A.2d. 858 for the leading statement of 
the U.S. formulation of a Business Judgment Rule. For a 
consideration of the take-over regime in Delaware 
generally, see Lamb (1994: pp.283-285), Cary and 
Eisenberg (1988: p p .1088-1293) and Knepper (1978: pp.227- 
228). For a survey of the federal and state law on take­
overs in the U.S., see Hazen (1990: pp.465-607).
81 It must be noted that those decisions are still 
justified as being in the long term interests of the 
shareholders or in the interests of future shareholders.
82 See REVLON INC. V MACANDREWS AND FORBES HOLDINGS 
INC. (1986) 506 A.2d. 173 the Supreme Court of Delaware 
held that once a decision to sell the company was made 
the directors role is changed "from defenders of the 
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the 
best price for the stockholders at a sale of the 
company." When examining whether the directors behaved 
bona fide the criteria is not whether the board intended 
to serve the corporate interest but whether the best 
result was achieved i.e. the highest price.
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defined purely in financial terms and so equates to the 
board maximising "profit" on all its decisions. 83 84
The court here makes two assumptions, that the 
directors do not act against the interests of the company 
and that they will act in the "best" interests of the 
company. Gower (1979: p.576) adopts this approach when he 
states that "directors must act bona fide, that is in 
what they believe to be the best interests of the 
company. " Inherent in this assumption is the need to 
establish a best option, one which maximises the profit 
available. This involves the court assessing the choices 
the board faced and evaluating them on their merits. The 
court's function can only be fulfilled when it has 
ascertained the best option at the time the directors 
made their decision.
The court's function has now changed and it is, 
itself, exercising the managerial discretion that was 
formerly the ambit of the board.85 This approach by the
It must be noted though that prior to a decision to 
sell being made the directors are still "defenders", see 
the decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware in 
PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS INC. V TIME INC. (1989) 571
A.2d. 1140.
83 See DARVALL V NORTH SYDNEY BRICK & TILE CO. LTD. 
(No.2) (1989) 7 A.C.L.C. (Court of Appeal of New South
Wales) 659 above.
84 See also MILLS ACQUISITION CO. V MACMILLAN INC. 
(1988) A. 2d. 1261 where the directors were held by the
Supreme Court of Delaware to have breached their duty of 
loyalty because they had a positive duty to accept the 
highest bid.
85 This raises the question of the need for a 
fiduciary duty at all if it can supplanted by judicial 
intervention.
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judiciary with the implicit threat of intervention 
carries before it definitive criteria with which the 
directors must comply.86 The best option must be chosen 
or else the duty will not be fulfilled and liability will 
be imposed on the directors.87 Thus in BELL V LEVER BROS.
[1932] A .C . 161 and SCOTTISH CO-OPERATIVE WHOLESALE
SOCIETY V MEYER [1959] A.C. 324 (H.L.) the courts applied 
this second line of thought and found that the directors 
had not acted in the best interest of the company.88
In the U.S. jurisdiction a clear judicial decision 
which weighed the two trains of thought on the director's 
duty and came down in favour of the second, is DODGE V 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (1919) 204 MICH. 459; 170 N.W. 668.
There, Henry Ford, who had control of the board of 
directors, stated that it was the policy of the Ford 
Motor Company not to pay in the future any special 
dividends. He intended to plough back into the company 
all future earnings of the company, save a small 
dividend. His declared aim was that the general public 
should benefit from the company's good fortune.
The court had to consider, on the one hand, an
86 see Sealy (1992b: pp.229-231) .
87 An example of this can be seen in the U.S. where 
the Delaware courts not only consider good faith, 
dilligence, etc, regarding directors decisions but may 
also exercise their own "independent business judgment". 
See further Block and Prussin (1981).
88 Applying this train of thought directors may not 
be bound by a contract to take a course of action after 
deciding that course of action is no longer in the 
company's interests, see Mercer (1993: pp.5-6).
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argument that the corporation had a social responsibility 
and, on the other, that the shareholders' interest in 
profit should be served. The trial court ordered Ford 
Motor Company to declare a dividend of $19.3 million, an 
immense amount equal to half the company's cash surplus 
as of July 31, 1916. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed 
the following piece of the trial court's decree : -
[t]here should be no confusion (of which there 
is evidence) of the duties which Mr. Ford 
conceives that he and the stockholders owe to 
the general public and the duties which in law 
he and his co-directors owe to protesting, 
minority stockholders. A business corporation 
is organised and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the 
directors are to be employed for that end. The 
discretion of directors is to be exercised in 
the choice of means to attain the end and does 
not extend to a change in the end itself, to 
the reduction of profits or to the 
nondistribution of profits among stockholders 
in order to devote them to other purposes.
It can be seen from the above that there are two 
distinct methods of applying the directors' fiduciary 
duty to act in the "interests of the company." The first 
approach by the judiciary offers a more pragmatic set of 
tests. It carries the disadvantage of not really being a 
definitive set of criteria and allowing the directors 
themselves to determine the extent of their own duty. The 
second imposes control and financial responsibility on 
the directors. It carries the disadvantage of imposing 
liability on the directors where the result of their
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decision has not maximised the benefit to the company.89
The Take-over Situation.
In the preceding chapter the erosion of the model 
company was examined from the perspective of the take­
over situation. The directors may, if they believe that 
it is in the interests of the company, oppose a take­
over.90 91 Outright opposition to a take-over, by the 
board of directors is difficult.92 It is the choice of 
bidder by the board of directors which usually causes the 
duty to be questioned.93 We shall see that the above
89 This line of thought raises the possibility of 
liability being imposed on the basis of hindsight. A 
decision which results in failure whether through 
incompetence, bad luck or economic factors, may carry 
with it the weight of judicial hindsight and liability 
for breach of fiduciary duty.
90 See CAYNE & ANOTHER V GLOBAL NATURAL RESOURCES 
PLC. , Ch. D., UNREPORTED, 12 AUGUST 1982 for an example 
of when directors may legitimately oppose a take-over. 
See also Barnard (1992: pp.474-507) for a consideration 
of this point.
91 In TECK CORPORATION LTD. V MILLAR (1972) 33 D.L.R. 
(3d) 288 the Supreme Court of British Columbia held that 
where directors of a company seek, by entering into an 
agreement to issue new shares, to prevent a majority 
shareholder from exercising control of the company, they 
will not be held to have failed in their fiduciary duty 
to the company if they act in good faith in what they 
believe, on reasonable grounds to be in the interests of 
the company.
92 The interests of the shareholder being paramount 
brings about this situation. The board would usually look 
for another bidder who was less hostile. See RE OLYMPIA 
AND YORK ENTERPRISES AND HIRAM WALKER (1986) 59 O.R. (2d) 
254 H.C.
93 In RE ALBERTA LTD. AND PRODUCERS PIPELINE INC. 
(1991) 80 D.L.R. 4th 359 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
stated:-
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differing judicial definitions of the interests of the 
company make it difficult for the directors to challenge 
a take-over.
First, the "interests of the company" is defined in 
terms of the shareholders interests, present and future. 
The present shareholders are likely to favour a take-over 
as it brings large financial rewards, the future 
shareholders are likely to be those bidding to take-over 
the company. Thus the duty seems to be weighted in favour 
of a take-over.
The discretion of the directors comes into question 
in situations where they reject the highest bid in a 
take-over. The shareholders then challenge that decision 
as not acting in the interests of the company.94 Thus 
depending on the train of thought followed by the 
judiciary the directors have or have not complied with 
their duty.
In SCOTTISH CO-OPERATIVE WHOLESALE SOCIETY V MEYER
when a corporation is faced with susceptibility 
to a take-over bid or an actual take-over bid, 
the directors must exercise their powers in 
accordance with their overriding duty to act 
bona fide and in the best interests of the
corporation  If, after investigation, they
determine that action is necessary to advance 
the best interests of the company they may act, 
but the onus will be on them to show that their 
acts were reasonable...
94 In an acquisition situation directors also have a 
duty to be honest and not to mislead the shareholders 
when giving advice regarding the acquisition; per 
Brightman J. in GETHING V KILNER [1972] 1 ALL E.R. 1166.
In DAWSON INTERNATIONAL PLC. V COATS PATONS PLC. AND 
OTHERS [1989] B.C.L.C. 233 this duty was termed a 
secondary one.
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[1959] A . C . 324 (H.L.) Lord Denning was of the opinion
that "when the realignment of shareholding was under
discussion, the duty of the three directors of the
company was to get the best possible price for any new
issue of its shares."95
In HERON INTERNATIONAL V LORD GRADE, ASSOCIATION 
COMMUNICATIONS CORP PLC. AND OTHERS [1983] B.C.L.C. 244 
the Court of Appeal maintained that the board
owed a duty to the general body of 
shareholders... to obtain for the shareholders 
the opportunity to accept or reject the best 
bid reasonably obtainable.
On the other hand Hoffmann J. in RE A COMPANY [1986]
B.C.L.C. 382 stated:-
I cannot accept the proposition that the board 
must inevitably be under a positive duty to 
recommend and take all steps within their power 
to facilitate whichever is the highest offer.
In the Australian case of HARLOWE'S NOMINEES LTD V 
WOODSIDE (LAKES ENTRANCE) OIL CO. (1968) 121 C.L.R. 483
the High Court stated:-
[t]he ultimate question must always be whether 
in truth the issue was made honestly in the 
interests of the company. Directors... may be 
concerned with a wide range of practical 
considerations, and their judgment, if 
exercised in good faith and not for irrelevant
95 See also the comments of Lord Wright in LOWRY V 
CONSOLIDATED AFRICAN SELECTION TRUST LTD. [1940] 2 ALL
E.R. 545.
purposes, is not open to review by the 
courts. 96 97
Further Barwick C.J. in ASHBURTON OIL N.L. V ALPHA 
MINERALS N.L. (1971) 123 C.L.R. 614, (HIGH COURT OF
AUSTRALIA) stated:-
[d]irectors who are minded to do something 
which in their honest view is for the benefit 
of the company are not restrained because a 
majority shareholder or shareholders holding a 
majority of shares in the company do not want 
the directors so to act.
The judiciary has consistently applied both trains 
of thought examined above, even in a take-over situation. 
The rejection of the highest bid represents the first 
train of thought, where once some benefit accrues to the 
company the duty is complied with. The highest bid 
represents maximisation of profits and the second train 
of judicial thought. The uncertainty regarding which 
version of the duty prevails creates great difficulties 
for directors and further erodes their managerial 
discretion.
96 See also MILLS V MILLS (1938) 60 (C.L.R.) 150
(AUST. H.C.) where Latham C.J. stated that directors 
were:-
not required by the law to live in an unreal 
region of detached altruism and to act in a 
vague mood of ideal abstraction from obvious 
facts which must be present to the mind of any 
honest and intelligent man when he exercises 
his powers as a director.
97 See also RICHARD BRADY FRANKS LTD. V PRICE (193 7) 
58 C.L.R. 112.
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4.3 Conclusion.
While there would appear to be scope within the 
judicial definition of the "interests of the company" for 
directors to balance the long and short term interests of 
the shareholders, or even just to take a long term view, 
public limited companies in the market place have 
difficulty taking such long term views.
Firstly, the directors are subjected to pressures 
from the institutional shareholders who wish for 
decisions to be made on a maximisation of profit basis.98 
Those directors may have been appointed to the board to 
represent the institutions' maximisation of profits
99view. y
The pressures on the directors are re-enforced by a 
market place which considers maximisation of profits as 
the sole function of a public limited company. Thus, 
directors who aim for corporate growth or place emphasis 
on research and development will find that there is a 
negative effect on the company share price.100 Begg et al 
(1991: p.102) consider this and state:-
[e]ven if the shareholders cannot recognise
that profits are lower than they should be,
98 See chapter three, 3.1 The Interests of the 
Institutions.
99 See chapter two, 2.4 Directors Appointed to Serve 
Another Interest.
100 Again, see chapter three, 3.1 The Interests of the 
Institution.
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other firms with experience in the industry may 
catch on faster. If profits are low, share 
prices will be low. By mounting a take-over, 
another company can buy the shares cheaply, 
sack the existing managers, restore profit- 
maximising policies, and make a handsome 
capital gain as the share prices then rise once 
the stock market perceives the improvement in 
profits.
Thus, non-compliance with the market expectation of 
profit maximisation will be punished by the market and 
eventually resolved through a take-over. The market 
itself is regulating the legal duty of the directors to 
ensure one outcome, profit maximisation.
Further, the shareholders within the company can 
create other pressures on the directors to maximise 
profits, by introducing a remuneration system which ties 
the directors' interests to that of the shareholders.101 
This is done through giving the directors share options 
which are large enough to create such a concurrence of 
interests.102 The directors, themselves, have a personal 
interest in the maximisation of profit.103
It can be seen from the above that the judicial 
formulation of the "interests of the company" is weighted
101 Healy (1985: pp. 85-107) has shown that
remuneration schemes do impact on managerial decisions. 
See also Aisenbrey (1993: pp.56-57) for a further
examination of this point.
102 See Liebowitz (1992: p. 5) for an examination of 
how senior managers were given a greater ownership stake 
in the firm to align their interests with those of C.S. 
First Boston's other institutional shareholders.
103 See Marsh (1990: p.53) and Larcker (1983: p p . 3 -
30) .
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in favour of the shareholders' interests. Within that 
formulation the judiciary have on occasion allowed 
directors a discretion to define the shareholders' 
interests in the long term. The directors may thus make 
decisions which benefit the employees, creditors and 
general public to the detriment of the shareholders. 
This, the thesis suggests, is no longer possible for 
public limited companies operating in the marketplace 
today. The director's discretion to do other than 
maximise profits has been subverted through a market 
system that punishes directors who fail to deliver 
maximum profits to the shareholders.
Central to the issue of defining the interests of 
the company, is an examination of the concept of a 
separate interest of the company. In looking at the 
origins of this concept the thesis has already looked at 
SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) and the
principles expounded there. Three distinct points arise 
from this case. First, that the company is a legal person 
separate and distinct from its members. Second, the 
company is not an agent of its members. Third, the 
motives of those who formed the company are not material 
to its subsequent rights and liabilities.
It is the first and third points which are of 
particular interest to this thesis. The separation of the 
legal personalities of the members and the company 
created an artificial legal person with rights and 
obligations which are separate from those of the members.
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The third point emphasises this, and notes that the 
artificial legal entity has rights and liabilities. If 
there are within a company structure two separate legal 
entities, that is to say the members and the company 
itself, with separate rights and liabilities, there is a 
potential for those rights and liabilities to clash.
In such circumstance, the company's rights and 
liabilities are protected by the directors' duty to act 
bona fide in the "interests of the company". The problem 
for the judiciary in enforcing that duty has been how to 
define the interest of an artificial entity and when to 
apply the duty. In defining the interest of the entity, 
the judiciary have been consistent in defining the 
"interests of the company" in terms of its constituent 
parts. While this may be a logical progression, it does 
not take account of situations where the component parts 
have differing interests. The case law treats the 
interest of the dominant component, the shareholders, as 
paramount. The concept of a separate interest of the 
company has essentially been lost. There is no difference 
between the members' interests and that of the corporate 
entity. SALOMON V SALOMON & Co. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) no
longer has any application.
The two lines of judicial thought on when the duty 
applies further diminish the concept of a separate 
interest of the company. The first with its pragmatic 
"hands off" approach gives the directors free reign with 
their managerial discretion as long as some benefit
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accrues to the company. The second looks to examine the 
decisions in terms of greater financial benefit to the 
company. The first provides too much scope for the 
directors to act with a lack of bona fides as long as 
some benefit falls to the company. The second is purely 
based on maximisation of profits and so has no place for 
the employees' interest or non-profit orientated benefit.
The two approaches serve the institutional 
shareholder and further erode the model company. The 
institutions are the dominant shareholders and, as such, 
the judicial definition of the "interests of the company" 
focusing on the shareholder, equates to their interest. 
The first line of thought on the application of the duty 
by the judiciary serves the institutions, as they have an 
input into the managerial discretion of the directors 
through the institutional briefings and representative 
directors. The second line of judicial thinking on when 
to apply the duty also serves the institutions as the 
best interest of the company is defined in terms of 
maximisation of profits.
192
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS.
5.0 The Subverted Model.
In this chapter, the thesis brings together the 
conclusions of the body of the thesis. It examines a 
particularly clear example of the eroded model. The 
conclusion that the model has been eroded is inescapable. 
The thesis then turns to the general question of reform, 
first examining the problem and then suggesting solutions 
for both private and public companies. The thesis then 
concludes that the importance of the thesis is in the 
recognition of the eroded model.
The hypothesis of the eroded model company was set 
out in chapter one, Part 1. There the model company was 
described in terms of its component parts, the decision 
in SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [18 97] A.C. 22 (H.L.) the
memorandum, articles of association, the Companies Act 
1963, section 25 and the decision in FOSS V HARBOTTLE 
(1843) 2 Hare 461. Those component elements were then
examined in isolation in Part 2 and it was posited that 
the individual components of the model company had been 
eroded thus making the model unworkable.
The format of chapter one was again repeated in the 
second chapter dealing specifically with the board of 
directors. There the model board of directors was 
described and the erosion of the managerial discretion
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examined. The chapter concluded that the board of 
directors had been degraded to a secondary organ through 
the members' power to influence managerial discretion, 
the presence of representative directors, and the erosion 
of the fiduciary safeguards.
In chapter three, the presence of the institutional 
investor was examined in terms of the eroded model 
company. The chapter concluded that the institutions have 
interests other than the company's to serve, and can 
obtain input into the managerial discretion through 
institutional briefings and representative directors. The 
model company is thus further eroded.
Chapter four examined the directors' duty to act in 
the interests of the company. The chapter concluded that 
the interests of the company have been judicially defined
as being the interests of the shareholders. The
directors' discretion to act is thus further eroded and
the concept of a separate interest of the company lost. 
The model company has been eroded and no longer exists.
The Eroded Model: An Example.
The eroded model can be seen clearly in
MULTINATIONAL GAS AND PETROCHEMICAL CO. V MULTINATIONAL 
GAS AND PETROCHEMICAL SERVICES LTD. AND OTHERS [1983] 2
Ch. 258. In 1970 three international oil companies, 
incorporated in the United States of America, France and 
Japan respectively, entered into a joint commercial 
venture for the purchase, transportation, storage and
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sale of liquified petroleum gas, liquified natural gas 
and similar products.
The three oil companies contemplated chartering and 
acquiring suitable tankers for the joint venture, which 
was to be conducted from London through the plaintiff 
company, a Liberian corporation formed for the purpose of 
the joint venture. The plaintiff company was originally 
to have run its business from London. However, on the 
advice of tax counsel that the plaintiff company should 
not carry on business in the U.K., the three oil 
companies formed the first defendant company in the 
United Kingdom. The defendant company's purpose was to 
act as the plaintiff company's agent and, acting as 
agent, to advise the plaintiff company about business 
prospects, give it financial information, perform routine 
management work and put into effect decisions made by the 
plaintiff company, which in fact had no place of business 
in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.
The three oil companies were the sole shareholders 
in both companies, the directors of which were employees 
and nominees of each of the three oil companies appointed 
with the intent that they should run the two companies 
for and in the interests of the three oil companies. The 
plaintiff company's directors held all their relevant 
board meetings outside the United Kingdom. The plaintiff 
company began trading in 1971 with a capital of $ US25m, 
mostly represented by vessels or interests in vessels.
It ran into financial difficulties and in January
195
1978 was ordered to be wound up with an estimated
deficiency of nearly £114m. As a result, the first 
defendant also ran into difficulties and was ordered to 
be wound up with assets of only £34,000. The losses
sustained by the plaintiff company were alleged by its
liquidator to have been caused by the highly speculative 
decision made by the plaintiff company's directors to 
build or acquire six tankers for trade in the spot oil 
market. The liquidator alleged that the decision in 
regard to the six tankers could not properly be regarded 
as falling within the scope of reasonable business 
judgment. However, the liquidator did not allege bad
faith.
The plaintiff company brought an action against the 
first defendant company, and also against its directors, 
the plaintiff company's directors and the three oil 
companies (the foreign defendants) claiming damages for 
negligence and alleging that the first defendant's 
directors were negligent in preparing inadequate and 
insufficient budgets, forecasts and information for the 
plaintiff company's directors, and that the plaintiff 
company's directors and the three oil companies were in 
turn also negligent in failing to appreciate those 
deficiencies as they ought to have done before acting on 
the basis of the material supplied.
While the issue in the case was the alleged 
negligence, the judges dealt with what they termed "the 
company law point." Lawton L.J. considered this:-
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[t]hese oil companies were the only 
shareholders. All the acts complained of became 
the plaintiff's acts. The plaintiff, although 
it had a separate existence from its oil 
company shareholders, existed for the benefit 
of those shareholders, who provided they acted 
intra vires and in good faith, could manage the 
plaintiff's affairs as they wished. If they 
wanted to take business risks through the 
plaintiff which no prudent businessman would 
take they could lawfully do so. Just as an 
individual can act like a fool provided he 
keeps within the law so could the plaintiff, 
but in its case it was for the shareholders to 
decide whether the plaintiff should act 
foolishly. As shareholders they owed no duty to 
those with whom the plaintiff did business... 
when the oil companies acting together required 
the plaintiff's directors to make decisions or 
approve what had already been done, what they 
did or approved became the plaintiff's acts and 
were binding on it... It follows, so it seems 
to me, that the plaintiff cannot now complain 
about what in law were its own acts.
Dillon L.J. considered the same points in greater detail, 
he stated:-
the business and affairs of Multinational were, 
at all times material to this action, under the 
control of the joint venturers. Further (as is 
pleaded more particularly in paragraph 32 
below) the Multinational Directors acted at all 
material times in all relevant matters in 
accordance with the directions and at the 
behest of the joint venturers and, accordingly, 
the powers of directing and managing the 
affairs of Multinational in relation to the 
matters hereinafter complained of were vested 
in and were exercised by the joint venturers. . .
The heart of the matter is therefore that 
certain commercial decisions which were not 
ultra vires the plaintiff were made honestly, 
not merely by the directors but by all the 
shareholders of the plaintiff at a time when 
the plaintiff was solvent. I do not see how 
there can be any complaint of that. An 
individual trader who is solvent is free to 
make stupid, but honest, commercial decisions 
in the conduct of his own business...
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The directors indeed stand in a fiduciary 
relationship to the company, as they are 
appointed to manage the affairs of the company 
and they owe fiduciary duties to the company 
though not to the creditors, present or future, 
or to individual shareholders...
The shareholders, however, owe no such 
duty to the company. Indeed, so long as the 
company is solvent the shareholders are in 
substance the company.
He concluded
If the company is bound by what was done when 
it was a going concern, then the liquidator is 
in no better position. He cannot sue the 
members because they owed no duty to the 
company as a separate entity and he cannot sue 
the directors because the decisions which he 
seeks to impugn were made by, and with the full 
assent of, the members.
The majority judgments of Lawton L.J. and Dillon L.J. 
affirm the elements of the model company as entirely 
eroded.
The importance of this decision is that the 
shareholders were able to run the corporate entity 
against the interests of that entity.
There was no separation of ownership and control. No 
board or general meetings were held. The directors and 
shareholders met jointly to exercise control.
The directors were representatives of the oil 
companies. They were appointed specifically to run the 
company in the interests of the oil companies. The 
shareholders owed no duty to the company as an entity.1
1 See PHILLIPS V MANUFACTURERS' SECURITIES LTD. (1917) 86
L.J. Ch. 3 05 and also chapter one, Equitable Considerations 
Concerning the Members Voting Rights.
The directors did owe a duty to act in the interests of 
the company. This though, was absolved by the 
shareholders' input into the managerial discretion.2
As such the directors and shareholders were free to 
make "foolish" and "stupid" decisions while owing no duty 
to the corporate entity.3 All the aspects of the legal 
entity have been eroded.4
5.1 Reform.
The limited liability corporation is the 
greatest single discovery of modern times. Even
2 Effectively the directors duty is being relieved by the 
members in general meeting; see chapter one, The Residual Power 
of the General Meeting.
3 They were also held not to owe a duty of care to the 
corporate entity.
4 Of note here that the dissenting judgment of May L.J. 
recognises the eroded model company. He states:-
the directors of both the plaintiff and Services were 
employees and the nominees of each of the three joint 
venturers respectively and were so appointed with the 
intent that all of them should run each of the two 
companies for and in the interests of the joint 
venturers.
He concluded:-
Salomon's case and the subsequent authorities make it 
clear that a limited company is a person separate and 
distinct from its members, even though a majority of 
the latter have the power to control its activities so 
long as it is not put into liquidation and whilst 
they remain members and a majority. Once, however, 
the joint venturers ceased to be able to call the 
tune, either because the company went into liquidation 
or indeed, though it is not this case, because others 
took over their interests as members of the company, 
then I can see no legal reason why the liquidator or 
the company itself could not sue in respect of the 
cause of action still vested in it.
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steam and electricity are less important than 
the limited liability company.
While the above statement of N.M. Butler, President of 
Columbia University,5 may seem a touch excessive it does 
raise an interesting comparison. The scientific process 
builds on the initial discovery. Other modifications and 
inventions arise from the continual learning process 
which arises from the original concept.
By contrast the limited liability company arose in 
essentially its modern form in 1844 and 1855.6 7 150
years have passed and little has been done to update the 
structure of the limited liability company. Sealy (1984: 
p.l) discusses this:-
[i] f the history of the steam engine subsequent 
to its discovery had followed a pattern similar 
to that of the limited company over the same 
period, every train leaving Paddington station 
today would be restricted to a speed of four 
miles per hour, and would still be preceded by 
the legendary man walking with his red flag.
This thesis has been about that model company that 
came into existence 150 years ago. It has shown that the 
model may be legislatively stagnant but in the absence of 
legislative change the judiciary have imposed change. The 
difficulty with this has been that it was not a judicial
5 Quoted in Diamond and Orhnial (1982: p.42).
6 Joint Stock Companies Acts 1844 and 1856.
7 See Formoy (1923), Shannon (1966) and for the origins of 
companies generally, see Griffith (1994: pp.105-112).
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attempt to deal with the entire model, rather it was an 
attempt to redefine particular elements of the model in 
light of the changing circumstance before them.8 9 The 
result of this has been the erosion of the model 
company.10
The Problem.
Professor Ballantine (1946: pp. 41-42) considered
the aims of company law:-
[t]he primary purpose of corporation laws is 
not regulatory. They are enabling Acts, to 
authorise businessmen to organise and to 
operate their business, large or small, with 
the advantage of the corporate mechanism. They 
are drawn with a view to facilitate efficient 
management of business, and adjustment to the 
needs of change.
The model company does not unfortunately fit this 
description. The task force which set about the reform of 
company law in Canada11 stated:-
[w]e set out to design a scheme of law that was 
clear, workable and, above all, written for the
8 McGlynn (1994: pp.301-307) states:-
[a]t present, the principles of company law are 
inconsistently applied producing doctrinally 
irreconcilable and inconclusive case law.
9 For an examination of the present role of the judiciary 
and recommendations for the future, see McLachlin (1994: pp.2 60- 
269) .
10 Gower (1980: p.115) considered that English companies 
legislation was "in a far worse mess than it had been at any time 
this century."
11 Dickerson et al (1971) .
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businessmen who will operate under it, not for 
the corporation lawyer. Accordingly, the Act 
simplifies and codifies where ever possible. We 
have sought to eliminate the obsolete and 
anachronistic, and to remove the trivially 
arcane.12
The authorities would seem to agree that company law 
should serve those who use it.13 The model company does 
not and so has been eroded.14 The difficulty with this is 
that its replacement serves only the dominant interest, 
the shareholders.15
Grantham (1993: p.264) states : -
[t]he advent of incorporation necessitated a 
change in form but the shareholders continued 
in their role of proprietor. Whether this
12 They also stated further at para. 20:-
There is....a belief that corporation law belongs to 
the legislatures which enact it and to the officials 
who administer it. It does not.
13 The Cohen Committee (1945: Cmnd. 6659, para 5) stated:-
[w] e are satisfied. . .that the great majority of 
limited companies.... are honestly and competently 
managed. We have bourn in mind the importance of not 
placing unreasonable fetters on business.
14 For an interesting discourse on why regulatory regimes do 
not work, see Baldwin (199 0: pp.321-33 7). There he finds that 
rules do not work when those willing to comply do not understand 
what compliance involves and those less willing to comply are not 
informed or stimulated in the right way. It must be suggested 
that this analysis fits the present regulatory regime for 
corporations. Effective rulemaking is the answer and as he states 
M [i]mproved rulemaking will come through paying regard to the 
issue rather than by clinging to the notion that rules shape the 
world."
15 For a consideration of some of the difficulties arising 
from the present model, see Jaffey (1994: pp.22-26).
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remains true today however is less clear. Since 
the rule first appeared late last century the 
underlying conception of the company has 
shifted towards a view of it as representing 
the interests of a wider range of groups.
Gower (1979: p.62) considered that social responsibility 
may also be a function of the modern corporation.16 He 
stated : -
[a]nxieties relating to mergers and 
concentration and to the increasing amounts of 
public money being invested in companies have 
been accompanied by a discussion of the social 
responsibility of companies. The suggestion 
that a company has social responsibilities 
seems to imply that it should not be its sole, 
or perhaps even its primary, aim to make 
profits for its shareholders, an implication 
which has led a leading "free-enterprise" 
American economist to dub the suggestion "pure 
unadulterated socialism. "17
The model company no longer serves those who use it, 
the shareholders and managers. Further, company 
responsibility has evolved to a point where there are 
other elements of importance within the greater corporate 
structure which the model legal structure does not 
represent such as creditors, employees, customer and 
general public.18
16 See also Xuereb (1988: pp. 156-172) .
17 For a consideration of the other interests within the 
corporation, see Davies (1992: p.85).
18 In 1973 the Confederation of British Industry, suggested 
that a public company must pursue profit but it must also act 
"like a good citizen in business" : Confederation of British
Industry Company Affairs Committee (1973: p.23). See also Note 
(1994b: p p .1941-1958) for a U.S. approach to reform of the
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The model company has been judicially redefined to 
serve the dominant interest, the shareholders. This must 
be corrected by a redefinition of the model company to 
include all the interests which make up the modern 
corporation.19 Only then can it be said that there is a 
separate legal entity distinct from its members. In 
attempting a redefinition of the model company the thesis 
distinguishes the private and public corporation.
Private Companies.
We have seen above in chapter one that the dominant 
form of incorporated business in Ireland and the U.K.20 
is the private company. This is surprising as the model 
company is not designed for use by a small businessman.21 
Indeed the original intention of the Act was not that of 
use by small companies.22 Kahn-Freund in Renner et al
present corporate structure.
19 Lord Templeman (1990: pp.10-14) discussed the development 
of company law in the U.K. over the previous 4 0 years. He 
considers that the greatest failing has been the exclusion of the 
employees from the existing structure.
20 For figures on the number of U.K. private companies see 
Department of Trade and Industry (1993).
21 There are no official figures on the number of companies 
which could be defined as small but a survey conducted by 
Freedman and Godwin (1994) suggested that 90% of private 
companies could be defined as such.
22 Lord Redesdale stated:-
some protection should be inserted, as a protection to 
poor persons, preventing very small Companies being 
set up under the Bill, for, otherwise petty Companies 
of all kinds would be set afloat...
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(1976) considered that the limited company was for the 
purposes of raising capital for major capitalists 
embarking on risky ventures.23 This intention was 
distorted by the "calamitous decision in SALOMON V 
SALOMON & CO. [1897] A.C. 22 (H .L . ) 1 so that "company law 
has come to annex the functions of the law of 
partnership." He further suggested:-
[ijnstead of, or in addition to, altering the 
legal consequence of company formation, one 
might make the formation of companies more 
difficult and more expensive, and thus reduce 
the number of companies and especially small 
companies. By doing so, Parliament might go 
some way towards restoring to the limited 
company its original function, and to the 
partnership its proper place in business life. 
Kahn-Freund (1944: p.54).
The use of the corporate form by small businesses is 
unsuitable as the structure of the company is really only 
conducive to a large company with a large number of 
shareholders.24 Freedman (1994: pp.555-584) considered
I
the use of the corporate structure by small businesses. 
She found that the structure of the corporation could 
create a burden on the small businessman, particularly 
through the procedural requirements for meetings and 
notices of meetings.
Freedman further found that small businessmen
Hansard (1855) .
23 See also Formoy (1923) .
24 See Gower (1979: p. 14) .
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perceived that one of the benefits of incorporation was 
to confer prestige, legitimacy and credibility on the 
venture.25 They thus incorporated when a partnership or 
sole trader would have been a more suitable form.26 She 
concluded that : -
[a]n increase in barriers to incorporation at 
the outset, as opposed to an increase in 
recurrent running costs, should result in fewer 
dissatisfied businesses in the long run. This 
could be a long-term saving for business owners 
and the wider business community. The corporate 
form brings burdens and privileges to the small 
business. For those who cannot utilise the 
privileges, the burdens will always be too 
great. But a flexible general company law can 
serve a wide range of firms and be moulded to 
facilitate the operation of their businesses.
The corporation has become a popular vehicle for small 
businessmen, whether or not it is suitable. It is likely 
to continue as such in the future. The model company does 
not provide for the various needs of the small business 
and indeed company law in general does not provide for 
the small businessman.27 As such the model company needs 
to be redefined to distinguish first, between public and
25 Historically the main motivation behind incorporation has 
been tax; Griffith (1994: pp.105-112).
26 This would also help to explain why businessmen 
incorporate when the main benefit, limited liability, is negated 
through personal guarantees provided to the lending institutions 
and the growth in liability insurance, see Finch (1994a: pp.880-
915) .
27 Indeed Sealy (1984: p. 5) suggests that the business 
community as a whole is ill-served by company law.
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private companies28 and second, between the needs of 
particular types of private companies.
This thesis suggests that a suitable revision of the 
law regarding private companies could be accomplished 
through a tiered set of articles of association and 
accompanying regulations.29
Thus a businessman who wishes to incorporate would 
have a choice of articles on incorporation. A choice of 
three sets of articles would be available. Set one would 
be suitable for a small business with no separation or 
minimal separation of ownership and control. Thus the 
articles would have minimal formal procedural 
requirements for meetings etc. Set two would be tailored 
to the medium sized private company, where the company is 
a vehicle for capitalization and therefore some 
separation of ownership and control exists. Again a 
streamlined procedural requirement would exist.
The third set would relate to the large private 
company where there is effective separation of ownership 
and control. The company could support the full regime of 
the existing model company with the recommendations 
regarding public companies applying.30
Accompanying each set of articles would be certain
28 Besides the minimal distinctions between the articles of 
association at present.
29 Which could be accommodated through the existing company 
structure.
30 See below recommendations regarding the law for public 
listed companies.
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exemptions from burdensome statutory requirements. For 
example, the set one articles could be accompanied by an 
exemption from the statutory audit. Set two would have a 
partial exemption and set three minimal if any exemption.
Public Companies.
It is one of the contentions of this thesis that the 
private and public company are fundamentally different. 
The fundamental difference between the two relates to 
their shareholdings. Shares in private companies are held 
by private individuals whereas the vast majority of 
shares in public limited companies are held by
institutions.31 This fact alone creates such a difference 
between the two types of legal entity as to make them 
entirely different creatures.
Institutional shareholders have a need for
information and input into managerial discretion. The 
erosion of the model legal company and its replacement by 
a shareholder-dominated structure has led in the case of 
the public limited company to the legal entity being run 
in the interests of those institutions rather than the 
interests of the company.
Corbett and Mayer (1991) define the corporate
environment present in the Anglophone countries as 
"outsider" systems. The defining characteristics of this 
system are:-
31 See chapter three, 3.1 The Interests of the Institutions.
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(1) dispersed ownership and control,
(2) separation of ownership and control,
(3) little incentive for outsiders to 
participate in corporate control,
(4) a climate where hostile takeovers are not 
unusual, and they can be costly and 
antagonistic,
(5) the interests of other stakeholders are not 
represented,
(6) low commitment of outside investors to the 
long term strategies of the company,
(7) takeovers may create monopolies.
It can be seen above that a key factor in this definition 
of an "outsider" system is the separation of ownership 
and control. This characteristic focuses on the model 
structure and not the market control structure which has 
evolved.
The market has evolved a structure whereby the 
control element is not delegated upwards to the board as 
article 80 provides, but is instead placed in an extra­
constitutional organ called "institutional briefings." 
Institutional briefings occur between the management and 
the institutions and it is here that the control and 
ownership functions are initially exercised, and 
subsequently implemented as a consequence of these 
briefings. The general meeting no longer exercises any 
real ownership or residual control function.
The market has evolved a structure whereby ownership 
and control is mixed. Thus the market model exhibits some 
of the characteristics of the "insider" system which are 
common in Japan and Germany. The characteristics of which 
Corbett and Mayer (1991) defined as:-
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(1) concentrated ownership,
(2) the association of ownership and control,
(3) control by related parties such as banks, 
partners and employees,
(4) absence of hostile takeovers,
(5) the interests of stakeholders are 
represented,
(6) the intervention of the outside investors 
is limited to periods of clear financial 
failure
(7) insider systems may create collusions and 
cartels.
It can be seen that the market control structure is 
really a pragmatic hybrid of the two systems. The point 
should be noted that the institutions in both "insider" 
and "outsider" systems have the same power. The 
difference between the two systems being that the German 
and Japanese systems have evolved in a rigid and 
structured manner, whereby each stakeholder has clearly 
defined responsibilities to go with its power. The 
institutions in the Anglophone countries have no 
responsibility to those stakeholders32 within the market 
place, their only responsibility being to the fund they 
control.
The Reconstructed Model.
It is with this issue that the rest of this chapter 
is concerned. In attempting to provide a solution to the 
erosion of the model company, this thesis poses a 
distinct choice. It could recommend a complete 
codification of the company law system in order to deal
32 Employees, creditors, and general public.
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with the erosion of the company or the thesis could offer 
a pragmatic settlement within the existing framework.33 
The former is an unlikely solution so this thesis has 
opted to attempt a pragmatic resolution.34
The starting point in this solution is the 
"calamitous decision in SALOMON V SALOMON & CO. [1897] 
A . C . 22 (H.L.) . 1,35 This thesis contends that the
decision, despite the above comment and the judicial 
attempts to erode it, provides the answer to the eroded 
model. The restructured model begins with the separate 
legal entity as the foundation. As a separate legal 
entity it has a definable interest. That interest is 
definable in terms of the component parts of the modern 
corporation; the shareholders, the managers, the 
employees, the creditors,36 and the general public 
interest. No one interest should dominate.
33 Miles (1994: pp.202-205) considers that the "problems can 
be better resolved through the adoption of a different company 
structure."
34 A lesson learned from Professor Gower's legislative work 
in Ghana.
35 See Kahn-Freund in Renner et al (1976) above p.204.
36 Grantham (1991a: pp.1-18) considering the directors duty 
to act in the interests of creditors, stated:-
[t] he courts' move to establish creditor protection in 
this way, it is suggested, involves not merely the 
reversal of a single rule, but a quite radical change 
in what is meant by "the company." For example once 
shareholders are displaced as owners, and the 
normative force of that position is lost, there are 
grounds, as have been noted above, to rethink the 
rules concerning shareholder ratification of 
managerial action, and indeed shareholder voting in 
general. It may even require a relaxation of the 
directors' obligation to pursue maximum profit.
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The Directors have a duty to act in the interests of 
the company.37 That duty can only be fulfilled if equal 
consideration is given to each element of the entity's 
definable interests.36 How could this work? The board 
structure would reflect the company's interests. Thus 
there would be an employee, 39 40 41 creditor, and public 
servant42 on the board as well as the shareholders and 
management. The shareholders would elect the management 
and their representative directors on a proportional 
representation basis. Thus while there are representative 
directors on the board their influence would be tempered
37 For a consideration of how this duty to the company would 
apply see GAIMAN V NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR MENTAL HEALTH [1971] 
Ch. 317.
38 Flynn (1991: p.117) states:-
[t] he process of reconceptualising the rights and 
duties of management and those groups traditionally 
situated outside the model of the company employed in 
our law opens possibilities for redrawing domestic 
relations in the company.
39 Consideration is already taking place on employee 
representation at a European level. For the original proposal see 
Employee Participation and Company Structure (1975, E.C. Bulletin 
Supp. 8/75) for the position at present see European Company 
(Societas Europaea) [1991] O.J. C176/1. See also Quinn (1989a: 
pp.268-270) and Quinn (1989b: pp.307-308) for an analysis of the 
European Community programme on harmonisation of company law. The 
outlook for implementation of the Company Law Directives at 
present is bleak, see Andenas (1994: pp.121-122) and Bovis (1994: 
pp.213-214) .
40 For an examination of how a Societas Europaea would work 
see, Khan and Lowe (1990: pp.33-34) and for a consideration of 
the likely impact of the Draft Fifth Company Law Directive, see 
Boyle (1992: pp.6-10).
41 For the U.S. position on employee participation in 
management decisions see, Note (1994a: pp.678-695).
42 Rotating each year.
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by the representative directors of the minority in 
general meeting and the other directors.43
The difficulties in applying the duty to act in the 
interests of the company would be made less convoluted if 
the decisions are made with the participation of the 
interests of the company. 44 45
Provision would also be made for the special 
information needs of the institutional investor. A sub­
committee of the board could be appointed to deal with 
shareholders' information.46 Access to this sub-committee
43 Du Plessis (1993: pp.224-229) in recommending reform of 
company law in South Africa considered the contrasting interests 
groups within the corporation. He stated " [t]he most successful 
company law will be that one in which equilibrium can be achieved 
between these divergent interests."
44 Decisions of the board would need a quorum necessary to 
represent the interests of the company.
45 See Hatherley (1992: p.85) where he considers that the 
network of accountability relationships that exist between 
stakeholders in a company needs to be reassessed in the context 
of the non-committed ownership phenomenon that has caused many 
company auditors in the U.K. to work in a vacuum.
Institutional shareholders, who account for the great 
majority of shareholdings on The Stock Exchange, see themselves 
as managing a portfolio and feel no need for a long term 
commitment to any given company, its management, strategy, or 
operations. He considers further that the traditional notion of 
ownership by, and accountability to, shareholders alone should 
be replaced with a principle of accountability to committed 
stakeholders. These could include long term shareholders, long 
term bankers and possibly suppliers, employees, and customers who 
are committed to the company. Shareholders who do not have a long 
term commitment are replaced by stakeholders who do. Rethinking 
the conception of the company may be the key element in moving 
away from short termism and toward the regeneration of U.K. 
business.
46 If this proved too cumbersome a shareholder liaison 
officer could be appointed to deal with shareholder information. 
He could have access to the board through a non-voting position 
at board meetings.
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would also be available to private shareholders.47 
Implementation of this reconstructed model would require 
limited statutory intervention.
The Take-over.
The take-over provides unique difficulties regarding 
the model company. The take-over is in essence about the 
shareholders right to sell his shares to whomever he 
wishes. The law at present places control over that 
decision in the hands of the shareholder. The difficulty 
arises in that the shareholders owe no duty to act in the 
interests of the company. Thus the interests of the 
employees, creditors and general public do not impact.48 
This is not correct.49 The solution to this problem is to 
take the decision out of the hands of the shareholders 
and into the board which represents the interests of the
47 For a consideration of a balanced investor relations 
programme see Lees (1994: p.5). There he describes the corporate 
constituencies as institutional shareholders, broker's analysts 
and small shareholders.
48 At a European level submissions have been made regarding 
the 13th Directive on Takeovers, that the interests of employees 
and the general public be considered in any proposed takeover; 
Dine (1991: pp.83-89). For a consideration of the difficulties 
which face this directive before it will be implemented, see 
Andenas (1993: pp.113-114).
49 Much of the traditional literature regarding the 
conflicting interests in a take-over, focuses on the conflict 
between management and the shareholder and thus the regulatory 
regime is aimed at these two groups. For example see Berle and 
Means (1933) and Helm (1989) . For an argument that there is a 
public interest involved in a take-over, see Bradley (1990: 
pp.170-186) . There she concludes that the public interest is not 
well served by the present regime.
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company.50 The constitutional difficulties raised by this 
action will, it is argued, be tempered by the public 
interest in doing so.51 52 53 54 55
50 In Italy for example the shareholders right to vote is 
limited where there is a conflict of interest. "The sacrifice of 
the company's interest is not justified even where all the 
shareholders are unanimous in wanting to inflict damage on the 
company with a view to personal gain;" CORT CASS. OCTOBER 25, 
1958, NO. 3471.
51 Of particular interest here is the decision of the Privy 
Council on appeal from the Supreme Court of Mauritius: GOVERNMENT 
OF MAURITIUS V UNION FLACQ SUGAR ESTATES CO. LTD AND GOVERNMENT 
OF MAURITIUS V THE MEDINE SHARES HOLDING CO. & ORS-APPEALS N O .S 
35 & 36 OF 1990. There the issue was a statutory provision which 
would deprive shareholders of their voting rights without 
compensation. The provision was challenged on the grounds that 
it was unconstitutional. The Constitution of Mauritius guaranteed 
the right of the individual to protection of property, and from 
deprivation of property without compensation. The Privy Council 
upheld the statutory provision on a number of grounds including; 
the company is a creature of statute and the rules applicable to 
a company can be altered by statute. See also Koenig (1994: 
p p .30-32).
52 And also in that, the shareholders have representation on 
the board that makes the decision.
53 See also the judgment of Oliver J. in RE HALT GARAGE 
(1964) LTD. [1982] 3 ALL E.R. 1016 where he moves towards 
accepting that shareholders are not free to vote as they wish. 
He stated:-
if this is right it leads to the bizarre result that 
a meeting of stupid or deranged but perfectly honest 
shareholders can like Bowen L.J.'s lunatic director, 
vote themselves, qua directors, some perfectly 
outlandish sum by way of remuneration and that in a 
subsequent winding up the liquidator can do nothing to 
recover it.
54 See also Ussher (1986: pp. 55-56) where he posits that the 
shareholders have by their agreement to take a shareholding in 
the company delegated their constitutional rights of property to 
the company as an entity.
55 Such an action would be less draconian than the results
of the Companies Act 1963, section 204, regarding the compulsory 
acquisition of the shares of a minority. For the English position
regarding this issue see, Mercer (1992: pp.139-141).
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5.2 In Summation.
This thesis set out to demonstrate the erosion of 
the model company. It has done that. The importance of 
the thesis is in its recognition of the eroded model. In 
essence the recommendations for reform contained above 
provide but an addendum to the essence of this thesis.
In summation, the words of Megarry J. in GAIMAN V 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR MENTAL HEALTH [1971] Ch. 317 at 
335 suffice:-
[w]here there is corporate personality, the 
directors or others exercising the powers in 
question are bound not merely by their duties 
towards the other members, but by their duties 
towards the corporation. . . .
In the case of a company, whether limited 
by shares or guarantee, a new legal entity 
comes into existence, namely, the company; and 
many of the powers have to be exercised for the 
benefit of that entity. This distinguishes a 
company from an ordinary club, which is not a 
legal entity distinct from its members; and 
although a trade union, of course, possesses 
some of the characteristics of corporate 
personality, it is not a corporation either. 
The conversion of a club into a limited 
company, too is no mere formality, but a change 
of substance.
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